capriciously　when　it　seeks　to　ignore　this　admission　when　speaking　about　faith；　or
  it　betrays　a　want　of　reflection　not　to　know；　that；　if　the　necessity　of　education　be
  once　admitted；　mediation　is　pronounced　indispensable。
  §67n
  The　reminiscence　of　ideas　spoken　of　by　Plato　is　equivalent　to　saying　that　ideas　implicitly　exist　in
  man；　instead　of　being；　as　the　Sophists　assert；　a　foreign　importation　into　his　mind。　But　to　conceive
  knowledge　as　reminiscence　does　not　interfere　with；　or　set　aside　as　useless；　the　development　of
  what　is　implicitly　in　man；　which　development　is　another　word　for　mediation。　The　same　holds　good
  of　the　innate　ideas　that　we　find　in　Descartes　and　the　Scotch　philosophers。　These　ideas　are　only
  potential　in　the　first　instance；　and　should　be　looked　at　as　being　a　sort　of　mere　capacity　in　man。
  §68
  In　the　case　of　these　experiences　the　appeal　turns　upon　something　that　shows　itself
  bound　up　with　immediate　consciousness。　Even　if　this　combination　be　in　the　first
  instance　taken　as　an　external　and　empirical　connection；　still；　even　for　empirical
  observation；　the　fact　of　its　being　constant　shows　it　to　be　essential　and　inseparable。
  But；　again；　if　this　immediate　consciousness；　as　exhibited　in　experience；　be　taken
  separately；　so　far　as　it　is　a　consciousness　of　God　and　the　divine　nature；　the　state
  of　mind　which　it　implies　is　generally　described　as　an　exaltation　above　the　finite；
  above　the　senses；　and　above　the　instinctive　desires　and　affections　of　the　natural
  heart：　which　exaltation　passes　over　into；　and　terminates　in；　faith　in　God　and　a
  divine　order。　It　is　apparent；　therefore；　that；　though　faith　may　be　an　immediate
  knowledge　and　certainty；　it　equally　implies　the　interposition　of　this　process　as　its
  antecedent　and　condition。
  It　has　been　already　observed；　that　the　so…called　proofs　of　the　being　of　God；　which
  start　from　finite　being；　give　an　expression　to　this　exaltation。　In　that　light　they　are
  no　inventions　of　an　oversubtle　reflection；　but　the　necessary　and　native　channel　in
  which　the　movement　of　mind　runs：　though　it　may　be　that；　in　their　ordinary　form；
  these　proofs　have　not　their　correct　and　adequate　expression。
  §69
  It　is　the　passage　（§　64）　from　the　subjective　Idea　to　being　which　forms　the　main
  concern　of　the　doctrine　of　immediate　knowledge。　A　primary　and　self…evident
  interconnection　is　declared　to　exist　between　our　Idea　and　being。　Yet　precisely　this
  central　point　of　transition；　utterly　irrespective　of　any　connections　which　show　in
  experience；　clearly　involves　a　mediation。　And　the　mediation　is　of　no　imperfect　or
  unreal　kind；　where　the　mediation　takes　place　with　and　through　something
  external；　but　one　comprehending　both　antecedent　and　conclusion。
  §70
  For；　what　this　theory　asserts　is　that　truth　lies　neither　in　the　Idea　as　a　merely
  subjective　thought；　nor　in　mere　being　on　its　own　account…that　mere　being　per　se；
  a　being　that　is　not　of　the　Idea；　is　the　sensible　finite　being　of　the　world。　Now　all
  this　only　affirms；　without　demonstration；　that　the　Idea　has　truth　only　by　means　of
  being；　and　being　has　truth　only　by　means　of　the　Idea。　The　maxim　of　immediate
  knowledge　rejects　an　indefinite　empty　immediacy　（and　such　is　abstract　being；　or
  pure　unity　taken　by　itself）；　and　affirms　in　its　stead　the　unity　of　the　Idea　with
  being。　And　it　acts　rightly　in　so　doing。　But　it　is　stupid　not　to　see　that　the　unity　of
  distinct　terms　or　modes　is　not　merely　a　purely　immediate　unity；　i。e。　unity　empty
  and　indeterminate；　but　that　…　with　equal　emphasis…the　one　term　is　shown　to　have
  truth　only　as　mediated　through　the　other　…　or；　if　the　phrase　be　preferred；　that
  either　term　is　only　mediated　with　truth　through　the　other。　That　the　quality　of
  mediation　is　involved　in　the　very　immediacy　of　intuition　is　thus　exhibited　as　a　fact；
  against　which　understanding；　conformably　to　the　fundamental　maxim　of
  immediate　knowledge　that　the　evidence　of　consciousness　is　infallible；　can　have
  nothing　to　object。　It　is　only　ordinary　abstract　understanding　which　takes　the　terms
  of　mediation　and　immediacy；　each　by　itself　absolutely；　to　represent　an　inflexible
  line　of　distinction；　and　thus　draws　upon　its　own　head　the　hopeless　task　of
  reconciling　them。　The　difficulty；　as　we　have　shown；　has　no　existence　in　the　fact；
  and。　it　vanishes　in　the　speculative　notion。
  §71
  The　one…sidedness　of　the　intuitional　school　has　certain　characteristics　attending
  upon　it；　which　we　shall　proceed　to　point　out　in　their　main　features；　now　that　we
