the　motions　perceived　are　both　really　in　the　object）　it　is
  possible　one　and　the　same　body　shall　be　really　moved　the　same　way
  at　once；　both　very　swift　and　very　slow。　How　is　this　consistent
  either　with　common　sense；　or　with　what　you　just　now　granted？
  ｛191｝
  。　I　have　nothing　to　say　to　it。
  。　Then　as　for　；　either　you　do　not　mean　any
  sensible　quality　by　that　word；　and　so　it　is　beside　our　inquiry：
  or　if　you　do；　it　must　be　either　hardness　or　resistance。　But　both
  the　one　and　the　other　are　plainly　relative　to　our　senses：　it
  being　evident　that　what　seems　hard　to　one　animal　may　appear　soft
  to　another；　who　hath　greater　force　and　firmness　of　limbs。　Nor　is
  it　less　plain　that　the　resistance　I　feel　is　not　in　the　body。
  。　I　own　the　very　　of　resistance；　which　is
  all　you　immediately　perceive；　is　not　in　the　body；　but　the
  of　that　sensation　is。
  。　But　the　causes　of　our　sensations　are　not　things
  immediately　perceived；　and　therefore　are　not　sensible。　This　point
  I　thought　had　been　already　determined。
  。　I　own　it　was；　but　you　will　pardon　me　if　I　seem　a
  little　embarrassed：　I　know　not　how　to　quit　my　old　notions。
  。　To　help　you　out；　do　but　consider　that　if
  be　once　acknowledged　to　have　no　existence　without　the　mind；　the
  same　must　necessarily　be　granted　of　motion；　solidity；　and
  gravity；　since　they　all　evidently　suppose　extension。　It　is
  therefore　superfluous　to　inquire　particularly　concerning　each　of
  them。　In　denying　extension；　you　have　denied　them　all　to　have　any
  real　existence。
  。　I　wonder；　Philonous；　if　what　you　say　be　true；　why
  those　philosophers　who　deny　the　Secondary　Qualities　any　real
  existence　should　yet　attribute　it　to　the　Primary。　If　there　is　no
  difference　between　them；　how　can　this　be　accounted　for？
  。　It　is　not　my　business　to　account　for　every　opinion
  of　the　philosophers。　But；　among　other　reasons　which　may　be
  assigned　for　this；　it　seems　probable　that　pleasure　and　pain　being
  rather　annexed　to　the　former　than　the　latter　may　be　one。　Heat　and
  cold；　tastes　and　smells；　have　something　more　vividly　pleasing　or
  disagreeable　than　the　ideas　of　extension；　figure；　and　motion
  affect　us　with。　And；　it　being　too　visibly　absurd　to　hold　that
  pain　or　pleasure　can　be　in　an　unperceiving　substance；　men　are
  more　easily　weaned　from　believing　the　external　existence　of　the
  Secondary　than　the　Primary　Qualities。　You　will　be　satisfied　there
  is　something　in　this；　if　you　recollect　the　difference　you　made
  between　an　intense　and　more　moderate　degree　of　heat；　allowing　the
  one　a　real　existence；　while　you　denied　it　to　the　other。　But；
  after　all；　there　is　no　rational　ground　for　that　distinction；　for；
  surely　an　indifferent　sensation　is　as　｛191｝　truly
  as　one　more　pleasing　or　painful；　and　consequently　should　not　any
  more　than　they　be　supposed　to　exist　in　an　unthinking　subject。
  。　It　is　just　come　into　my　head；　Philonous；　that　I　have
  somewhere　heard　of　a　distinction　between　absolute　and　sensible
  extension。　Now；　though　it　be　acknowledged　that　　and
  ；　consisting　merely　in　the　relation　which　other　extended
  beings　have　to　the　parts　of　our　own　bodies；　do　not　really　inhere
  in　the　substances　themselves；　yet　nothing　obliges　us　to　hold　the
  same　with　regard　to　；　which　is　something
  abstracted　from　　and　；　from　this　or　that　particular
  magnitude　or　figure。　So　likewise　as　to　motion；　　and
  are　altogether　relative　to　the　succession　of　ideas　in　our　own
  minds。　But；　it　doth　not　follow；　because　those　modifications　of
  motion　exist　not　without　the　mind；　that　therefore　absolute　motion
  abstracted　from　them　doth　not。
  。　Pray　what　is　it　that　distinguishes　one　motion；　or
  one　part　of　extension；　from　another？　Is　it　not　something
  sensible；　as　some　degree　of　swiftness　or　slowness；　some　certain
  magnitude　or　figure　peculiar　to　each？
  。　I　think　so。
  。　These　qualities；　therefore；　stripped　of　all　sensible
  properties；　are　without　all　specific　and　numerical　differences；
  as　the　schools　call　them。
  。　They　are。
  。　That　is　to　say；　they　are　extension　in　general；　and
  motion　in　general。
  。　Let　it　be　so。
  。　But　it　is　a　universally　received　maxim　that
  。　How　then　can　motion　in
  general；　or　extension　in　general；　exist　in　any　corporeal
  substance？　｛193｝
  。　I　will　take　time　to　solve　your　difficulty。
  。　But　I　think　the　point　may　be　speedily　decided。
