to　feel　in　his　mind　that　reason　obliges　him　to　do　this；　but　it　means
  that　he　can　apply　an　external　compulsion　to　force　any　such　one　so　to
  pay；　and　that　this　compulsion　is　quite　consistent　with　the　freedom
  of　all；　including　the　parties　in　question；　according　to　a　universal
  law。　Right　and　the　title　to　compel；　thus　indicate　the　same　thing。
  The　law　of　right；　as　thus　enunciated；　is　represented　as　a　reciprocal
  compulsion　necessarily　in　accordance　with　the　freedom　of　every　one；
  under　the　principle　of　a　universal　freedom。　It　is　thus；　as　it　were；
  a　representative　construction　of　the　conception　of　right；　by
  exhibiting　it　in　a　pure　intuitive　perception　a　priori；　after　the
  analogy　of　the　possibility　of　the　free　motions　of　bodies　under　the
  physical　law　of　the　equality　of　action　and　reaction。　Now；　as　in　pure
  mathematics；　we　cannot　deduce　the　properties　of　its　objects
  immediately　from　a　mere　abstract　conception；　but　can　only　discover
  them　by　figurative　construction　or　representation　of　its
  conceptions；　so　it　is　in　like　manner　with　the　principle　of　right。　It
  is　not　so　much　the　mere　formal　conception　of　right；　but　rather　that　of
  a　universal　and　equal　reciprocal　compulsion　as　harmonizing　with　it；
  and　reduced　under　general　laws；　that　makes　representation　of　that
  conception　possible。　But　just　as　those　conceptions　presented　in
  dynamics　are　founded　upon　a　merely　formal　representation　of　pure
  mathematics　as　presented　in　geometry；　reason　has　taken　care　also　to
  provide　the　understanding　as　far　as　possible　with　intuitive
  presentations　a　priori　in　behoof　of　a　construction　of　the　conception
  of　right。　The　right　in　geometrical　lines　（rectum）　is　opposed；　as　the
  straight；　to　that　which　is　curved　and　to　that　which　is　oblique。　In　the
  first　opposition；　there　is　involved　an　inner　quality　of　the　lines　of
  such　a　nature　that　there　is　only　one　straight　or　right　line　possible
  between　two　given　points。　In　the　second　case；　again；　the　positions
  of　two　intersecting　or　meeting　lines　are　of　such　a　nature　that　there
  can　likewise　be　only　one　line　called　the　perpendicular；　which　is　not
  more　inclined　to　the　one　side　than　the　other；　and　it　divides　space
  on　either　side　into　two　equal　parts。　After　the　manner　of　this　analogy；
  the　science　of　right　aims　at　determining　what　every　one　shall　have
  as　his　own　with　mathematical　exactness；　but　this　is　not　to　be　expected
  in　the　ethical　science　of　virtue；　as　it　cannot　but　allow　a　certain
  latitude　for　exceptions。　But；　without　passing　into　the　sphere　of
  ethics；　there　are　two　cases…　known　as　the　equivocal　right　of　equity
  and　necessity…　which　claim　a　juridical　decision；　yet　for　which　no
  one　can　be　found　to　give　such　a　decision；　and　which；　as　regards
  their　relation　to　rights；　belong；　as　it　were；　to　the　〃Intermundia〃
  of　Epicurus。　These　we　must　at　the　outset　take　apart　from　the　special
  exposition　of　the　science　of　right；　to　which　we　are　now　about　to
  advance；　and　we　may　consider　them　now　by　way　of　supplement　to　these
  introductory　explanations；　in　order　that　their　uncertain　conditions
  may　not　exert　a　disturbing　influence　on　the　fixed　principles　of　the
  proper　doctrine　of　right。
  F。　Supplementary　Remarks　on　Equivocal　Right。
  （Jus　Aequivocum）。
  With　every　right；　in　the　strict　acceptation　（jus　strictum）；　there　is
  conjoined　a　right　to　compel。　But　it　is　possible　to　think　of　other
  rights　of　a　wider　kind　（jus　latum）　in　which　the　title　to　compel　cannot
  be　determined　by　any　law。　Now　there　are　two　real　or　supposed　rights　of
  this　kind…　equity　and　the　right　of　necessity。　The　first　alleges　a
  right　that　is　without　compulsion；　the　second　adopts　a　compulsion
  that　is　without　right。　This　equivocalness；　however；　can　be　easily
  shown　to　rest　on　the　peculiar　fact　that　there　are　cases　of　doubtful
  right；　for　the　decision　of　which　no　judge　can　be　appointed。
  I。　Equity。
  Equity　（aequitas）；　regarded　objectively；　does　not　properly
  constitute　a　claim　upon　the　moral　duty　of　benevolence　or　beneficence
  on　the　part　of　others；　but　whoever　insists　upon　anything　on　the　ground
  of　equity；　founds　upon　his　right　to　the　same。　In　this　case；　however；
  the　conditions　are　awanting　that　are　requisite　for　the　function　of　a
  judge　in　order　that　be　might　determine　what　or　what　kind　of
  satisfaction　can　be　done　to　this　claim。　When　one　of　the　partners　of
  a　mercantile　company；　formed　under　the　condition　of　equal　profits；
  has；　however；　done　more　than　the　other　members；　and　in　consequence　has
