Well　then；　Protagoras；　we　will　assume　this；　and　now　supposing　that
  he　proceeded　to　say　further；　〃Then　holiness　is　not　of　the　nature　of
  justice；　nor　justice　of　the　nature　of　holiness；　but　of　the　nature　of
  unholiness；　and　holiness　is　of　the　nature　of　the　not　just；　and
  therefore　of　the　unjust；　and　the　unjust　is　the　unholy〃：　how　shall　we
  answer　him？　I　should　certainly　answer　him　on　my　own　behalf　that
  justice　is　holy；　and　that　holiness　is　just；　and　I　would　say　in　like
  manner　on　your　behalf　also；　if　you　would　allow　me；　that　justice　is
  either　the　same　with　holiness；　or　very　nearly　the　same；　and　above
  all　I　would　assert　that　justice　is　like　holiness　and　holiness　is
  like　justice；　and　I　wish　that　you　would　tell　me　whether　I　may　be
  permitted　to　give　this　answer　on　your　behalf；　and　whether　you　would
  agree　with　me。
  He　replied；　I　cannot　simply　agree；　Socrates；　to　the　proposition　that
  justice　is　holy　and　that　holiness　is　just；　for　there　appears　to　me
  to　be　a　difference　between　them。　But　what　matter？　if　you　please　I
  please；　and　let　us　assume；　if　you　will　I；　that　justice　is　holy；　and
  that　holiness　is　just。
  Pardon　me；　I　replied；　I　do　not　want　this　〃if　you　wish〃　or　〃if　you
  will〃　sort　of　conclusion　to　be　proven；　but　I　want　you　and　me　to　be
  proven：　I　mean　to　say　that　the　conclusion　will　be　best　proven　if　there
  be　no　〃if。〃
  Well；　he　said；　I　admit　that　justice　bears　a　resemblance　to　holiness；
  for　there　is　always　some　point　of　view　in　which　everything　is　like
  every　other　thing；　white　is　in　a　certain　way　like　black；　and　hard　is
  like　soft；　and　the　most　extreme　opposites　have　some　qualities　in
  common；　even　the　parts　of　the　face　which；　as　we　were　saying　before；
  are　distinct　and　have　different　functions；　are　still　in　a　certain
  point　of　view　similar；　and　one　of　them　is　like　another　of　them。　And
  you　may　prove　that　they　are　like　one　another　on　the　same　principle
  that　all　things　are　like　one　another；　and　yet　things　which　are　like　in
  some　particular　ought　not　to　be　called　alike；　nor　things　which　are
  unlike　in　some　particular；　however　slight；　unlike。
  And　do　you　think；　I　said　in　a　tone　of　surprise；　that　justice　and
  holiness　have　but　a　small　degree　of　likeness？
  Certainly　not；　any　more　than　I　agree　with　what　I　understand　to　be
  your　view。
  Well；　I　said；　as　you　appear　to　have　a　difficulty　about　this；　let
  us　take　another　of　the　examples　which　you　mentioned　instead。　Do　you
  admit　the　existence　of　folly？
  I　do。
  And　is　not　wisdom　the。　very　opposite　of　folly？
  That　is　true；　he　said。
  And　when　men　act　rightly　and　advantageously　they　seem　to　you　to　be
  temperate？
  Yes；　he　said。
  And　temperance　makes　them　temperate？
  Certainly。
  And　they　who　do　not　act　rightly　act　foolishly；　and　in　acting　thus
  are　not　temperate？
  I　agree；　he　said。
  Then　to　act　foolishly　is　the　opposite　of　acting　temperately？
  He　assented。
  And　foolish　actions　are　done　by　folly；　and　temperate　actions　by
  temperance？
  He　agreed。
  And　that　is　done　strongly　which　is　done　by　strength；　and　that
  which　is　weakly　done；　by　weakness？
  He　assented。
  And　that　which　is　done　with　swiftness　is　done　swiftly；　and　that
  which　is　done　with　slowness；　slowly？
  He　assented　again。
  And　that　which　is　done　in　the　same　manner；　is　done　by　the　same；
  and　that　which　is　done　in　an　opposite　manner　by　the　opposite？
  He　agreed。
  Once　more；　I　said；　is　there　anything　beautiful？
  Yes。
  To　which　the　only　opposite　is　the　ugly？
  There　is　no　other。
  And　is　there　anything　good？
  There　is。
  To　which　the　only　opposite　is　the　evil？
  There　is　no　other。
  And　there　is　the　acute　in　sound？
  True。
  To　which　the　only　opposite　is　the　grave？
  There　is　no　other；　he　said；　but　that。
  Then　every　opposite　has　one　opposite　only　and　no　more？
  He　assented。
  Then　now；　I　said；　let　us　recapitulate　our　admissions。　First　of　all
  we　admitted　that　everything　has　one　opposite　and　not　more　than　one？
  We　did　so。
  And　we　admitted　also　that　what　was　done　in　opposite　ways　was　done　by
  opposites？
  Yes。
  And　that　which　was　done　foolishly；　as　we　further　admitted；　was
  done　in　the　opposite　way　to　that　which　was　done　temperately？
  Yes。
  And　that　which　was　done　temperately　was　done　by　temperance；　and　that
  which　was　done　foolishly　by　folly？
  He　agreed。
