。　What　object　do　you　mean？　the　object　of　the　senses？
  。　The　same。
  。　It　is　then　immediately　perceived？　｛195｝
  。　Right。
  。　Make　me　to　understand　the　difference　between　what　is
  immediately　perceived　and　a　sensation。
  。　The　sensation　I　take　to　be　an　act　of　the　mind
  perceiving；　besides　which；　there　is　something　perceived；　and　this
  I　call　the　。　For　example；　there　is　red　and　yellow　on　that
  tulip。　But　then　the　act　of　perceiving　those　colours　is　in　me
  only；　and　not　in　the　tulip。
  。　What　tulip　do　you　speak　of？　Is　it　that　which　you
  see？
  。　The　same。
  。　And　what　do　you　see　beside　colour；　figure；　and
  extension？
  。　Nothing。
  。　What　you　would　say　then　is　that　the　red　and　yellow
  are　coexistent　with　the　extension；　is　it　not？
  。　That　is　not　all；　I　would　say　they　have　a　real
  existence　without　the　mind；　in　some　unthinking　substance。
  。　That　the　colours　are　really　in　the　tulip　which　I　see
  is　manifest。　Neither　can　it　be　denied　that　this　tulip　may　exist
  independent　of　your　mind　or　mine；　but；　that　any　immediate　object
  of　the　senses；　　that　is；　any　idea；　or　combination　of　ideas
  should　exist　in　an　unthinking　substance；　or　exterior　to
  minds；　is　in　itself　an　evident　contradiction。　Nor　can　I　imagine
  how　this　follows　from　what　you　said　just　now；　to　wit；　that　the
  red　and　yellow　were　on　the　tulip　；　since　you　do　not
  pretend　to　　that　unthinking　substance。
  。　You　have　an　artful　way；　Philonous；　of　diverting　our
  inquiry　from　the　subject。
  。　I　see　you　have　no　mind　to　be　pressed　that　way。　To
  return　then　to　your　distinction　between　　and　；
  if　I　take　you　right；　you　distinguish　in　every　perception　two
  things；　the　one　an　action　of　the　mind；　the　other　not。
  。　True。
  。　And　this　action　cannot　exist　in；　or　belong　to；　any
  unthinking　thing；　but；　whatever　beside　is　implied　in　a　perception
  may？　｛196｝
  。　That　is　my　meaning。
  。　So　that　if　there　was　a　perception　without　any　act　of
  the　mind；　it　were　possible　such　a　perception　should　exist　in　an
  unthinking　substance？
  。　I　grant　it。　But　it　is　impossible　there　should　be　such
  a　perception。
  。　When　is　the　mind　said　to　be　active？
  。　When　it　produces；　puts　an　end　to；　or　changes；
  anything。
  。　Can　the　mind　produce；　discontinue；　or　change
  anything；　but　by　an　act　of　the　will？
  。　It　cannot。
  。　The　mind　therefore　is　to　be　accounted　　in
  its　perceptions　so　far　forth　as　　is　included　in　them？
  。　It　is。
  。　In　plucking　this　flower　I　am　active；　because　I　do　it
  by　the　motion　of　my　hand；　which　was　consequent　upon　my　volition；
  so　likewise　in　applying　it　to　my　nose。　But　is　either　of　these
  smelling？
  。　。
  。　I　act　too　in　drawing　the　air　through　my　nose；
  because　my　breathing　so　rather　than　otherwise　is　the　effect　of　my
  volition。　But　neither　can　this　be　called　：　for；　if　it
  were；　I　should　smell　every　time　I　breathed　in　that　manner？
  。　True。
  。　Smelling　then　is　somewhat　consequent　to　all　this？
  。　It　is。
  。　But　I　do　not　find　my　will　concerned　any　farther。
  Whatever　more　there　is　　as　that　I　perceive　such　a　particular
  smell；　or　any　smell　at　all　　this　is　independent　of　my　will；　and
  therein　I　am　altogether　passive。　Do　you　find　it　otherwise　with
  you；　Hylas？
  。　No；　the　very　same。
  。　Then；　as　to　seeing；　is　it　not　in　your　power　to　open
  your　eyes；　or　keep　them　shut；　to　turn　them　this　or　that　way？
  。　Without　doubt。
  。　But；　doth　it　in　like　manner　depend　on　　will
  that　in　looking　on　this　flower　you　perceive　　rather　than
  any　other　colour？　Or；　directing　your　open　eyes　towards　yonder
  part　of　the　heaven；　can　you　avoid　seeing　the　sun？　Or　is　light　or
  darkness　the　effect　of　your　volition？
  。　No；　certainly。
  。　You　are　then　in　these　respects　altogether　passive？
  ｛197｝
  。　I　am。
  。　Tell　me　now；　whether　　consists　in　perceiving
  light　and　colours；　or　in　opening　and　turning　the　eyes？
  。　Without　doubt；　in　the　former。
  。　Since　therefore　you　are　in　the　very　perception　of
  light　and　colours　altogether　passive；　what　is　become　of　that
  action　you　were　speaking　of　as　an　ingredient　in　every　sensation？
  And；　doth　it　not　follow　from　your　own　concessions；　that　the
