distinguished　or　undistinguished　according　to　their　own　natural
  capacities　as　flute…players；　and　the　son　of　a　good　player　would
  often　turn　out　to　be　a　bad　one；　and　the　son　of　a　bad　player　to　be　a
  good　one；　all　flute…players　would　be　good　enough　in　comparison　of
  those　who　were　ignorant　and　unacquainted　with　the　art　of
  flute…playing？　In　like　manner　I　would　have　you　consider　that　he　who
  appears　to　you　to　be　the　worst　of　those　who　have　been　brought　up　in
  laws　and　humanities；　would　appear　to　be　a　just　man　and　a　master　of
  justice　if　he　were　to　be　compared　with　men　who　had　no　education；　or
  courts　of　justice；　or　laws；　or　any　restraints　upon　them　which
  compelled　them　to　practise　virtue…with　the　savages；　for　example；
  whom　the　poet　Pherecrates　exhibited　on　the　stage　at　the　last　year's
  Lenaean　festival。　If　you　were　living　among　men　such　as　the
  man…haters　in　his　Chorus；　you　would　be　only　too　glad　to　meet　with
  Eurybates　and　Phrynondas；　and　you　would　sorrowfully　long　to　revisit
  the　rascality　of　this　part　of　the　world。　you；　Socrates；　are
  discontented；　and　why？　Because　all　men　are　teachers　of　virtue；　each
  one　according　to　his　ability；　and　you　say；　Where　are　the　teachers？　You
  might　as　well　ask；　Who　teaches　Greek？　For　of　that　too　there　will　not
  be　any　teachers　found。　Or　you　might　ask；　Who　is　to　teach　the　sons　of
  our　artisans　this　same　art　which　they　have　learned　of　their　fathers？
  He　and　his　fellow…workmen　have　taught　them　to　the　best　of　their
  ability；…but　who　will　carry　them　further　in　their　arts？　And　you
  would　certainly　have　a　difficulty；　Socrates；　in　finding　a　teacher　of
  them；　but　there　would　be　no　difficulty　in　finding　a　teacher　of　those
  who　are　wholly　ignorant。　And　this　is　true　of　virtue　or　of　anything
  else；　if　a　man　is　better　able　than　we　are　to　promote　virtue　ever　so
  little；　we　must　be　content　with　the　result。　A　teacher　of　this　sort　I
  believe　myself　to　be；　and　above　all　other　men　to　have　the　knowledge
  which　makes　a　man　noble　and　good；　and　I　give　my　pupils　their
  money's…worth；　and　even　more；　as　they　themselves　confess。　And
  therefore　I　have　introduced　the　following　mode　of　payment：…When　a
  man　has　been　my　pupil；　if　he　likes　he　pays　my　price；　but　there　is　no
  compulsion；　and　if　he　does　not　like；　he　has　only　to　go　into　a　temple
  and　take　an　oath　of　the　value　of　the　instructions；　and　he　pays　no　more
  than　he　declares　to　be　their　value。
  Such　is　my　Apologue；　Socrates；　and　such　is　the　argument　by　which　I
  endeavour　to　show　that　virtue　may　be　taught；　and　that　this　is　the
  opinion　of　the　Athenians。　And　I　have　also　attempted　to　show　that　you
  are　not　to　wonder　at　good　fathers　having　bad　sons；　or　at　good　sons
  having　bad　fathers；　of　which　the　sons　of　Polycleitus　afford　an
  example；　who　are　the　companions　of　our　friends　here；　Paralus　and
  Xanthippus；　but　are　nothing　in　comparison　with　their　father；　and
  this　is　true　of　the　sons　of　many　other　artists。　As　yet　I　ought　not
  to　say　the　same　of　Paralus　and　Xanthippus　themselves；　for　they　are
  young　and　there　is　still　hope　of　them。
  Protagoras　ended；　and　in　my　ear
  So　charming　left　his　voice；　that　I　the　while
  Thought　him　still　speaking；　still　stood　fixed　to　hear。
  At　length；　when　the　truth　dawned　upon　me；　that　he　had　really　finished；
  not　without　difficulty　I　began　to　collect　myself；　and　looking　at
  Hippocrates；　I　said　to　him：　O　son　of　Apollodorus；　how　deeply
  grateful　I　am　to　you　for　having　brought　me　hither；　I　would　not　have
  missed　the　speech　of　Protagoras　for　a　great　deal。　For　I　used　to
  imagine　that　no　human　care　could　make　men　good；　but　I　know　better　now。
  Yet　I　have　still　one　very　small　difficulty　which　I　am　sure　that
  Protagoras　will　easily　explain；　as　he　has　already　explained　so　much。
  If　a　man　were　to　go　and　consult　Pericles　or　any　of　our　great
  speakers　about　these　matters；　he　might　perhaps　hear　as　fine　a
  discourse；　but　then　when　one　has　a　question　to　ask　of　any　of　them；
  like　books；　they　can　neither　answer　nor　ask；　and　if　any　one　challenges
  the　least　particular　of　their　speech；　they　go　ringing　on　in　a　long
  harangue；　like　brazen　pots；　which　when　they　are　struck　continue　to
  sound　unless　some　one　puts　his　hand　upon　them；　whereas　our　friend
  Protagoras　can　not　only　make　a　good　speech；　as　he　has　already　shown；
  but　when　he　is　asked　a　question　he　can　answer　briefly；　and　when　he
