§32
  （3）　In　the　third　place；　this　system　of　metaphysic　turned　into　Dogmatism。　When
  our　thoughts　never　ranges　beyond　narrow　and　rigid　terms；　we　are　forced　to
  assume　that　of　two　opposite　assertions；　such　as　were　the　above　propositions；　the
  one　must　be　true　and　the　other　false。
  §32n
  Dogmatism　may　be　most　simply　described　as　the　contrary　of　Scepticism。　The　ancient　Sceptics
  gave　the　name　of　Dogmatism　to　every　philosophy　whatever　holding　a　system　of　definite　doctrine。
  In　this　large　sense　Scepticism　may　apply　the　name　even　to　philosophy　which　is　properly
  Speculative。　But　in　the　narrower　sense；　Dogmatism　consists　in　the　tenacity　which　draws　a　hard
  and　fast　line　between　certain　terms　and　others　opposite　to　them。　We　may　see　this　clearly　in　the
  strict　'either　…　or'：　for　instance；　The　world　is　either　finite　or　infinite；　but　one　of　these　two　it　must　be。
  The　contrary　of　this　rigidity　is　the　characteristic　of　all　Speculative　truth。　There　no　such　inadequate
  formulae　are　allowed；　nor　can　they　possibly　exhaust　it。　These　formulae　Speculative　truth　holds　in
  union　as　a　totality；　whereas　Dogmatism　invests　them　in　their　isolation　with　a　title　to　fixity　and　truth。
  It　often　happens　in　philosophy　that　the　half…truth　takes　its　place　beside　the　whole　truth　and
  assumes　on　its　own　account　the　position　of　something　permanent。　But　the　fact　is　that　the　half…truth；
  instead　of　being　a　fixed　or　self…subsistent　principle；　is　a　mere　element　absolved　and　included　in　the
  whole。　The　metaphysic　of　understanding　is　dogmatic；　because　it　maintains　half…truths　in　their
  isolation：　whereas　the　idealism　of　speculative　philosophy　carries　out　the　principle　of　totality　and
  shows　that　it　can　reach　beyond　the　inadequate　formularies　of　abstract　thought。　Thus　idealism
  would　say：　The　soul　is　neither　finite　only；　nor　infinite　only；　it　is　really　the　one　just　as　much　as　the
  other；　and　in　that　way　neither　the　one　nor　the　other。　In　other　words；　such　formularies　in　their
  isolation　are　inadmissible；　and　only　come　into　account　as　formative　elements　in　a　larger　notion。
  Such　idealism　we　see　even　in　the　ordinary　phases　of　consciousness。　Thus　we　say　of　sensible
  things；　that　they　are　changeable：　that　is；　they　are；　but　it　is　equally　true　that　they　are　not。　We　show
  more　obstinacy　in　dealing　with　the　categories　of　the　understanding。　These　are　terms　which　we
  believe　to　be　somewhat　firmer　…　or　even　absolutely　firm　and　fast。　We　look　upon　them　as　separated
  from　each　other　by　an　infinite　chasm；　so　that　opposite　categories　can　never　get　at　each　other。　The
  battle　of　reason　is　the　struggle　to　break　up　the　rigidity　to　which　the　understanding　has　reduced
  everything。
  §33
  The　first　part　of　this　metaphysic　in　its　systematic　form　is　Ontology；　or　the
  doctrine　of　the　abstract　characteristics　of　Being。　The　multitude　of　these
  characteristics；　and　the　limits　set　to　their　applicability；　are　not　founded　upon　any
  principle。　They　have　in　consequence　to　be　enumerated　as　experience　and
  circumstances　direct；　and　the　import　ascribed　to　them　is　founded　only　upon
  common　sensualised　conceptions；　upon　assertions　that　particular　words　are　used
  in　a　particular　sense；　and　even　perhaps　upon　etymology。　If　experience　pronounces
  the　list　to　be　complete；　and　if　the　usage　of　language；　by　its　agreement；　shows　the
  analysis　to　be　correct；　the　metaphysician　is　satisfied；　and　the　intrinsic　and
  independent　truth　and　necessity　of　such　characteristics　is　never　made　a　matter　of
  ：investigation　at　all。
  To　ask　if　being；　existence；　finitude；　simplicity；　complexity；　etc。　are　notions
  intrinsically　and　independently　true；　must　surprise　those　who　believe　that　a
  question　about　truth　can　only　concern　propositions　（as　to　whether　a　notion　is　or　is
  not　with　truth　to　be　attributed；　as　the　phrase　is；　to　a　subject）；　and　that　falsehood
  lies　in　the　contradiction　existing　between　the　subject　in　our　ideas；　and　the　notion
  to　be　predicated　of　it。　Now　as　the　notion　is　concrete；　it　and　every　character　of　it
  in　general　is　essentially　a　self…contained　unity　of　distinct　characteristics。　If　truth
  then　were　nothing　more　than　the　absence　of　contradiction；　it　would　be　first　of　all
  necessary　in　the　case　of　every　notion　to　examine　whether　it；　taken　individually；
  did　not　contain　this　sort　of　intrinsic　contradiction。
  §34
  The　second　branch　of　the　metaphysical　system　was　Rational　Psychology　or
  Pneumatology。　It　dealt　with　the　metaphysical　nature　of　the　soul　…　that　is；　of　the
  Mind　regarded　as　a　thing。　It　expected　to　find　immortality　in　a　sphere　dominated