  And　that　which　is　done　in　opposite　ways　is　done　by　opposites？
  Yes。
  And　one　thing　is　done　by　temperance；　and　quite　another　thing　by
  folly？
  Yes。
  And　in　opposite　ways？
  Certainly。
  And　therefore　by　opposites：…then　folly　is　the　opposite　of
  temperance？
  Clearly。
  And　do　you　remember　that　folly　has　already　been　acknowledged　by　us
  to　be　the　opposite　of　wisdom？
  He　assented。
  And　we　said　that　everything　has　only　one　opposite？
  Yes。
  Then；　Protagoras；　which　of　the　two　assertions　shall　we　renounce？　One
  says　that　everything　has　but　one　opposite；　the　other　that　wisdom　is
  distinct　from　temperance；　and　that　both　of　them　are　parts　of　virtue；
  and　that　they　are　not　only　distinct；　but　dissimilar；　both　in
  themselves　and　in　their　functions；　like　the　parts　of　a　face。　Which
  of　these　two　assertions　shall　we　renounce？　For　both　of　them　together
  are　certainly　not　in　harmony；　they　do　not　accord　or　agree：　for　how　can
  they　be　said　to　agree　if　everything　is　assumed　to　have　only　one
  opposite　and　not　more　than　one；　and　yet　folly；　which　is　one；　has
  clearly　the　two　opposites　wisdom　and　temperance？　Is　not　that　true；
  Protagoras？　What　else　would　you　say？
  He　assented；　but　with　great　reluctance。
  Then　temperance　and　wisdom　are　the　same；　as　before　justice　and
  holiness　appeared　to　us　to　be　nearly　the　same。　And　now；　Protagoras；
  I　said；　we　must　finish　the　enquiry；　and　not　faint。　Do　you　think　that
  an　unjust　man　can　be　temperate　in　his　injustice？
  I　should　be　ashamed；　Socrates；　he　said；　to　acknowledge　this　which
  nevertheless　many　may　be　found　to　assert。
  And　shall　I　argue　with　them　or　with　you？　I　replied。
  I　would　rather；　he　said；　that　you　should　argue　with　the　many
  first；　if　you　will。
  Whichever　you　please；　if　you　will　only　answer　me　and　say　whether　you
  are　of　their　opinion　or　not。　My　object　is　to　test　the　validity　of
  the　argument；　and　yet　the　result　may　be　that　I　who　ask　and　you　who
  answer　may　both　be　put　on　our　trial。
  Protagoras　at　first　made　a　show　of　refusing；　as　he　said　that　the
  argument　was　not　encouraging；　at　length；　he　consented　to　answer。
  Now　then；　I　said；　begin　at　the　beginning　and　answer　me。　You　think
  that　some　men　are　temperate；　and　yet　unjust？
  Yes；　he　said；　let　that　be　admitted。
  And　temperance　is　good　sense？
  Yes。
  And　good　sense　is　good　counsel　in　doing　injustice？
  Granted。
  If　they　succeed；　I　said；　or　if　they　do　not　succeed？
  If　they　succeed。
  And　you　would　admit　the　existence　of　goods？
  Yes。
  And　is　the　good　that　which　is　expedient　for　man？
  Yes；　indeed；　he　said：　and　there　are　some　things　which　may　be
  inexpedient；　and　yet　I　call　them　good。
  I　thought　that　Protagoras　was　getting　ruffled　and　excited；　he　seemed
  to　be　setting　himself　in　an　attitude　of　war。　Seeing　this；　I　minded
  my　business；　and　gently　said：…
  When　you　say；　Protagoras；　that　things　inexpedient　are　good；　do　you
  mean　inexpedient　for　man　only；　or　inexpedient　altogether？　and　do　you
  call　the　latter　good？
  Certainly　not　the　last；　he　replied；　for　I　know　of　many　things…meats；
  drinks；　medicines；　and　ten　thousand　other　things；　which　are
  inexpedient　for　man；　and　some　which　are　expedient；　and　some　which
  are　neither　expedient　nor　inexpedient　for　man；　but　only　for　horses；
  and　some　for　oxen　only；　and　some　for　dogs；　and　some　for　no　animals；
  but　only　for　trees；　and　some　for　the　roots　of　trees　and　not　for
  their　branches；　as　for　example；　manure；　which　is　a　good　thing　when
  laid　about　the　roots　of　a　tree；　but　utterly　destructive　if　thrown　upon
  the　shoots　and　young　branches；　or　I　may　instance　olive　oil；　which　is
  mischievous　to　all　plants；　and　generally　most　injurious　to　the　hair　of
  every　animal　with　the　exception　of　man；　but　beneficial　to　human　hair
  and　to　the　human　body　generally；　and　even　in　this　application　（so
  various　and　changeable　is　the　nature　of　the　benefit）；　that　which　is
  the　greatest　good　to　the　outward　parts　of　a　man；　is　a　very　great
  evil　to　his　inward　parts：　and　for　this　reason　physicians　always　forbid
  their　patients　the　use　of　oil　in　their　food；　except　in　very　small
  quantities；　just　enough　to　extinguish　the　disagreeable　sensation　of
  smell　in　meats　and　sauces。
  When　he　had　given　this　answer；　the　company　cheered　him。　And　I
  said：　Protagoras；　I　have　a　wretched　memory；　and　when　any　one　makes　a