conditions。　（b）　The　conditions　are　passive；　and　used　as　materials　for　the　fact；　into
  the　content　of　which　they　thus　enter。　They　are　likewise　intrinsically　conformable
  to　this　content；　and　already　contain　its　whole　characteristic。
  ＇b＇　The　Fact　is　also　（a）　something　presupposed　or　ante…stated；　i。e。　is　it　at　first；
  and　as　supposed；　only　inner　and　possible；　and　also；　being　prior；　as　independent
  content　by　itself。　（b）　By　using　up　the　conditions；　it　receives　its　external　existence；
  the　realisation　of　the　articles　of　its　content；　which　reciprocally　correspond　to　the
  conditions；　so　that　while　it　presents　itself　out　of　these　as　the　facts；　it　also　proceeds
  from　them。
  ＇c＇　The　Activity　similarly　has　（a）　an　independent　existence　of　its　own　（as　man；　a
  character）；　and　at　the　same　time　it　is　possible　only　where　the　conditions　are　and
  the　fact。　（B）　It　is　the　movement　which　translates　the　conditions　into　fact；　and　the
  latter　into　the　former　as　the　side　of　existence；　or　rather　the　movement　which
  educes　the　fact　from　the　conditions　in　which　it　is　potentially　present；　and　which
  gives　existence　to　the　fact　by　abolishing　the　existence　possessed　by　the　conditions。
  In　so　far　as　these　three　elements　stand　to　each　other　in　the　shape　of　independent
  existences；　this　process　has　the　aspect　of　an　outward　necessity。　Outward
  necessity　has　a　limited　content　for　its　fact。　For　the　fact　is　this　whole；　in　phase　of
  singleness。　But　since　in　its　form　this　whole　is　external　to　itself；　it　is
  self…externalised　even　in　its　own　self　and　in　its　content；　and　this　externality；
  attaching　to　the　fact；　is　a　limit　of　its　content。
  §　149
  The　Circle　of　Circumstances
  Necessity；　then；　is　potentially　the　one　essence；　self…same；　but　not　full　of　content；
  in　the　reflected　light　of　which　its　distinctions　take　the　form　of　independent
  realities。　This　self…sameness　is　at　the　same　time；　as　absolute　form；　the　activity
  which　reduces　into　dependency　and　mediates　into　immediacy。　Whatever　is
  necessary　is　through　another；　which　is　broken　up　into　mediating　ground　（the　Fact
  and　the　Activity）　and　an　immediate　actuality；　or　accidental　circumstance；　which　is
  at　the　same　time　a　Condition。　The　necessary；　being　through　an　other；　is　not　in　and
  for　itself：　hypothetical；　it　is　a　mere　result　of　assumption。　But　this　intermediation　is
  just　as　immediate　however　as　the　abrogation　of　itself。　The　ground　and　contingent
  condition　is　translated　into　immediacy；　by　which　that　dependency　is　now　lifted　up
  into　actuality；　and　the　fact　has　closed　with　itself。　In　this　return　to　itself；　the
  necessary　simply　and　positively　is；　as　unconditioned　actuality。　The　necessary　is
  so；　mediated　through　a　circle　of　circumstances：　it　is　so；　because　the　circumstances
  are　so；　and　at　the　same　time　it　is　so；　unmediated：　it　is　so；　because　it　is。
  （a）　The　Relationship　of　Substantiality
  §　150
  The　necessary　is　in　itself　an　absolute　correlation　of　elements；　i。e。　the　process
  developed　in　the　preceding　paragraphs）；　in　which　the　correlation　also　suspends
  itself　to　absolute　identity。
  In　its　immediate　form　it　is　the　relationship　of　Substance　and　Accident。　The
  absolute　self…identity　of　this　relationship　is　Substance　as　such；　which　as　necessity
  gives　the　negative　to　this　form　of　inwardness；　and　thus　invests　itself　with
  actuality；　but　which　also　gives　the　negative　to　this　outward　thing。　In　this
  negativity；　the　actual；　as　immediate；　is　only　an　accidental　which　through　this　bare
  possibility　passes　over　into　another　actuality。　This　transition　is　the　identity　of
  substance；　regarded　as　form…activity。
  §　151
  Substance
  Substance　is　accordingly　the　totality　of　the　Accidents；　revealing　itself　in　them　as
  their　absolute　negativity　（that　is　to　say；　as　absolute　power）　and　at　the　same　time
  as　the　wealth　of　all　content。　This　content　however　is　nothing　but　that　very
  revelation；　since　the　character　（being　reflected　in　itself　to　make　content）　is　only　a
  passing　stage　of　the　form　which　passes　away　in　the　power　of　substance。
  Substantiality　is　the　absolute　form…activity　and　the　power　of　necessity：　all　content
  is　but　a　vanishing　element　which　merely　belongs　to　this　position；　where　there　is　an
  absolute　revulsion　of　form　and　content　into　one　another。
  §　151n
  In　the　history　of　philosophy　we　meet　with　Substance　as　the　principle　of　Spinoza's　system。　On　the
  import　and　value　of　this　much…praised　and　no…less　decried　philosophy　there　has　been　great
  misunderstanding　and　a　deal　of　talking　since　the　days　of　Spinoza。　The　atheism；　and　as　a　further