  perception　of　light　and　colours；　including　no　action　in　it；　may
  exist　in　an　unperceiving　substance？　And　is　not　this　a　plain
  contradiction？
  。　I　know　not　what　to　think　of　it。
  。　Besides；　since　you　distinguish　the　　and
  in　every　perception；　you　must　do　it　in　that　of　pain。
  But　how　is　it　possible　that　pain；　be　it　as　little　active　as　you
  please；　should　exist　in　an　unperceiving　substance？　In　short；　do
  but　consider　the　point；　and　then　confess　ingenuously；　whether
  light　and　colours；　tastes；　sounds；　&c。　are　not　all　equally
  passions　or　sensations　in　the　soul。　You　may　indeed　call　them
  ；　and　give　them　in　words　what　subsistence　you
  please。　But；　examine　your　own　thoughts；　and　then　tell　me　whether
  it　be　not　as　I　say？
  。　I　acknowledge；　Philonous；　that；　upon　a　fair
  observation　of　what　passes　in　my　mind；　I　can　discover　nothing
  else　but　that　I　am　a　thinking　being；　affected　with　variety　of
  sensations；　neither　is　it　possible　to　conceive　how　a　sensation
  should　exist　in　an　unperceiving　substance。　But　then；　on　the　other
  hand；　when　I　look　on　sensible　things　in　a　different　view；
  considering　them　as　so　many　modes　and　qualities；　I　find　it
  necessary　to　suppose　a　；　without　which　they
  cannot　be　conceived　to　exist。
  。　　call　you　it？　Pray；　by　which　of
  your　senses　came　you　acquainted　with　that　being？
  。　It　is　not　itself　sensible；　its　modes　and　qualities
  only　being　perceived　by　the　senses。
  。　I　presume　then　it　was　by　reflexion　and　reason　you
  obtained
  the　idea　of　it？
  。　I　do　not　pretend　to　any　proper　positive　　of　it。
  However；　I　conclude　it　exists；　because　qualities　cannot　be
  conceived　to　exist　without　a　support。
  。　It　seems　then　you　have　only　a　relative　　of
  it；　or　that　you　conceive　it　not　otherwise　than　by　conceiving　the
  relation　it　bears　to　sensible　qualities？　｛198｝
  。　Right。
  。　Be　pleased　therefore　to　let　me　know　wherein　that
  relation
  consists。
  。　Is　it　not　sufficiently　expressed　in　the　term
  ；　or　？
  。　If　so；　the　word　　should　import　that　it
  is　spread　under　the　sensible　qualities　or　accidents？
  。　True。
  。　And　consequently　under　extension？
  。　I　own　it。
  。　It　is　therefore　somewhat　in　its　own　nature　entirely
  distinct
  from　extension？
  。　I　tell　you；　extension　is　only　a　mode；　and　Matter　is
  something　that　supports　modes。　And　is　it　not　evident　the　thing
  supported　is　different　from　the　thing　supporting？
  。　So　that　something　distinct　from；　and　exclusive　of；
  extension　is　supposed　to　be　the　　of　extension？
  。　Just　so。
  。　Answer　me；　Hylas。　Can　a　thing　be　spread　without
  extension？　or　is　not　the　idea　of　extension　necessarily　included
  in　？
  。　It　is。
  。　Whatsoever　therefore　you　suppose　spread　under
  anything　must　have　in　itself　an　extension　distinct　from　the
  extension　of　that　thing　under　which　it　is　spread？
  。　It　must。
  。　Consequently；　every　corporeal　substance；　being　the
  of　extension；　must　have　in　itself　another　extension；
  by　which　it　is　qualified　to　be　a　：　and　so　on　to
  infinity。　And　I　ask　whether　this　be　not　absurd　in　itself；　and
  repugnant　to　what　you　granted　just　now；　to　wit；　that　the
  was　something　distinct　from　and　exclusive　of
  extension？
  。　Aye　but；　Philonous；　you　take　me　wrong。　I　do　not　mean
  that　Matter　is　　in　a　gross　literal　sense　under　extension。
  The　word　　is　used　only　to　express　in　general　the　same
  thing　with　。
  。　Well　then；　let　us　examine　the　relation　implied　in
  the　term　。　Is　it　not　that　it　stands　under　accidents？
  。　The　very　same。
  。　But；　that　one　thing　may　stand　under　or　support
  another；　must　it　not　be　extended？
  。　It　must。　｛199｝
  。　Is　not　therefore　this　supposition　liable　to　the　same
  absurdity　with　the　former？
  。　You　still　take　things　in　a　strict　literal　sense。　That
  is　not　fair；　Philonous。
  。　I　am　not　for　imposing　any　sense　on　your　words：　you
  are　at　liberty　to　explain　them　as　you　please。　Only；　I　beseech
  you；　make　me　understand　something　by　them。　You　tell　me　Matter
  supports　or　stands　under　accidents。　How！　is　it　as　your　legs
  support　your　body？
  。　No；　that　is　the　literal　sense。
  。　Pray　let　me　know　any　sense；　li