THE　SCIENCE　OF　RIGHT
  by　Immanual　Kant
  translated　by　W。　Hastie
  INTRODUCTION　TO　THE　SCIENCE　OF　RIGHT。
  GENERAL　DEFINITIONS；　AND　DIVISIONS。
  A。　What　the　Science　of　Right　is。
  The　Science　of　Right　has　for　its　object　the　principles　of　all　the
  laws　which　it　is　possible　to　promulgate　by　external　legislation。　Where
  there　is　such　a　legislation；　it　becomes；　in　actual　application　to
  it；　a　system　of　positive　right　and　law；　and　he　who　is　versed　in　the
  knowledge　of　this　system　is　called　a　jurist　or　jurisconsult
  （jurisconsultus）。　A　practical　jurisconsult　（jurisperitus）；　or　a
  professional　lawyer；　is　one　who　is　skilled　in　the　knowledge　of
  positive　external　laws；　and　who　can　apply　them　to　cases　that　may　occur
  in　experience。　Such　practical　knowledge　of　positive　right；　and　law；
  may　be　regarded　as　belonging　to　jurisprudence　（jurisprudentia）　in
  the　original　sense　of　the　term。　But　the　theoretical　knowledge　of　right
  and　law　in　principle；　as　distinguished　from　positive　laws　and
  empirical　cases；　belongs　to　the　pure　science　of　right　（jurisscientia）。
  The　science　of　right　thus　designates　the　philosophical　and
  systematic　knowledge　of　the　principles　of　natural　right。　And　it　is
  from　this　science　that　the　immutable　principles　of　all　positive
  legislation　must　be　derived　by　practical　jurists　and　lawgivers。
  B。　What　is　Right？
  This　question　may　be　said　to　be　about　as　embarrassing　to　the
  jurist　as　the　well…known　question；　〃What　is　truth？〃　is　to　the
  logician。　It　is　all　the　more　so；　if；　on　reflection；　he　strives　to
  avoid　tautology　in　his　reply　and　recognise　the　fact　that　a　reference
  to　what　holds　true　merely　of　the　laws　of　some　one　country　at　a
  particular　time　is　not　a　solution　of　the　general　problem　thus
  proposed。　It　is　quite　easy　to　state　what　may　be　right　in　particular
  cases　（quid　sit　juris）；　as　being　what　the　laws　of　a　certain　place
  and　of　a　certain　time　say　or　may　have　said；　but　it　is　much　more
  difficult　to　determine　whether　what　they　have　enacted　is　right　in
  itself；　and　to　lay　down　a　universal　criterion　by　which　right　and　wrong
  in　general；　and　what　is　just　and　unjust；　may　be　recognised。　All　this
  may　remain　entirely　hidden　even　from　the　practical　jurist　until　he
  abandon　his　empirical　principles　for　a　time　and　search　in　the　pure
  reason　for　the　sources　of　such　judgements；　in　order　to　lay　a　real
  foundation　for　actual　positive　legislation。　In　this　search；　his
  empirical　laws　may；　indeed；　furnish　him　with　excellent　guidance；　but　a
  merely　empirical　system　that　is　void　of　rational　principles　is；　like
  the　wooden　head　in　the　fable　of　Phaedrus；　fine　enough　in　appearance；
  but　unfortunately　it　wants　brain。
  1。　The　conception　of　right…　as　referring　to　a　corresponding
  obligation　which　is　the　moral　aspect　of　it…　in　the　first　place；　has
  regard　only　to　the　external　and　practical　relation　of　one　person　to
  another；　in　so　far　as　they　can　have　influence　upon　each　other；
  immediately　or　mediately；　by　their　actions　as　facts。　2。　In　the
  second　place；　the　conception　of　right　does　not　indicate　the　relation
  of　the　action　of　an　individual　to　the　wish　or　the　mere　desire　of
  another；　as　in　acts　of　benevolence　or　of　unkindness；　but　only　the
  relation　of　his　free　action　to　the　freedom　of　action　of　the　other。
  3。　And；　in　the　third　place；　in　this　reciprocal　relation　of　voluntary
  actions；　the　conception　of　right　does　not　take　into　consideration
  the　matter　of　the　matter　of　the　act　of　will　in　so　far　as　the　end　which
  any　one　may　have　in　view　in　willing　it　is　concerned。　In　other　words；
  it　is　not　asked　in　a　question　of　right　whether　any　one　on　buying　goods
  for　his　own　business　realizes　a　profit　by　the　transaction　or　not；
  but　only　the　form　of　the　transaction　is　taken　into　account；　in
  considering　the　relation　of　the　mutual　acts　of　will。　Acts　of　will　or
  voluntary　choice　are　thus　regarded　only　in　so　far　as　they　are　free；
  and　as　to　whether　the　action　of　one　can　harmonize　with　the　freedom
  of　another；　according　to　a　universal　law。
  Right；　therefore；　comprehends　the　whole　of　the　conditions　under
  which　the　voluntary　actions　of　any　one　person　can　be　harmonized　in
  reality　with　the　voluntary　actions　of　every　other　person；　according　to
  a　universal　law　of　freedom。
  C。　Universal　Principle　of　Right。
  〃Every　action　is　right　which　in　itself；　or　in　the　maxim　on　which
  it　proceeds；　is　such　that　it　can　coexist　along　with　the　freedom　of　the