  asks　he　will　wait　and　hear　the　answer；　and　this　is　a　very　rare　gift。
  Now　I；　Protagoras；　want　to　ask　of　you　a　little　question；　which　if
  you　will　only　answer；　I　shall　be　quite　satisfied。　You　were　saying　that
  virtue　can　be　taught；…that　I　will　take　upon　your　authority；　and
  there　is　no　one　to　whom　I　am　more　ready　to　trust。　But　I　marvel　at
  one　thing　about　which　I　should　like　to　have　my　mind　set　at　rest。　You
  were　speaking　of　Zeus　sending　justice　and　reverence　to　men；　and
  several　times　while　you　were　speaking；　justice；　and　temperance；　and
  holiness；　and　all　these　qualities；　were　described　by　you　as　if
  together　they　made　up　virtue。　Now　I　want　you　to　tell　me　truly
  whether　virtue　is　one　whole；　of　which　justice　and　temperance　and
  holiness　are　parts；　or　whether　all　these　are　only　the　names　of　one　and
  the　same　thing：　that　is　the　doubt　which　still　lingers　in　my　mind。
  There　is　no　difficulty；　Socrates；　in　answering　that　the　qualities　of
  which　you　are　speaking　are　the　parts　of　virtue　which　is　one。
  And　are　they　parts；　I　said；　in　the　same　sense　in　which　mouth；
  nose；　and　eyes；　and　ears；　are　the　parts　of　a　face；　or　are　they　like
  the　parts　of　gold；　which　differ　from　the　whole　and　from　one　another
  only　in　being　larger　or　smaller？
  I　should　say　that　they　differed；　Socrates；　in　the　first　way；　they
  are　related　to　one　another　as　the　parts　of　a　face　are　related　to　the
  whole　face。
  And　do　men　have　some　one　part　and　some　another　part　of　virtue？　Of　if
  a　man　has　one　part；　must　he　also　have　all　the　others？
  By　no　means；　he　said；　for　many　a　man　is　brave　and　not　just；　or
  just　and　not　wise。
  You　would　not　deny；　then；　that　courage　and　wisdom　are　also　parts
  of　virtue？
  Most　undoubtedly　they　are；　he　answered；　and　wisdom　is　the　noblest　of
  the　parts。
  And　they　are　all　different　from　one　another？　I　said。
  Yes。
  And　has　each　of　them　a　distinct　function　like　the　parts　of　the
  face；…the　eye；　for　example；　is　not　like　the　ear；　and　has　not　the
  same　functions；　and　the　other　parts　are　none　of　them　like　one　another；
  either　in　their　functions；　or　in　any　other　way？　I　want　to　know　whether
  the　comparison　holds　concerning　the　parts　of　virtue。　Do　they　also
  differ　from　one　another　in　themselves　and　in　their　functions？　For　that
  is　clearly　what　the　simile　would　imply。
  Yes；　Socrates；　you　are　right　in　supposing　that　they　differ。
  Then；　I　said；　no　other　part　of　virtue　is　like　knowledge；　or　like
  justice；　or　like　courage；　or　like　temperance；　or　like　holiness？
  No；　he　answered。
  Well　then；　I　said；　suppose　that　you　and　I　enquire　into　their
  natures。　And　first；　you　would　agree　with　me　that　justice　is　of　the
  nature　of　a　thing；　would　you　not？　That　is　my　opinion：　would　it　not
  be　yours　also？
  Mine　also；　he　said。
  And　suppose　that　some　one　were　to　ask　us；　saying；　〃O　Protagoras；　and
  you；　Socrates；　what　about　this　thing　which　you　were　calling　justice；
  is　it　just　or　unjust？〃…and　I　were　to　answer；　just：　would　you　vote　with
  me　or　against　me？
  With　you；　he　said。
  Thereupon　I　should　answer　to　him　who　asked　me；　that　justice　is　of
  the　nature　of　the　just：　would　not　you？
  Yes；　he　said。
  And　suppose　that　he　went　on　to　say：　〃Well　now；　is　there　also　such
  a　thing　as　holiness？　〃we　should　answer；　〃Yes；〃　if　I　am　not　mistaken？
  Yes；　he　said。
  Which　you　would　also　acknowledge　to　be　a　thing…should　we　not　say　so？
  He　assented。
  〃And　is　this　a　sort　of　thing　which　is　of　the　nature　of　the　holy；
  or　of　the　nature　of　the　unholy？〃　I　should　be　angry　at　his　putting　such
  a　question；　and　should　say；　〃Peace；　man；　nothing　can　be　holy　if
  holiness　is　not　holy。〃　What　would　you　say？　Would　you　not　answer　in　the
  same　way？
  Certainly；　he　said。
  And　then　after　this　suppose　that　he　came　and　asked　us；　〃What　were
  you　saying　just　now？　Perhaps　I　may　not　have　heard　you　rightly；　but　you
  seemed　to　me　to　be　saying　that　the　parts　of　virtue　were　not　the　same
  as　one　another。〃　I　should　reply；　〃You　certainly　heard　that　said；　but
  not；　as　you　imagine；　by　me；　for　I　only　asked　the　question；
  Protagoras　gave　the　answer。〃　And　suppose　that　he　turned　to　you　and
  said；　〃Is　this　true；　Protagoras？　and　do　you　maintain　that　one　part
  of　virtue　is　unlike　another；　and　is　this　your　position？〃…how　would　you
  answer　him？
  I　could　not　help　acknowledging　the　truth　of　what　he　said；　Socrates。
  Well　then；　Protagoras；　we　will　assume　this；　and　now　supposing　that
  he