proofs　from　signs　are　based　on　consequences。　For　when　rhetoricians
  wish　to　show　that　a　man　is　an　adulterer；　they　take　hold　of　some
  consequence　of　an　adulterous　life；　viz。　that　the　man　is　smartly
  dressed；　or　that　he　is　observed　to　wander　about　at　night。　There　are；
  however；　many　people　of　whom　these　things　are　true；　while　the　charge
  in　question　is　untrue。　It　happens　like　this　also　in　real　reasoning；
  e。g。　Melissus'　argument；　that　the　universe　is　eternal；　assumes　that
  the　universe　has　not　come　to　be　（for　from　what　is　not　nothing　could
  possibly　come　to　be）　and　that　what　has　come　to　be　has　done　so　from　a
  first　beginning。　If；　therefore；　the　universe　has　not　come　to　be；　it
  has　no　first　beginning；　and　is　therefore　eternal。　But　this　does　not
  necessarily　follow：　for　even　if　what　has　come　to　be　always　has　a　first
  beginning；　it　does　not　also　follow　that　what　has　a　first　beginning　has
  come　to　be；　any　more　than　it　follows　that　if　a　man　in　a　fever　be
  hot；　a　man　who　is　hot　must　be　in　a　fever。
  The　refutation　which　depends　upon　treating　as　cause　what　is　not　a
  cause；　occurs　whenever　what　is　not　a　cause　is　inserted　in　the
  argument；　as　though　the　refutation　depended　upon　it。　This　kind　of
  thing　happens　in　arguments　that　reason　ad　impossible：　for　in　these
  we　are　bound　to　demolish　one　of　the　premisses。　If；　then；　the　false
  cause　be　reckoned　in　among　the　questions　that　are　necessary　to
  establish　the　resulting　impossibility；　it　will　often　be　thought　that
  the　refutation　depends　upon　it；　e。g。　in　the　proof　that　the　'soul'
  and　'life'　are　not　the　same：　for　if　coming…to…be　be　contrary　to
  perishing；　then　a　particular　form　of　perishing　will　have　a
  particular　form　of　coming…to…be　as　its　contrary：　now　death　is　a
  particular　form　of　perishing　and　is　contrary　to　life：　life；　therefore；
  is　a　coming　to…be；　and　to　live　is　to　come…to…be。　But　this　is
  impossible：　accordingly；　the　'soul'　and　'life'　are　not　the　same。　Now
  this　is　not　proved：　for　the　impossibility　results　all　the　same；　even
  if　one　does　not　say　that　life　is　the　same　as　the　soul；　but　merely　says
  that　life　is　contrary　to　death；　which　is　a　form　of　perishing；　and　that
  perishing　has　'coming…to…be'　as　its　contrary。　Arguments　of　that
  kind；　then；　though　not　inconclusive　absolutely；　are　inconclusive　in
  relation　to　the　proposed　conclusion。　Also　even　the　questioners
  themselves　often　fail　quite　as　much　to　see　a　point　of　that　kind。
  Such；　then；　are　the　arguments　that　depend　upon　the　consequent　and
  upon　false　cause。　Those　that　depend　upon　the　making　of　two　questions
  into　one　occur　whenever　the　plurality　is　undetected　and　a　single
  answer　is　returned　as　if　to　a　single　question。　Now；　in　some　cases；
  it　is　easy　to　see　that　there　is　more　than　one；　and　that　an　answer　is
  not　to　be　given；　e。g。　'Does　the　earth　consist　of　sea；　or　the　sky？'　But
  in　some　cases　it　is　less　easy；　and　then　people　treat　the　question　as
  one；　and　either　confess　their　defeat　by　failing　to　answer　the
  question；　or　are　exposed　to　an　apparent　refutation。　Thus　'Is　A　and
  is　B　a　man？'　'Yes。'　'Then　if　any　one　hits　A　and　B；　he　will　strike　a
  man'　（singular）；'not　men'　（plural）。　Or　again；　where　part　is　good　and
  part　bad；　'is　the　whole　good　or　bad？'　For　whichever　he　says；　it　is
  possible　that　he　might　be　thought　to　expose　himself　to　an　apparent
  refutation　or　to　make　an　apparently　false　statement：　for　to　say　that
  something　is　good　which　is　not　good；　or　not　good　which　is　good；　is
  to　make　a　false　statement。　Sometimes；　however；　additional　premisses
  may　actually　give　rise　to　a　genuine　refutation；　e。g。　suppose　a　man
  were　to　grant　that　the　descriptions　'white'　and　'naked'　and　'blind'
  apply　to　one　thing　and　to　a　number　of　things　in　a　like　sense。　For　if
  'blind'　describes　a　thing　that　cannot　see　though　nature　designed　it　to
  see；　it　will　also　describe　things　that　cannot　see　though　nature
  designed　them　to　do　so。　Whenever；　then；　one　thing　can　see　while
  another　cannot；　they　will　either　both　be　able　to　see　or　else　both　be
  blind；　which　is　impossible。
  6
  The　right　way；　then；　is　either　to　divide　apparent　proofs　and
  refutations　as　above；　or　else　to　refer　them　all　to　ignorance　of　what
  'refutation'　is；　and　make　that　our　starting…point：　for　it　is
  possible　to　analyse　all　the　aforesaid　modes　of　fallacy　into　breaches
  of　the　definition　of　a　refutation。　In　the　first　place；　we　may　see　if
