idea　the　objective　is　the　immediate　world　found　ready　to　hand；　or　the　idea　as　life
  is　in　the　phenomenon　of　individual　existence。　At　the　same　time；　in　so　far　as　this
  judgement　is　pure　distinguishing　within　its　own　limits　（§　223）；　the　idea　realises　in
  one　both　itself　and　its　other。　Consequently　it　is　the　certitude　of　the　virtual　identity
  between　itself　and　the　objective　world。　Reason　comes　to　the　world　with　an
  absolute　faith　in　its　ability　to　make　the　identity　actual；　and　to　raise　its　certitude　to
  truth；　and　with　the　instinct　of　realising　explicitly　the　nullity　of　that　contrast　which
  it　sees　to　be　implicitly　null。
  §　225
  This　process　is　in　general　terms　Cognition。　In　Cognition　in　a　single　act　the
  contrast　is　virtually　superseded；　as　regards　both　the　one…sidedness　of　subjectivity
  and　the　one…sidedness　of　objectivity。　At　first；　however；　the　supersession　of　the
  contrast　is　but　implicit。　The　process　as　such　is　in　consequence　immediately
  infected　with　the　finitude　of　this　sphere；　and　splits　into　the　twofold　movement　of
  the　instinct　of　reason；　presented　as　two　different　movements。　On　the　one　hand　it
  supersedes　the　one…sidedness　of　the　Idea's　subjectivity　by　receiving　the　existing
  world　into　itself；　into　subjective　conception　and　thought；　and　with　this　objectivity；
  which　is　thus　taken　to　be　real　and　true；　for　its　content　it　fills　up　the　abstract
  certitude　of　itself。　On　the　other　hand；　it　supersedes　the　one…sidedness　of　the
  objective　world；　which　is　now；　on　the　contrary；　estimated　as　only　a　mere
  semblance；　a　collection　of　contingencies　and　shapes　at　bottom　visionary。　It
  modifies　and　informs　that　world　by　the　inward　nature　of　the　subjective；　which　is
  here　taken　to　be　the　genuine　objective。　The　former　is　the　instinct　of　science　after
  Truth；　Cognition　properly　so　called　…　the　Theoretical　action　of　the　idea。　The
  latter　is　the　instinct　of　the　Good　to　fulfil　the　same　…　the　Practical　activity　of　the
  idea；　or　Volition。
  ？
  ＇a＇　Cognition　proper
  §　226
  The　universal　finitude　of　Cognition；　which　lies　in　the　one　judgement；　the
  presupposition　of　the　contrast　（§　224）　…　a　presupposition　in　contradiction　of
  which　its　own　act　lodges　protest　…　specialises　itself　more　precisely　on　the　face　of
  its　own　idea。　The　result　of　that　specialisation　is　that　its　two　elements　receive　the
  aspect　of　being　diverse　from　each　other；　and；　as　they　are　at　least　complete；　they
  take　up　the　relation　of　'reflection'；　not　of　'notion'；　to　one　another。　The　assimilation
  of　the　matter；　therefore；　as　a　datum；　presents　itself　in　the　light　of　a　reception　of　it
  into　categories　which　at　the　same　time　remain　external　to　it；　and　which　meet　each
  other　in　the　same　style　of　diversity。　Reason　is　active　here；　but　it　is　reason　in　the
  shape　of　understanding。　The　truth　which　such　Cognition　can　reach　will　therefore
  be　only　finite：　the　infinite　truth　（of　the　notion）　is　isolated　and　made　transcendent；
  an　inaccessible　goal　in　a　world　of　its　own。　Still　in　its　external　action　cognition
  stands　under　the　guidance　of　the　notion；　and　notional　principles　form　the　secret
  clue　to　its　movement。
  §　226n
  The　finitude　of　Cognition　lies　in　the　presupposition　of　a　world　already　in　existence；　and　in　the
  consequent　view　of　the　knowing　subject　as　a　tabula　rasa。　The　conception　is　one　attributed　to
  Aristotle；　but　no　man　is　further　than　Aristotle　from　such　an　outside　theory　of　Cognition。　Such　a
  style　of　Cognition　does　not　recognise　in　itself　the　activity　of　the　notion　…　an　activity　which　it　is
  implicitly；　but　not　consciously。　In　its　own　estimation　its　procedure　is　passive。　Really　that　procedure
  is　active。
  §　227
  Finite　Cognition；　when　it　presupposes　what　is　distinguished　from　it　to　be
  something　already　existing　and　confronting　it　…　to　be　the　various　facts　of　external
  nature　or　of　consciousness　…　has；　in　the　first　place；　（1）　formal　identity　or　the
  abstraction　of　universality　for　the　form　of　its　action。　Its　activity　therefore　consists
  in　analysing　the　given　concrete　object；　isolating　its　differences；　and　giving　them
  the　form　of　abstract　universality。　Or　it　leaves　the　concrete　thing　as　a　ground；　and
  by　setting　aside　the　unessential…looking　particulars；　brings　into　relief　a　concrete
  universal；　the　Genus；　or　Force　and　Law。　This　is　the　Analytical　Method。
  §　227n
  People　generally　speak　of　the　analytical　and　synthetic　methods；　as　if　it　depended　solely　on　our
  choice　which　we　pursued。　This　is　far　from　the　case。　It　depends　on　the　form　of　the　objects　of　our
