（1）　When　either　the　expression　or　the　name　has　strictly　more　than
  one　meaning；　e。g。　aetos　and　the　'dog'；　（2）　when　by　custom　we　use
  them　so；　（3）　when　words　that　have　a　simple　sense　taken　alone　have　more
  than　one　meaning　in　combination；　e。g。　'knowing　letters'。　For　each
  word；　both　'knowing'　and　'letters'；　possibly　has　a　single　meaning：　but
  both　together　have　more　than　one…either　that　the　letters　themselves
  have　knowledge　or　that　someone　else　has　it　of　them。
  Amphiboly　and　ambiguity；　then；　depend　on　these　modes　of　speech。　Upon
  the　combination　of　words　there　depend　instances　such　as　the　following：
  'A　man　can　walk　while　sitting；　and　can　write　while　not　writing'。　For
  the　meaning　is　not　the　same　if　one　divides　the　words　and　if　one
  combines　them　in　saying　that　'it　is　possible　to　walk…while…sitting'
  and　write　while　not　writing＇。　The　same　applies　to　the　latter　phrase；
  too；　if　one　combines　the　words　'to　write…while…not…writing'：　for
  then　it　means　that　he　has　the　power　to　write　and　not　to　write　at　once；
  whereas　if　one　does　not　combine　them；　it　means　that　when　he　is　not
  writing　he　has　the　power　to　write。　Also；　'He　now　if　he　has　learnt
  his　letters'。　Moreover；　there　is　the　saying　that　'One　single　thing
  if　you　can　carry　a　crowd　you　can　carry　too'。
  Upon　division　depend　the　propositions　that　5　is　2　and　3；　and　odd；
  and　that　the　greater　is　equal：　for　it　is　that　amount　and　more　besides。
  For　the　same　phrase　would　not　be　thought　always　to　have　the　same
  meaning　when　divided　and　when　combined；　e。g。　'I　made　thee　a　slave　once
  a　free　man'；　and　'God…like　Achilles　left　fifty　a　hundred　men'。
  An　argument　depending　upon　accent　it　is　not　easy　to　construct　in
  unwritten　discussion；　in　written　discussions　and　in　poetry　it　is
  easier。　Thus　（e。g。）　some　people　emend　Homer　against　those　who
  criticize　as　unnatural　his　expression　to　men　ou　kataputhetai
  ombro。　For　they　solve　the　difficulty　by　a　change　of　accent；
  pronouncing　the　ou　with　an　acuter　accent。　Also；　in　the　passage
  about　Agamemnon's　dream；　they　say　that　Zeus　did　not　himself　say　'We
  grant　him　the　fulfilment　of　his　prayer'；　but　that　he　bade　the　dream
  grant　it。　Instances　such　as　these；　then；　turn　upon　the　accentuation。
  Others　come　about　owing　to　the　form　of　expression　used；　when　what　is
  really　different　is　expressed　in　the　same　form；　e。g。　a　masculine　thing
  by　a　feminine　termination；　or　a　feminine　thing　by　a　masculine；　or　a
  neuter　by　either　a　masculine　or　a　feminine；　or；　again；　when　a
  quality　is　expressed　by　a　termination　proper　to　quantity　or　vice
  versa；　or　what　is　active　by　a　passive　word；　or　a　state　by　an　active
  word；　and　so　forth　with　the　other　divisions　previously'　laid　down。　For
  it　is　possible　to　use　an　expression　to　denote　what　does　not　belong
  to　the　class　of　actions　at　all　as　though　it　did　so　belong。　Thus　（e。g。）
  'flourishing'　is　a　word　which　in　the　form　of　its　expression　is　like
  'cutting'　or　'building'：　yet　the　one　denotes　a　certain　quality…i。e。
  a　certain　condition…while　the　other　denotes　a　certain　action。　In　the
  same　manner　also　in　the　other　instances。
  Refutations；　then；　that　depend　upon　language　are　drawn　from　these
  common…place　rules。　Of　fallacies；　on　the　other　hand；　that　are
  independent　of　language　there　are　seven　kinds：
  （1）　that　which　depends　upon　Accident：
  （2）　the　use　of　an　expression　absolutely　or　not　absolutely　but　with
  some　qualification　of　respect　or　place；　or　time；　or　relation：
  （3）　that　which　depends　upon　ignorance　of　what　'refutation'　is：
  （4）　that　which　depends　upon　the　consequent：
  （5）　that　which　depends　upon　assuming　the　original　conclusion：
  （6）　stating　as　cause　what　is　not　the　cause：
  （7）　the　making　of　more　than　one　question　into　one。
  5
  Fallacies；　then；　that　depend　on　Accident　occur　whenever　any
  attribute　is　claimed　to　belong　in　like　manner　to　a　thing　and　to　its
  accident。　For　since　the　same　thing　has　many　accidents　there　is　no
  necessity　that　all　the　same　attributes　should　belong　to　all　of　a
  thing's　predicates　and　to　their　subject　as　well。　Thus　（e。g。）；　'If
  Coriscus　be　different　from　〃man〃；　he　is　different　from　himself：　for　he
  is　a　man'：　or　'If　he　be　different　from　Socrates；　and　Socrates　be　a
  man；　then'；　they　say；　'he　has　admitted　that　Coriscus　is　different　from
  a　man；　because　it　so　happens　（accidit）　that　the　person　from　whom　he
  said　that　he　（Coriscus）　is　different　is　a　man'。