  they　are　inconclusive：　for　the　conclusion　ought　to　result　from　the
  premisses　laid　down；　so　as　to　compel　us　necessarily　to　state　it　and
  not　merely　to　seem　to　compel　us。　Next　we　should　also　take　the
  definition　bit　by　bit；　and　try　the　fallacy　thereby。　For　of　the
  fallacies　that　consist　in　language；　some　depend　upon　a　double　meaning；
  e。g。　ambiguity　of　words　and　of　phrases；　and　the　fallacy　of　like　verbal
  forms　（for　we　habitually　speak　of　everything　as　though　it　were　a
  particular　substance）…while　fallacies　of　combination　and　division
  and　accent　arise　because　the　phrase　in　question　or　the　term　as　altered
  is　not　the　same　as　was　intended。　Even　this；　however；　should　be　the
  same；　just　as　the　thing　signified　should　be　as　well；　if　a　refutation
  or　proof　is　to　be　effected；　e。g。　if　the　point　concerns　a　doublet；　then
  you　should　draw　the　conclusion　of　a　'doublet'；　not　of　a　'cloak'。　For
  the　former　conclusion　also　would　be　true；　but　it　has　not　been
  proved；　we　need　a　further　question　to　show　that　'doublet'　means　the
  same　thing；　in　order　to　satisfy　any　one　who　asks　why　you　think　your
  point　proved。
  Fallacies　that　depend　on　Accident　are　clear　cases　of　ignoratio
  elenchi　when　once　'proof'　has　been　defined。　For　the　same　definition
  ought　to　hold　good　of　'refutation'　too；　except　that　a　mention　of
  'the　contradictory'　is　here　added：　for　a　refutation　is　a　proof　of
  the　contradictory。　If；　then；　there　is　no　proof　as　regards　an
  accident　of　anything；　there　is　no　refutation。　For　supposing；　when　A
  and　B　are；　C　must　necessarily　be；　and　C　is　white；　there　is　no
  necessity　for　it　to　be　white　on　account　of　the　syllogism。　So；　if　the
  triangle　has　its　angles　equal　to　two　right…angles；　and　it　happens　to
  be　a　figure；　or　the　simplest　element　or　starting　point；　it　is　not
  because　it　is　a　figure　or　a　starting　point　or　simplest　element　that　it
  has　this　character。　For　the　demonstration　proves　the　point　about　it
  not　qua　figure　or　qua　simplest　element；　but　qua　triangle。　Likewise
  also　in　other　cases。　If；　then；　refutation　is　a　proof；　an　argument
  which　argued　per　accidens　could　not　be　a　refutation。　It　is；　however；
  just　in　this　that　the　experts　and　men　of　science　generally　suffer
  refutation　at　the　hand　of　the　unscientific：　for　the　latter　meet　the
  scientists　with　reasonings　constituted　per　accidens；　and　the
  scientists　for　lack　of　the　power　to　draw　distinctions　either　say　'Yes'
  to　their　questions；　or　else　people　suppose　them　to　have　said　'Yes'；
  although　they　have　not。
  Those　that　depend　upon　whether　something　is　said　in　a　certain
  respect　only　or　said　absolutely；　are　clear　cases　of　ignoratio
  elenchi　because　the　affirmation　and　the　denial　are　not　concerned
  with　the　same　point。　For　of　'white　in　a　certain　respect'　the
  negation　is　'not　white　in　a　certain　respect'；　while　of　'white
  absolutely'　it　is　'not　white；　absolutely'。　If；　then；　a　man　treats
  the　admission　that　a　thing　is　'white　in　a　certain　respect'　as　though
  it　were　said　to　be　white　absolutely；　he　does　not　effect　a
  refutation；　but　merely　appears　to　do　so　owing　to　ignorance　of　what
  refutation　is。
  The　clearest　cases　of　all；　however；　are　those　that　were　previously
  described'　as　depending　upon　the　definition　of　a　'refutation'：　and
  this　is　also　why　they　were　called　by　that　name。　For　the　appearance
  of　a　refutation　is　produced　because　of　the　omission　in　the　definition；
  and　if　we　divide　fallacies　in　the　above　manner；　we　ought　to　set
  'Defective　definition'　as　a　common　mark　upon　them　all。
  Those　that　depend　upon　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　and　upon
  stating　as　the　cause　what　is　not　the　cause；　are　clearly　shown　to　be
  cases　of　ignoratio　elenchi　through　the　definition　thereof。　For　the
  conclusion　ought　to　come　about　'because　these　things　are　so'；　and　this
  does　not　happen　where　the　premisses　are　not　causes　of　it：　and　again　it
  should　come　about　without　taking　into　account　the　original　point；
  and　this　is　not　the　case　with　those　arguments　which　depend　upon
  begging　the　original　point。
  Those　that　depend　upon　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　and　upon
  stating　as　the　cause　what　is　not　the　cause；　are　clearly　shown　to　be
  cases　of　ignoratio　elenchi　through　the　definition　thereof。　For　the
  conclusion　ought　to　come　about　'because　these　things　are　so'；　and　this
  does　not　happen　where　the　premisses　are　not　causes　of　it：　and　again　it
  should　come　about　without　t