  charge；　the　pantheism　of　the　system　has　formed　the　commonest　ground　of　accusation。　These　cries
  arise　because　of　Spinoza's　conception　of　God　as　substance；　and　substance　only。　What　we　are　to
  think　of　this　charge　follows；　in　the　first　instance；　from　the　place　which　substance　takes　in　the
  system　of　the　logical　idea。　Though　an　essential　stage　in　the　evolution　of　the　idea；　substance　is　not
  the　same　with　absolute　idea；　but　the　idea　under　the　still　limited　form　of　necessity。
  ？
  It　is　true　that　God　is　necessity；　or；　as　we　may　also　put　it；　that　he　is　the　absolute　Thing：　he　is
  however　no　less　the　absolute　Person。　That　he　is　the　absolute　Person　however　is　a　point　which　the
  philosophy　of　Spinoza　never　reached：　and　on　that　side　it　falls　short　of　the　true　notion　of　God　which
  forms　the　content　of　religious　consciousness　in　Christianity。　Spinoza　was　by　descent　a　Jew；　and　it
  is　upon　the　whole　the　Oriental　way　of　seeing　things；　according　to　which　the　nature　of　the　finite
  world　seems　frail　and　transient；　that　has　found　its　intellectual　expression　in　his　system。　This　Oriental
  view　of　the　unity　of　substance　certainly　gives　the　basis　for　all　real　further　development。　Still　it　is　not
  the　final　idea。　It　is　marked　by　the　absence　of　the　principle　of　the　Western　world；　the　principle　of
  individuality；　which　first　appeared　under　a　philosophic　shape；　contemporaneously　with　Spinoza；　in
  the　Monadology　of　Leibnitz。
  From　this　point　we　glance　back　to　the　alleged　atheism　of　Spinoza。　The　charge　will　be　seen　to　be
  unfounded　if　we　remember　that　his　system；　instead　of　denying　God；　rather　recognises　that　he　alone
  really　is。　Nor　can　it　be　maintained　that　the　God　of　Spinoza；　although　he　is　described　as　alone　true；
  is　not　the　true　God；　and　therefore　as　good　as　no　God。　If　that　were　a　just　charge；　it　would　only
  prove　that　all　other　systems；　where　speculation　has　not　gone　beyond　a　subordinate　stage　of　the
  idea　—　that　the　Jews　and　Mohammedans　who　know　God　only　as　the　Lord　—　and　that　even　the
  many　Christians　for　whom　God　is　merely　the　most　high；　unknowable；　and　transcendent　being；　are
  as　much　atheists　as　Spinoza。　The　so…called　atheism　of　Spinoza　is　merely　an　exaggeration　of　the
  fact　that　he　defrauds　the　principle　of　difference　or　finitude　of　its　due。　Hence　his　system；　as　it　holds
  that　there　is　properly　speaking　no　world；　at　any　rate　that　the　world　has　no　positive　being；　should
  rather　be　styled　Acosmism。　These　considerations　will　also　show　what　is　to　be　said　of　the　charge　of
  Pantheism。　If　Pantheism　means；　as　it　often　does；　the　doctrine　which　takes　finite　things　in　their
  finitude　and　in　the　complex　of　them　to　be　God；　we　must　acquit　the　system　of　Spinoza　of　the　crime
  of　Pantheism。　For　in　that　system；　finite　things　and　the　world　as　a　whole　are　denied　all　truth。　On　the
  other　hand；　the　philosophy　which　is　Acosmism　is　for　that　reason　certainly　pantheistic。
  The　shortcoming　thus　acknowledged　to　attach　to　the　content　turns　out　at　the　same　time　to　be　a
  shortcoming　in　respect　of　form。　Spinoza　puts　substance　at　the　head　of　his　system；　and　defines　it　to
  be　the　unity　of　thought　and　extension；　without　demonstrating　how　he　gets　to　this　distinction；　or　how
  he　traces　it　back　to　the　unity　of　substance。　The　further　treatment　of　the　subject　proceeds　in　what　is
  called　the　mathematical　method。　Definitions　and　axioms　are　first　laid　down：　after　them　comes　a
  series　of　theorems；　which　are　proved　by　an　analytical　reduction　of　them　to　these　unproved
  postulates。　Although　the　system　of　Spinoza；　and　that　even　by　those　who　altogether　reject　its
  contents　and　results；　is　praised　for　the　strict　sequence　of　its　method；　such　unqualified　praise　of　the
  form　is　as　little　justified　as　an　unqualified　rejection　of　the　content。　The　defect　of　the　content　is　that
  the　form　is　not　known　as　immanent　in　it；　and　therefore　only　approaches　it　as　an　outer　and
  subjective　form。　As　intuitively　accepted　by　Spinoza　without　a　previous　mediation　by　dialectic；
  Substance；　as　the　universal　negative　power；　is　as　it　were　a　dark　shapeless　abyss　which　engulfs　all
  definite　content　as　radically　null；　and　produces　from　itself　nothing　that　has　a　positive　subsistence　of
  its　own。
  §　152
  At　the　stage　where　substance；　as　absolute　power；　is　the　self…relating　power　（itself
  a　merely　inner　possibility）；　which　thus　determines　itself　to　accidentality　—　from
  which　power　the　externality　it　thereby　creates　is　distinguished　—　necessity　is　a
  correlation　strictly　so　called；　just　as　in　the　f