  Without　doubt　you　can　tell　whether　you　are　able　to　frame　this　or
  that　idea。　Now　I　am　content　to　put　our　dispute　on　this　issue。　If
  you　can　frame　in　your　thoughts　a　distinct　　of
  motion　or　extension；　divested　of　all　those　sensible　modes；　as
  swift　and　slow；　great　and　small；　round　and　square；　and　the　like；
  which　are　acknowledged　to　exist　only　in　the　mind；　I　will　then
  yield　the　point　you　contend　for。　But　if　you　cannot；　it　will　be
  unreasonable　on　your　side　to　insist　any　longer　upon　what　you　have
  no　notion　of。
  。　To　confess　ingenuously；　I　cannot。
  。　Can　you　even　separate　the　ideas　of　extension　and
  motion　from　the　ideas　of　all　those　qualities　which　they　who　make
  the　distinction　term　？
  。　What！　is　it　not　an　easy　matter　to　consider　extension
  and　motion　by　themselves；　abstracted　from　all　other　sensible
  qualities？　Pray　how　do　the　mathematicians　treat　of　them？
  。　I　acknowledge；　Hylas；　it　is　not　difficult　to　form
  general　propositions　and　reasonings　about　those　qualities；
  without　mentioning　any　other；　and；　in　this　sense；　to　consider　or
  treat　of　them　abstractedly。　But；　how　doth　it　follow　that；　because
  I　can　pronounce　the　word　　by　itself；　I　can　form　the　idea
  of　it　in　my　mind　exclusive　of　body？　or；　because　theorems　may　be
  made　of　extension　and　figures；　without　any　mention　of　　or
  ；　or　any　other　sensible　mode　or　quality；　that　therefore　it
  is　possible　such　an　abstract　idea　of　extension；　without　any
  particular　size　or　figure；　or　sensible　quality；＇3　＇　＇should　be
  distinctly　formed；　and　apprehended　by　the　mind？　Mathematicians
  treat　of　quantity；　without　regarding　what　other　sensible。
  qualities　it　is　attended　with；　as　being　altogether　indifferent　to
  their　demonstrations。　But；　when　laying　aside　the　words；　they
  contemplate　the　bare　ideas；　I　believe　you　will　find；　they　are　not
  the　pure　abstracted　ideas　of　extension。
  。　But　what　say　you　to　？　May　not
  abstracted　ideas　be　framed　by　that　faculty？
  。　Since　I　cannot　frame　abstract　ideas　at　all；　it　is
  plain　I　cannot　frame　them　by　the　help　of　；　｛194｝
  whatsoever　faculty　you　understand　by　those　words。　Besides；　not　to
  inquire　into　the　nature　of　pure　intellect　and　its　spiritual
  objects；　as　；　；　；　or　the　like；　thus　much
  seems　manifest　　that　sensible　things　are　only　to　be　perceived
  by　sense；　or　represented　by　the　imagination。　Figures；　therefore；
  and　extension；　being　originally　perceived　by　sense；　do　not　belong
  to　pure　intellect：　but；　for　your　farther　satisfaction；　try　if　you
  can　frame　the　idea　of　any　figure；　abstracted　from　all
  particularities　of　size；　or　even　from　other　sensible　qualities。
  。　Let　me　think　a　little　　I　do　not　find　that　I　can。
  。　And　can　you　think　it　possible　that　should　really
  exist　in　nature　which　implies　a　repugnancy　in　its　conception？
  。　By　no　means。
  。　Since　therefore　it　is　impossible　even　for　the　mind
  to　disunite　the　ideas　of　extension　and　motion　from　all　other
  sensible　qualities；　doth　it　not　follow；　that　where　the　one　exist
  there　necessarily　the　other　exist　likewise？
  。　It　should　seem　so。
  。　Consequently；　the　very　same　arguments　which　you
  admitted　as　conclusive　against　the　Secondary　Qualities　are；
  without　any　farther　application　of　force；　against　the　Primary
  too。　Besides；　if　you　will　trust　your　senses；　is　it　not　plain　all
  sensible　qualities　coexist；　or　to　them　appear　as　being　in　the
  same　place？　Do　they　ever　represent　a　motion；　or　figure；　as　being
  divested　of　all　other　visible　and　tangible　qualities？
  。　You　need　say　no　more　on　this　head。　I　am　free　to　own；
  if　there　be　no　secret　error　or　oversight　in　our　proceedings
  hitherto；　that　all　sensible　qualities　are　alike　to　be　denied
  existence　without　the　mind。　But；　my　fear　is　that　I　have　been　too
  liberal　in　my　former　concessions；　or　overlooked　some　fallacy　or
  other。　In　short；　I　did　not　take　time　to　think。
  。　For　that　matter；　Hylas；　you　may　take　what　time　you
  please　in　reviewing　the　progress　of　our　inquiry。　You　are　at
  liberty　to　recover　any　slips　you　might　have　made；　or　offer
  whatever　you　have　omitted　which　makes　for　your　first　opinion。
  。　One　great　oversight　I　take　to　be　this　　that　I　did
  not　sufficiently　distinguish　the　　from　the　。
  Now；　though　this　latter　may　not　exist　without　the　mind；　yet　it
  will　not　thence　follow　that　the　former　cannot。
  。　What　object　do　you　mean？　the　object　of　the　senses？
  。　The　same。
  。　It　is　t