positions　of　the　sun；　moon；　and　stars。　But　for　the　cheat；　of
  divining　by　the　stars　by　their　oppositions　or　conjunctions；　it　has
  not　so　much　as　entered　into　their　thoughts。　They　have　a　particular
  sagacity；　founded　upon　much　observation；　in　judging　of　the
  weather；　by　which　they　know　when　they　may　look　for　rain；　wind；　or
  other　alterations　in　the　air；　but　as　to　the　philosophy　of　these
  things；　the　causes　of　the　saltness　of　the　sea；　of　its　ebbing　and
  flowing；　and　of　the　origin　and　nature　both　of　the　heavens　and　the
  earth；　they　dispute　of　them；　partly　as　our　ancient　philosophers
  have　done；　and　partly　upon　some　new　hypothesis；　in　which；　as　they
  differ　from　them；　so　they　do　not　in　all　things　agree　among
  themselves。
  As　to　moral　philosophy；　they　have　the　same　disputes　among　them　as
  we　have　here：　they　examine　what　are　properly　good　both　for　the
  body　and　the　mind；　and　whether　any　outward　thing　can　be　called
  truly　good；　or　if　that　term　belong　only　to　the　endowments　of　the
  soul。　They　inquire　likewise　into　the　nature　of　virtue　and
  pleasure；　but　their　chief　dispute　is　concerning　the　happiness　of　a
  man；　and　wherein　it　consists？　Whether　in　some　one　thing；　or　in　a
  great　many？　They　seem；　indeed；　more　inclinable　to　that　opinion
  that　places；　if　not　the　whole；　yet　the　chief　part　of　a　man's
  happiness　in　pleasure；　and；　what　may　seem　more　strange；　they　make
  use　of　arguments　even　from　religion；　notwithstanding　its　severity
  and　roughness；　for　the　support　of　that　opinion　so　indulgent　to
  pleasure；　for　they　never　dispute　concerning　happiness　without
  fetching　some　arguments　from　the　principles　of　religion；　as　well
  as　from　natural　reason；　since　without　the　former　they　reckon　that
  all　our　inquiries　after　happiness　must　be　but　conjectural　and
  defective。
  These　are　their　religious　principles；　that　the　soul　of　man　is
  immortal；　and　that　God　of　his　goodness　has　designed　that　it　should
  be　happy；　and　that　he　has　therefore　appointed　rewards　for　good　and
  virtuous　actions；　and　punishments　for　vice；　to　be　distributed
  after　this　life。　Though　these　principles　of　religion　are　conveyed
  down　among　them　by　tradition；　they　think　that　even　reason　itself
  determines　a　man　to　believe　and　acknowledge　them；　and　freely
  confess　that　if　these　were　taken　away　no　man　would　be　so
  insensible　as　not　to　seek　after　pleasure　by　all　possible　means；
  lawful　or　unlawful；　using　only　this　caution；　that　a　lesser
  pleasure　might　not　stand　in　the　way　of　a　greater；　and　that　no
  pleasure　ought　to　be　pursued　that　should　draw　a　great　deal　of　pain
  after　it；　for　they　think　it　the　maddest　thing　in　the　world　to
  pursue　virtue；　that　is　a　sour　and　difficult　thing；　and　not　only　to
  renounce　the　pleasures　of　life；　but　willingly　to　undergo　much　pain
  and　trouble；　if　a　man　has　no　prospect　of　a　reward。　And　what　reward
  can　there　be　for　one　that　has　passed　his　whole　life；　not　only
  without　pleasure；　but　in　pain；　if　there　is　nothing　to　be　expected
  after　death？　Yet　they　do　not　place　happiness　in　all　sorts　of
  pleasures；　but　only　in　those　that　in　themselves　are　good　and
  honest。
  There　is　a　party　among　them　who　place　happiness　in　bare　virtue；
  others　think　that　our　natures　are　conducted　by　virtue　to
  happiness；　as　that　which　is　the　chief　good　of　man。　They　define
  virtue　thus；　that　it　is　a　living　according　to　nature；　and　think
  that　we　are　made　by　God　for　that　end；　they　believe　that　a　man　then
  follows　the　dictates　of　nature　when　he　pursues　or　avoids　things
  according　to　the　direction　of　reason；　they　say　that　the　first
  dictate　of　reason　is　the　kindling　in　us　of　a　love　and　reverence
  for　the　Divine　Majesty；　to　whom　we　owe　both　all　that　we　have　and
  all　that　we　can　ever　hope　for。　In　the　next　place；　reason　directs
  us　to　keep　our　minds　as　free　from　passion　and　as　cheerful　as　we
  can；　and　that　we　should　consider　ourselves　as　bound　by　the　ties　of
  good…nature　and　humanity　to　use　our　utmost　endeavors　to　help
  forward　the　happiness　of　all　other　persons；　for　there　never　was