  by　the　laws　of　composition；　time；　qualitative　change；　and　quantitative　increase　or
  decrease。
  §34n
  The　name　'rational'；　given　to　this　species　of　psychology；　served　to　contrast　it　with　empirical　modes
  of　observing　the　phenomena　of　the　soul　Rational　psychology　viewed　the　soul　in　its　metaphysical
  nature；　and　through　the　categories　supplied　by　abstract　thought。　The　rationalists　endeavoured　to
  ascertain　the　inner　nature　of　the　soul　as　it　is　in　itself　and　as　it　is　for　thought。　In　philosophy　at　present
  we　hear　little　of　the　soul：　the　favourite　term　is　now　mind　（spirit）。　The　two　are　distinct；　soul　being　as
  it　were　the　middle　term　between　body　and　spirit；　or　the　bond　between　the　two。　The　mind；　as　soul；
  is　immersed　in　corporeity；　and　the　soul　is　the　animating　principle　of　the　body。
  The　pre…Kantian　metaphysic；　we　say；　viewed　the　soul　as　a　thing。　'Thing'　is　a　very　ambiguous
  word。　By　a　thing；　we　mean；　firstly；　an　immediate　existence；　something　we　represent　in　sensuous
  form：　and　in　this　meaning　the　term　has　been　applied　to　the　soul。　Hence　the　question　regarding　the
  seat　of　the　soul。　Of　course；　if　the　soul　have　a　seat；　it　is　in　space　and　sensuously　envisaged。　So；　too；
  if　the　soul　be　viewed　as　a　thing　we　can　ask　whether　the　soul　is　simple　or　composite。　The　question
  is　important　as　bearing　on　the　immortality　of　the　soul；　which　is　supposed　to　depend　on　the　absence
  of　composition。　But　the　fact　is；　that　in　abstract　simplicity　we　have　a　category；　which　as　little
  corresponds　to　the　nature　of　the　soul；　as　that　of　compositeness。
  One　word　on　the　relation　of　rational　to　empirical　psychology。　The　former；　because　it　sets　itself　to
  apply　thought　to　cognise　mind　and　even　to　demonstrate　the　result　of　such　thinking；　is　the　higher；
  whereas　empirical　psychology　starts　from　perception；　and　only　recounts　and　describes　what
  perception　supplies。　But　if　we　propose　to　think　the　mind；　we　must　not　be　quite　so　shy　of　its　special
  phenomena。　Mind　is　essentially　active　in　the　same　sense　as　the　Schoolmen　＇Scholastics＇　said　that
  God　is　'absolute　actuosity'。　But　if　the　mind　is　active　it　must　as　it　were　utter　itself。　It　is　wrong
  therefore　to　take　the　mind　for　a　processless　ens；　as　did　the　old　metaphysic　which　divided　the
  processless　inward　life　of　the　mind　from　its　outward　life。　The　mind；　of　all　things；　must　be　looked　at
  in　its　concrete　actuality；　in　its　energy；　and　in　such　a　way　that　its　manifestations　are　seen　to　be
  determined　by　its　inward　force。
  §35
  The　third　branch　of　metaphysics　was　Cosmology。　The　topics　it　embraced　were
  the　world；　its　contingency；　necessity；　eternity；　limitation　in　time　and　space：　the
  laws　（only　formal）　of　its　changes：　the　freedom　of　man　and　the　origin　of　evil。
  To　these　topics　it　applied　what　were　believed　to　be　thoroughgoing　contrasts：　such
  as　contingency　and　necessity；　eternal　and　internal　necessity；　efficient　and　final
  cause；　or　causality　in　general　and　design；　essence　or　substance　and　phenomenon；
  form　and　matter；　freedom　and　necessity；　happiness　and　pain；　good　and　evil。
  The　object　of　Cosmology　comprised　not　merely　Nature；　but　Mind　too；　in　its　external　complicating
  in　its　phenomenon…in　fact；　existence　in　general；　or　the　sum　of　finite　things。　This　object　however　it
  viewed　not　as　a　concrete　whole；　but　only　under　certain　abstract　points　of　view。　Thus　the　questions
  Cosmology　attempted　to　solve　were　such　as　these：　Is　accident　or　necessity　dominant　in　the　world？
  Is　the　world　eternal　or　created？　It　was　therefore　a　chief　concern　of　this　study　to　lay　down　what
  were　called　general　cosmological　laws：　for　instance；　that　Nature　does　not　act　by　fits　an　starts。　And
  by　fits　and　starts　（saltus）　they　meant　a　qualitative　difference　or　qualitative　alteration　showing　itself
  without　any　antecedent　determining　mean：　whereas；　on　the　contrary；　a　gradual　change　（of　quantity）
  is　obviously　not　without　intermediation。
  In　regard　to　Mind　as　it　makes　itself　felt　in　the　world；　the　questions　which　Cosmology　chiefly
  discussed　turned　upon　the　freedom　of　man　and　the　origin　of　evil。　Nobody　can　deny　that　these　are
  questions　of　the　highest　importance。　But　to　give　them　a　satisfactory　answer；　it　is　above　all　things
  necessary　not　to　claim　finality　for　the　abstract　formulae　of　understanding；　or　to　suppose　that　each
  of　the　two　terms　in　an　antithesis　has　an　independent　subsistence　or　can　be　treated　in　its　isolation　as
  a　complete　and　self…centred　truth。　This　however　is　the　general　position　taken　by　the
  metaphysicians　before　Kant；