  also　lost　more；　it　is　in　accordance　with　equity　that　he　should
  demand　from　the　company　more　than　merely　an　equal　share　of　advantage
  with　the　rest。　But；　in　relation　to　strict　right…　if　we　think　of　a
  judge　considering　his　case…　he　can　furnish　no　definite　data　to
  establish　how　much　more　belongs　to　him　by　the　contract；　and　in　case　of
  an　action　at　law；　such　a　demand　would　be　rejected。　A　domestic　servant；
  again；　who　might　be　paid　his　wages　due　to　the　end　of　his　year　of
  service　in　a　coinage　that　became　depreciated　within　that　period；　so
  that　it　would　not　be　of　the　same　value　to　him　as　it　was　when　he
  entered　on　his　engagement；　cannot　claim　by　right　to　be　kept　from
  loss　on　account　of　the　unequal　value　of　the　money　if　he　receives　the
  due　amount　of　it。　He　can　only　make　an　appeal　on　the　ground　of　equity；…
  a　dumb　goddess　who　cannot　claim　a　bearing　of　right；…　because　there　was
  nothing　bearing　on　this　point　in　the　contract　of　service；　and　a
  judge　cannot　give　a　decree　on　the　basis　of　vague　or　indefinite
  conditions。
  Hence　it　follows；　that　a　court　of　equity；　for　the　decision　of
  disputed　questions　of　right；　would　involve　a　contradiction。　It　is　only
  where　his　own　proper　rights　are　concerned；　and　in　matters　in　which
  he　can　decide；　that　a　judge　may　or　ought　to　give　a　hearing　to
  equity。　Thus；　if　the　Crown　is　supplicated　to　give　an　indemnity　to
  certain　persons　for　loss　or　injury　sustained　in　its　service；　it　may
  undertake　the　burden　of　doing　so；　although；　according　to　strict　right；
  the　claim　might　be　rejected　on　the　ground　of　the　pretext　that　the
  parties　in　question　undertook　the　performance　of　the　service
  occasioning　the　loss；　at　their　own　risk。
  The　dictum　of　equity　may　be　put　thus：　〃The　strictest　right　is　the
  greatest　wrong〃　（summum　jus　summa　injuria）。　But　this　evil　cannot　be
  obviated　by　the　forms　of　right；　although　it　relates　to　a　matter　of
  right；　for　the　grievance　that　it　gives　rise　to　can　only　be　put
  before　a　〃court　of　conscience〃　（forum　poli）；　whereas　every　question　of
  right　must　be　taken　before　a　civil　court　（forum　soli）。
  II。　The　Right　of　Necessity。
  The　so…called　right　of　necessity　（jus　necessitatis）　is　the
  supposed　right　or　title；　in　case　of　the　danger　of　losing　my　own
  life；　to　take　away　the　life　of　another　who　has；　in　fact；　done　me　no
  harm。　It　is　evident　that；　viewed　as　a　doctrine　of　right；　this　must
  involve　a　contradiction；　For　this　is　not　the　case　of　a　wrongful
  aggressor　making　an　unjust　assault　upon　my　life；　and　whom　I　anticipate
  by　depriving　him　of　his　own　（jus　inculpatae　tutelae）；　nor　consequently
  is　it　a　question　merely　of　the　recommendation　of　moderation　which
  belongs　to　ethics　as　the　doctrine　of　virtue；　and　not　to
  jurisprudence　as　the　doctrine　of　right。　It　is　a　question　of　the
  allowableness　of　using　violence　against　one　who　has　used　none
  against　me。
  It　is　clear　that　the　assertion　of　such　a　right　is　not　to　be
  understood　objectively　as　being　in　accordance　with　what　a　law　would
  prescribe；　but　merely　subjectively；　as　proceeding　on　the　assumption　of
  how　a　sentence　would　be　pronounced　by　a　court　in　the　case。　There
  can；　in　fact；　be　no　criminal　law　assigning　the　penalty　of　death　to　a
  man　who；　when　shipwrecked　and　struggling　in　extreme　danger　for　his
  life；　and　in　order　to　save　it；　may　thrust　another　from　a　plank　on
  which　he　had　saved　himself。　For　the　punishment　threatened　by　the　law
  could　not　possibly　have　greater　power　than　the　fear　of　the　loss　of
  life　in　the　case　in　question。　Such　a　penal　law　would　thus　fail
  altogether　to　exercise　its　intended　effect；　for　the　threat　of　an
  evil　which　is　still　uncertain…　such　as　death　by　a　judicial　sentence…
  could　not　overcome　the　fear　of　an　evil　which　is　certain；　as　drowning
  is　in　such　circumstances。　An　act　of　violent　self…preservation；　then；
  ought　not　to　be　considered　as　altogether　beyond　condemnation
  （inculpabile）；　it　is　only　to　be　adjudged　as　exempt　from　punishment
  （impunibile）。　Yet　this　subjective　condition　of　impunity；　by　a
  strange　confusion　of　ideas；　has　been　regarded　by　jurists　as　equivalent
  to　objective　lawfulness。
  The　dictum　of　the　right　of　necessity　is　put　in　these　terms：
  〃Necessity　has　no　law〃　（Necessitas　non　habet　legem）。　And　yet　there
  cannot　be　a　necessity　that　could　make　what　is　wrong　lawful。
  It　is　apparent；　then；　that　in。　judgements　relating　both　to
  〃equity〃　and　〃the　right　of　necessity；〃　the　equivocations　involved
  arise　from　an　interchange　of　the　objective　and　subjective　grou