  investigation；　which　of　the　two　methods　that　are　derivable　from　the　notion　of　finite　cognition　ought
  to　be　applied。　In　the　first　place；　cognition　is　analytical。　Analytical　cognition　deals　with　an　object
  which　is　presented　in　detachment；　and　the　aim　of　its　action　is　to　trace　back　to　a　universal　the
  individual　object　before　it。　Thought　in　such　circumstances　means　no　more　than　an　act　of
  abstraction　or　of　formal　identity。　That　is　the　sense　in　which　thought　is　understood　by　Locke　and　all
  empiricists。　Cognition；　it　is　often　said；　can　never　do　more　than　separate　the　given　concrete　objects
  into　their　abstract　elements；　and　then　consider　these　elements　in　their　isolation。　It　is；　however；　at
  once　apparent　that　this　turns　things　upside　down；　and　that　cognition；　if　its　purpose　be　to　take　things
  as　they　are；　thereby　falls　into　contradiction　with　itself。　Thus　the　chemist　e。g。　places　a　piece　of　flesh
  in　his　retort；　tortures　it　in　many　ways；　and　then　informs　us　that　it　consists　of　nitrogen；　carbon；
  hydrogen；　etc。　True：　but　these　abstract　matters　have　ceased　to　be　flesh。　The　same　defect　occurs　in
  the　reasoning　of　an　empirical　psychologist　when　he　analyses　an　action　into　the　various　aspects
  which　it　presents；　and　then　sticks　to　these　aspects　in　their　separation。　The　object　which　is
  subjected　to　analysis　is　treated　as　a　sort　of　onion　from　which　one　coat　is　peeled　off　after　another。
  §　228
  This　universality　is　（2）　also　a　specific　universality。　In　this　case　the　line　of　activity
  follows　the　three　'moments'　of　the　notion；　which　（as　it　has　not　its　infinity　in　finite
  cognition）　is　the　specific　or　definite　notion　of　understanding。　The　reception　of　the
  object　into　the　forms　of　this　notion　is　the　Synthetic　Method。
  §　228n
  The　movement　of　the　Synthetic　method　is　the　reverse　of　the　Analytical　method。　The　latter　starts
  from　the　individual；　and　proceeds　to　the　universal；　in　the　former　the　starting…point　is　given　by　the
  universal　（as　a　definition）；　from　which　we　proceed　by　particularising　（in　division）　to　the　individual
  （the　theorem）。　The　Synthetic　method　thus　presents　itself　as　the　development　…　the　'moments'　of　the
  notion　on　the　object。
  Definition；　Division　and　Theorem
  §　229
  ＇a＇　When　the　object　has　been　in　the　first　instance　brought　by　cognition　into　the
  form　of　the　specific　notion　in　general；　so　that　in　this　way　its　genus　and　its
  universal　character　or　speciality　are　explicitly　stated；　we　have　the　Definition。　The
  materials　and　the　proof　of　Definition　are　procured　by　means　of　the　Analytical
  method　（§　227）。　The　specific　character　however　is　expected　to　be　a　'mark'　only：
  that　is　to　say　it　is　to　be　in　behoof　only　of　the　purely　subjective　cognition　which　is
  external　to　the　object。
  §　229n
  Definition　involves　the　three　organic　elements　of　the　notion：　the　universal　or　proximate　genus
  （genus　proximum）；　the　particular　or　specific　character　of　the　genus　（qualitas　specifica）；　and　the
  individual；　or　object　defined。　The　first　question　that　definition　suggests；　is　where　it　comes　from。
  The　general　answer　to　this　question　is　to　say；　that　definitions　originate　by　way　of　analysis。　This　will
  explain　how　it　happens　that　people　quarrel　about　the　correctness　of　proposed　definitions；　for　here
  everything　depends　on　what　perceptions　we　started　from；　and　what　points　of　view　we　had　before
  our　eyes　in　so　doing。　The　richer　the　object　to　be　defined　is；　that　is；　the　more　numerous　are　the
  aspects　which　it　offers　to　our　notice；　the　more　various　are　the　definitions　we　may　frame　of　it。　Thus
  there　are　quite　a　host　of　definitions　of　life；　of　the　state；　etc。　Geometry；　on　the　contrary；　dealing　with
  a　theme　so　abstract　as　space；　has　an　easy　task　in　giving　definitions。　Again；　in　respect　of　the　matter
  or　contents　of　the　objects　defined；　there　is　no　constraining　necessity　present。　We　are　expected　to
  admit　that　space　exists；　that　there　are　plants；　animals；　etc。；　nor　is　it　the　business　of　geometry；
  botany；　etc。；　to　demonstrate　that　the　objects　in　question　necessarily　are。　This　very　circumstance
  makes　the　synthetic　method　of　cognition　as　little　suitable　for　philosophy　as　the　analytical：　for
  philosophy　has　above　all　things　to　leave　no　doubt　of　the　necessity　of　its　objects。　And　yet　several
  attempts　have　been　made　to　introduce　the　synthetic　method　into　philosophy。　Thus　Spinoza；　in
  particular；　begins　with　definitions。　He　says；　for　instance；　that　s