  have　discussed　the　fundamental　principle。　The　first　of　these　corollaries　is　as
  follows。　Since　the　criterion　of　truth　is　found；　not　in　the　nature　of　the　content；　but
  in　the　mere　fact　of　consciousness；　every　alleged　truth　has　no　other　basis　than
  subjective　certitude　and　the　assertion　that　we　discover　a　certain　fact　in　our
  consciousness。　What　I　discover　in　my　consciousness　is　thus　exaggerated　into　a
  fact　of　the　consciousness　of　all；　and　even　passed　off　for　the　very　nature　of
  consciousness。
  Among　the　so…called　proofs　of　the　existence　of　God；　there　used　to　stand　the
  consensus　gentium；　to　which　appeal　is　made　as　early　as　Cicero。　The　consensus
  gentium　is　a　weighty　authority；　and　the　transition　is　easy　and　natural；　from　the
  circumstance　that　a　certain　fact　is　found　in　the　consciousness　of　every　one　to　the
  conclusion　that　it　is　a　necessary　element　in　the　very　nature　of　consciousness。　In
  this　category　of　general　agreement　there　was　latent　the　deep…rooted　perception；
  which　does　not　escape　even　the　least　cultivated　mind；　that　the　consciousness　of
  the　individual　is　at　the　same　time　particular　and　accidental。　Yet　unless　we　examine
  the　nature　of　this　consciousness　itself；　stripping　it　of　its　particular　and　accidental
  elements　and；　by　the　toilsome　operation　of　reflection　disclosing　the　universal　in　its
  entirety　and　purity；　it　is　only　a　unanimous　agreement　upon　a　given　point　that　can
  authorise　a　decent　presumption　that　that　point　is　part　of　the　very　nature　of
  consciousness。
  Of　course；　if　thought　insists　on　seeing　the　necessity　of　what　is　presented　as　a　fact
  of　general　occurrence；　the　consensus　gentium　is　certainly　not　sufficient。　Yet　even
  granting　the　universality　of　the　fact　to　be　a　satisfactory　proof；　it　has　been　found
  impossible　to　establish　the　belief　in　God　on　such　an　argument；　because　experience
  shows　that　there　are　individuals　and　nations　without　any　such　faith。
  In　order　to　judge　of　the　greater　or　less　extent　to　which　Experience　shows　cases　of　Atheism　or　of
  the　belief　in　God；　it　is　all…important　to　know　if　the　mere　general　conception　of　deity　suffices；　or　if
  a　more　definite　knowledge　of　God　is　required。　The　Christian　world　would　certainly　refuse　the
  title　of　God　to　the　idols　of　the　Hindus　and　the　Chinese；　to　the　fetishes　of　the　Africans；　and　even
  to　the　gods　of　Greece　themselves。　If　so；　a　believer　in　these　idols　would　not　be　a　believer　in　God。
  If　it　were　contended；　on　the　other　hand；　that　such　a　belief　in　idols　implies　some　sort　of　belief　in
  God；　as　the　species　implies　the　genus；　then　idolatry　would　argue　not　faith　in　an　idol　merely；　but
  faith　in　God。　The　Athenians　took　an　opposite　view。　The　poets　and　philosophers　who　explained
  Zeus　to　be　a　cloud；　and　maintained　that　there　was　only　one　God；　were　treated　as　atheists　at
  Athens。
  The　danger　in　these　questions　lies　in　looking　at　what　the　mind　may　make　out　of　an　object；　and
  not　what　that　object　actually　and　explicitly　is。　If　we　fail　to　note　this　distinction；　the　commonest
  perceptions　of　men's　senses　will　be　religion：　for　every　such　perception；　and　indeed　every　act　of
  mind；　implicitly　contains　the　principle　which；　when　it　is　purified　and　developed；　rises　to　religion。
  But　to　be　capable　of　religion　is　one　thing；　to　have　it　another。　And　religion　yet　implicit　is　only　a
  capacity　or　a　possibility。
  Thus　in　modern　times；　travellers　have　found　tribes　（as　Captains　Ross　and　Parry　found　the
  Esquimaux）　which；　as　they　tell　us；　have　not　even　that　small　modicum　of　religion　possessed　by
  African　sorcerers；　the　goetes　of　Herodotus。　On　the　other　hand；　an　Englishman；　who　spent　the
  first　months　of　the　last　Jubilee　at　Rome；　says；　in　his　account　of　the　modern　Romans；　that　the
  common　people　are　bigots；　whilst　those　who　can　read　and　write　are　atheists　to　a　man。
  The　charge　of　Atheism　is　seldom　heard　in　modern　times：　principally　because　the　facts　and　the
  requirements　of　religion　are　reduced　to　a　minimum。　（See　§　73。）
  But　there　can　be　nothing　shorter　and　more　convenient　than　to　have　the　bare
  assertion　to　make；　that　we　discover　a　fact　in　our　consciousness；　and　are　certain
  that　it　is　true：　and　to　declare　that　this　certainty；　instead　of　proceeding　from　our
  particular　mental　constitution　only；　belongs　to　the　very　nature　of　the　mind。
  §72
  A　second　corollary　which　results　from　holding　immediacy　of　consciousness　to　be
  the　criterion　of　truth　is　that　all　superstition　or　idolatry　is　all