  Those　that　depend　on　whether　an　expression　is　used　absolutely　or
  in　a　certain　respect　and　not　strictly；　occur　whenever　an　expression
  used　in　a　particular　sense　is　taken　as　though　it　were　used　absolutely；
  e。g。　in　the　argument　'If　what　is　not　is　the　object　of　an　opinion；　then
  what　is　not　is'：　for　it　is　not　the　same　thing　'to　be　x'　and　'to　be'
  absolutely。　Or　again；　'What　is；　is　not；　if　it　is　not　a　particular　kind
  of　being；　e。g。　if　it　is　not　a　man。'　For　it　is　not　the　same　thing
  'not　to　be　x'　and　'not　to　be'　at　all：　it　looks　as　if　it　were；
  because　of　the　closeness　of　the　expression；　i。e。　because　'to　be　x'
  is　but　little　different　from　'to　be'；　and　'not　to　be　x'　from　'not　to
  be'。　Likewise　also　with　any　argument　that　turns　upon　the　point　whether
  an　expression　is　used　in　a　certain　respect　or　used　absolutely。　Thus
  e。g。　'Suppose　an　Indian　to　be　black　all　over；　but　white　in　respect
  of　his　teeth；　then　he　is　both　white　and　not　white。'　Or　if　both
  characters　belong　in　a　particular　respect；　then；　they　say；　'contrary
  attributes　belong　at　the　same　time'。　This　kind　of　thing　is　in　some
  cases　easily　seen　by　any　one；　e。g。　suppose　a　man　were　to　secure　the
  statement　that　the　Ethiopian　is　black；　and　were　then　to　ask　whether　he
  is　white　in　respect　of　his　teeth；　and　then；　if　he　be　white　in　that
  respect；　were　to　suppose　at　the　conclusion　of　his　questions　that
  therefore　he　had　proved　dialectically　that　he　was　both　white　and　not
  white。　But　in　some　cases　it　often　passes　undetected；　viz。　in　all　cases
  where；　whenever　a　statement　is　made　of　something　in　a　certain　respect；
  it　would　be　generally　thought　that　the　absolute　statement　follows　as
  well；　and　also　in　all　cases　where　it　is　not　easy　to　see　which　of　the
  attributes　ought　to　be　rendered　strictly。　A　situation　of　this　kind
  arises；　where　both　the　opposite　attributes　belong　alike：　for　then
  there　is　general　support　for　the　view　that　one　must　agree　absolutely
  to　the　assertion　of　both；　or　of　neither：　e。g。　if　a　thing　is　half　white
  and　half　black；　is　it　white　or　black？
  Other　fallacies　occur　because　the　terms　'proof'　or　'refutation'　have
  not　been　defined；　and　because　something　is　left　out　in　their
  definition。　For　to　refute　is　to　contradict　one　and　the　same
  attribute…not　merely　the　name；　but　the　reality…and　a　name　that　is
  not　merely　synonymous　but　the　same　name…and　to　confute　it　from　the
  propositions　granted；　necessarily；　without　including　in　the
  reckoning　the　original　point　to　be　proved；　in　the　same　respect　and
  relation　and　manner　and　time　in　which　it　was　asserted。　A　'false
  assertion'　about　anything　has　to　be　defined　in　the　same　way。　Some
  people；　however；　omit　some　one　of　the　said　conditions　and　give　a
  merely　apparent　refutation；　showing　（e。g。）　that　the　same　thing　is　both
  double　and　not　double：　for　two　is　double　of　one；　but　not　double　of
  three。　Or；　it　may　be；　they　show　that　it　is　both　double　and　not
  double　of　the　same　thing；　but　not　that　it　is　so　in　the　same　respect：
  for　it　is　double　in　length　but　not　double　in　breadth。　Or；　it　may　be；
  they　show　it　to　be　both　double　and　not　double　of　the　same　thing　and　in
  the　same　respect　and　manner；　but　not　that　it　is　so　at　the　same　time：
  and　therefore　their　refutation　is　merely　apparent。　One　might；　with
  some　violence；　bring　this　fallacy　into　the　group　of　fallacies
  dependent　on　language　as　well。
  Those　that　depend　on　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　to　be
  proved；　occur　in　the　same　way；　and　in　as　many　ways；　as　it　is
  possible　to　beg　the　original　point；　they　appear　to　refute　because
  men　lack　the　power　to　keep　their　eyes　at　once　upon　what　is　the　same
  and　what　is　different。
  The　refutation　which　depends　upon　the　consequent　arises　because
  people　suppose　that　the　relation　of　consequence　is　convertible。　For
  whenever；　suppose　A　is；　B　necessarily　is；　they　then　suppose　also
  that　if　B　is；　A　necessarily　is。　This　is　also　the　source　of　the
  deceptions　that　attend　opinions　based　on　sense…perception。　For
  people　often　suppose　bile　to　be　honey　because　honey　is　attended　by　a
  yellow　colour：　also；　since　after　rain　the　ground　is　wet　in
  consequence；　we　suppose　that　if　the　ground　is　wet；　it　has　been
  raining；　whereas　that　does　not　necessarily　follow。　In　rhetoric
  proofs　from　signs　are　based　on　consequences。　For　when　rhetoricians
  wish　to　show　that　a　man　is　an　adulterer；　they　take　hold　of　some