  will　of　each　and　all　in　action；　according　to　a　universal　law。〃
  If；　then；　my　action　or　my　condition　generally　can　coexist　with　the
  freedom　of　every　other；　according　to　a　universal　law；　any　one　does
  me　a　wrong　who　hinders　me　in　the　performance　of　this　action；　or　in　the
  maintenance　of　this　condition。　For　such　a　hindrance　or　obstruction
  cannot　coexist　with　freedom　according　to　universal　laws。
  It　follows　also　that　it　cannot　be　demanded　as　a　matter　of　right；
  that　this　universal　principle　of　all　maxims　shall　itself　be　adopted　as
  my　maxim；　that　is；　that　I　shall　make　it　the　maxim　of　my　actions。　For
  any　one　may　be　free；　although　his　freedom　is　entirely　indifferent　to
  me；　or　even　if　I　wished　in　my　heart　to　infringe　it；　so　long　as　I　do
  not　actually　violate　that　freedom　by　my　external　action。　Ethics；
  however；　as　distinguished　from　jurisprudence；　imposes　upon　me　the
  obligation　to　make　the　fulfillment　of　right　a　maxim　of　my　conduct。
  The　universal　law　of　right　may　then　be　expressed　thus：　〃Act
  externally　in　such　a　manner　that　the　free　exercise　of　thy　will　may
  be　able　to　coexist　with　the　freedom　of　all　others；　according　to　a
  universal　law。〃　This　is　undoubtedly　a　law　which　imposes　obligation
  upon　me；　but　it　does　not　at　all　imply　and　still　less　command　that　I
  ought；　merely　on　account　of　this　obligation；　to　limit　my　freedom　to
  these　very　conditions。　Reason　in　this　connection　says　only　that　it
  is　restricted　thus　far　by　its　idea；　and　may　be　likewise　thus　limited
  in　fact　by　others；　and　it　lays　this　down　as　a　postulate　which　is　not
  capable　of　further　proof。　As　the　object　in　view　is　not　to　teach
  virtue；　but　to　explain　what　right　is；　thus　far　the　law　of　right；　as
  thus　laid　down；　may　not　and　should　not　be　represented　as　a
  motive…principle　of　action。
  D。　Right　is　Conjoined　with　the　Title　or　Authority　to　Compel。
  The　resistance　which　is　opposed　to　any　hindrance　of　an　effect　is
  in　reality　a　furtherance　of　this　effect　and　is　in　accordance　with
  its　accomplishment。　Now；　everything　that　is　wrong　is　a　hindrance　of
  freedom；　according　to　universal　laws；　and　compulsion　or　constraint
  of　any　kind　is　a　hindrance　or　resistance　made　to　freedom。
  Consequently；　if　a　certain　exercise　of　freedom　is　itself　a　hindrance
  of　the　freedom　that　is　according　to　universal　laws；　it　is　wrong；　and
  the　compulsion　of　constraint　which　is　opposed　to　it　is　right；　as　being
  a　hindering　of　a　hindrance　of　freedom；　and　as　being　in　accord　with　the
  freedom　which　exists　in　accordance　with　universal　laws。　Hence；
  according　to　the　logical　principle　of　contradiction；　all　right　is
  accompanied　with　an　implied　title　or　warrant　to　bring　compulsion　to
  bear　on　any　one　who　may　violate　it　in　fact。
  E。　Strict　Right　may　be　also　Represented　as　the　Possibility
  of　a　Universal　Reciprocal　Compulsion　in　harmony　with
  the　Freedom　of　All　according　to　Universal　Laws。
  This　proposition　means　the　right　is　not　to　be　regarded　as　composed
  of　two　different　elements…　obligation　according　to　a　law；　and　a
  title　on　the　part　of　one　who　has　bound　another　by　his　own　free
  choice　to　compel　him　to　perform。　But　it　imports　that　the　conception　of
  right　may　be　viewed　as　consisting　immediately　in　the　possibility　of
  a　universal　reciprocal　compulsion；　in　harmony　with　the　freedom　of　all。
  As　right　in　general　has　for　its　object　only　what　is　external　in
  actions；　strict　right；　as　that　with　which　nothing　ethical　is
  intermingled；　requires　no　other　motives　of　action　than　those　that
  are　merely　external；　for　it　is　then　pure　right　and　is　unmixed　with　any
  prescriptions　of　virtue。　A　strict　right；　then；　in　the　exact　sense　of
  the　term；　is　that　which　alone　can　be　called　wholly　external。　Now
  such　right　is　founded；　no　doubt；　upon　the　consciousness　of　the
  obligation　of　every　individual　according　to　the　law；　but　if　it　is　to
  be　pure　as　such；　it　neither　may　nor　should　refer　to　this　consciousness
  as　a　motive　by　which　to　determine　the　free　act　of　the　will。　For　this
  purpose；　however；　it　founds　upon　the　principle　of　the　possibility　of
  an　external　compulsion；　such　as　may　coexist　with　the　freedom　of
  every　one　according　to　universal　laws。　Accordingly；　then；　where　it
  is　said　that　a　creditor　has　a　right　to　demand　from　a　debtor　the
  payment　of　his　debt；　this　does　not　mean　merely　that　he　can　bring　him
  to　feel　in　his　mind　that　reason　obliges　him　to　do　this；　but　it　means
  that　he　can