  any　man　such　a　morose　and　severe　pursuer　of　virtue；　such　an　enemy
  to　pleasure；　that　though　he　set　hard　rules　for　men　to　undergo　much
  pain；　many　watchings；　and　other　rigors；　yet　did　not　at　the　same
  time　advise　them　to　do　all　they　could；　in　order　to　relieve　and
  ease　the　miserable；　and　who　did　not　represent　gentleness　and　good…
  nature　as　amiable　dispositions。　And　from　thence　they　infer　that　if
  a　man　ought　to　advance　the　welfare　and　comfort　of　the　rest　of
  mankind；　there　being　no　virtue　more　proper　and　peculiar　to　our
  nature；　than　to　ease　the　miseries　of　others；　to　free　from　trouble
  and　anxiety；　in　furnishing　them　with　the　comforts　of　life；　in
  which　pleasure　consists；　nature　much　more　vigorously　leads　them　to
  do　all　this　for　himself。
  A　life　of　pleasure　is　either　a　real　evil；　and　in　that　case　we
  ought　not　to　assist　others　in　their　pursuit　of　it；　but　on　the
  contrary；　to　keep　them　from　it　all　we　can；　as　from　that　which　is
  most　hurtful　and　deadly；　or　if　it　is　a　good　thing；　so　that　we　not
  only　may；　but　ought　to　help　others　to　it；　why；　then；　ought　not　a
  man　to　begin　with　himself？　Since　no　man　can　be　more　bound　to　look
  after　the　good　of　another　than　after　his　own；　for　nature　cannot
  direct　us　to　be　good　and　kind　to　others；　and　yet　at　the　same　time
  to　be　unmerciful　and　cruel　to　ourselves。　Thus；　as　they　define
  virtue　to　be　living　according　to　nature；　so　they　imagine　that
  nature　prompts　all　people　on　to　seek　after　pleasure；　as　the　end　of
  all　they　do。　They　also　observe　that　in　order　to　our　supporting　the
  pleasures　of　life；　nature　inclines　us　to　enter　into　society；　for
  there　is　no　man　so　much　raised　above　the　rest　of　mankind　as　to　be
  the　only　favorite　of　nature　who；　on　the　contrary；　seems　to　have
  placed　on　a　level　all　those　that　belong　to　the　same　species。　Upon
  this　they　infer　that　no　man　ought　to　seek　his　own　conveniences　so
  eagerly　as　to　prejudice　others；　and　therefore　they　think　that　not
  only　all　agreements　between　private　persons　ought　to　be　observed；
  but　likewise　that　all　those　laws　ought　to　be　kept；　which　either　a
  good　prince　has　published　in　due　form；　or　to　which　a　people　that
  is　neither　oppressed　with　tyranny　nor　circumvented　by　fraud；　has
  consented；　for　distributing　those　conveniences　of　life　which
  afford　us　all　our　pleasures。
  They　think　it　is　an　evidence　of　true　wisdom　for　a　man　to　pursue
  his　own　advantages　as　far　as　the　laws　allow　it。　They　account　it
  piety　to　prefer　the　public　good　to　one's　private　concerns；　but
  they　think　it　unjust　for　a　man　to　seek　for　pleasure　by　snatching
  another　man's　pleasures　from　him。　And　on　the　contrary；　they　think
  it　a　sign　of　a　gentle　and　good　soul；　for　a　man　to　dispense　with
  his　own　advantage　for　the　good　of　others；　and　that　by　this　means　a
  good　man　finds　as　much　pleasure　one　way　as　he　parts　with　another；
  for　as　he　may　expect　the　like　from　others　when　he　may　come　to　need
  it；　so　if　that　should　fail　him；　yet　the　sense　of　a　good　action；
  and　the　reflections　that　he　makes　on　the　love　and　gratitude　of
  those　whom　he　has　so　obliged；　gives　the　mind　more　pleasure　than
  the　body　could　have　found　in　that　from　which　it　had　restrained
  itself。　They　are　also　persuaded　that　God　will　make　up　the　loss　of
  those　small　pleasures；　with　a　vast　and　endless　joy；　of　which
  religion　easily　convinces　a　good　soul。
  Thus；　upon　an　inquiry　into　the　whole　matter；　they　reckon　that　all
  our　actions；　and　even　all　our　virtues；　terminate　in　pleasure；　as
  in　our　chief　end　and　greatest　happiness；　and　they　call　every
  motion　or　state；　either　of　body　or　mind；　in　which　nature　teaches
  us　to　delight；　a　pleasure。　Thus　they　cautiously　limit　pleasure
  only　to　those　appetites　to　which　nature　leads　us；　for　they　say
  that　nature　leads　us　only　to　those　delights　to　which　reason　as
  well　as　sense　carries　us；　and　by　which　we　neither　injure　any　other
  person　nor　lose　the　possession　of　greater　pleasures；　and　of　such
  as　draw　no　troub