第 16 节
作者:桃桃逃      更新:2022-08-21 16:33      字数:9317
  thought we must not forget the difference between finite or discursive thinking and the thinking
  which is infinite and rational。 The categories; as they meet us prima facie and in isolation; are finite
  forms。 But truth is always infinite; and cannot be expressed or presented to consciousness in finite
  terms。 The phrase infinite thought may excite surprise; if we adhere to the modern conception
  that thought is always limited。 But it is; speaking rightly; the very essence of thought to be infinite。
  The nominal explanation of calling a thing finite is that it has an end; that it exists up to a certain
  point only; where it comes into contact with; and is limited by; its other。 The finite therefore
  subsists in reference to its other; which is its negation and presents itself as its limit。 Now thought is
  always in its own sphere its relations are with itself; and it is its own object。 In having a thought for
  object; I am at home with myself。 The thinking power; the 'I'; is therefore infinite; because; when it
  thinks; it is in relation to an object which is itself。 Generally speaking; an object means a something
  else; a negative confronting me。 But in the case where thought thinks itself; it has an object which is
  at the same time no object: in other words; its objectivity is suppressed and transformed into an
  idea。 Thought; as thought; therefore in its unmixed nature involves no limits; it is finite only when it
  keeps to limited categories; which it believes to be ultimate。 Infinite or speculative thought; on the
  contrary; while it no less defines; does in the very act of limiting and defining make that defect
  vanish。 And so infinity is not; as most frequently happens; to be conceived as an abstract away
  and away for ever and ever; but in the simple manner previously indicated。
  The thinking of the old metaphysical system was finite。 Its whole mode of action was regulated by
  categories; the limits of which it believed to be permanently fixed and not subject to any further
  negation。 Thus; one of its questions was: Has God existence? The question supposes that
  existence is an altogether positive term; a sort of ne plus ultra。 We shall see however at a later
  point that existence is by no means a merely positive term; but one which is too low for the
  Absolute Idea; and unworthy of God。 A second question in these metaphysical systems was: Is
  the world finite or infinite ? The very terms of the question assume that the finite is a permanent
  contradictory to the infinite: and one can easily see that; when they are so opposed; the infinite;
  which of course ought to be the whole; only appears as a single aspect and suffers restriction from
  the finite。 But a restricted infinity is itself only a finite。 In the same way it was asked whether the
  soul was simple or composite。 Simpleness was; in other words; taken to be an ultimate
  characteristic; giving expression to a whole truth。 Far from being so; simpleness is the expression
  of a half…truth; as one…sided and abstract as existence … a term of thought; which; as we shall
  hereafter see; is itself untrue and hence unable to hold truth。 If the soul be viewed as merely and
  abstractly simple; it is characterised in an inadequate and finite way。
  It was therefore the main question of the pre…Kantian metaphysic to discover whether predicates
  of the kind mentioned were to be ascribed to its objects。 Now these predicates are after all only
  limited formulae of the understanding which; instead of expressing the truth; merely impose a limit。
  More than this; it should be noted that the chief feature of the method lay in 'assigning' or
  'attributing' predicates to the object that was to be cognised; for example; to God。 But attribution
  is no more than an external reflection about the object: the predicates by which the object is to be
  determined are supplied from the resources of picture…thought; and are applied in a mechanical
  way。 Whereas; if we are to have genuine cognition; the object must characterise its own self and
  not derive its predicates from without。 Even supposing we follow the method of predicating; the
  mind cannot help feeling that predicates of this sort fail to exhaust the object。 From the same point
  of view the Orientals are quite correct in calling God the many…named or the myriad…named One。
  One after another of these finite categories leaves the soul unsatisfied; and the Oriental sage is
  compelled unceasingly to seek for more and more of such predicates。 In finite things it is no doubt
  the case that they have to be characterised through finite predicates: and with these things the
  understanding finds proper scope for its special action。 Itself finite; it knows only the nature of the
  finite。 Thus; when I call some action a theft; I have characterised the action in its essential facts;
  and such a knowledge is sufficient for the judge。 Similarly; finite things stand to each other as cause
  and effect; force and exercise; and when they are apprehended in these categories; they are
  known in their finitude。 But the objects of reason cannot be defined by these finite predicates。 To
  try to do so was the defect of the old metaphysic。
  §29
  Predicates of this kind; taken individually; have but a limited range of meaning;
  and no one can fail to perceive how inadequate they are; and how far they fall
  below the fullness of detail which our imaginative thought gives; in the case; for
  example; of God; Mind; or Nature。 Besides; though the fact of their being all
  predicates of one subject supplies them with a certain connection; their several
  meanings keep them apart: and consequently each is brought in as a stranger in
  relation to the others。
  (1) The first of these defects the Orientals sought to remedy; when; for example;
  they defined God by attributing to Him many names; but still they felt that the
  number of names would have had to be infinite。
  §30
  (2) In the second place; the metaphysical systems adopted a wrong criterion。
  Their objects were no doubt totalities which in their own proper selves belong to
  reason that is; to the organised and systematically developed universe of thought。
  But these totalities …God; the Soul; the World…were taken by the metaphysician as
  subjects made and ready; to form the basis for an application of the categories of
  the understanding。 They were assumed from popular conception。 Accordingly
  popular conception was the only canon for settling whether or not the predicates
  were suitable and sufficient。
  §31
  The common conceptions of God; the Soul; the World; may be supposed to
  afford thought a firm and fast footing。 They do not really do so。 Besides having a
  particular and subjective character clinging to them; and thus leaving room for
  great variety of interpretation; they themselves first of all require a firm and fast
  definition by thought。 This may be seen in any of these propositions where the
  predicate; or in philosophy the category; is needed to indicate what the subject; or
  the conception we start with; is。
  In such a sentence as 'God is eternal'; we begin with the conception of God; not
  knowing as yet what he is: to tell us that; is the business of the predicate。 In the
  principles of logic; accordingly; where the terms formulating the subject…matter
  are those of thought only; it is not merely superfluous to make these categories
  predicates to propositions in which God; or; still vaguer; the Absolute; is the
  subject; but it would also have the disadvantage of suggesting another canon than
  the nature of thought。 Besides; the propositional form (and for proposition; it
  would be more correct to substitute judgement) is not suited to express the
  concrete … and the true is always concrete … or the speculative。 Every judgement is
  by its form one…sided and; to that extent; false。
  §31n
  This metaphysic was not free or objective thinking。 Instead of letting the object freely and
  spontaneously expound its own characteristics; metaphysic presupposed it ready…made。 If anyone
  wishes to know what free thought means; he must go to Greek philosophy: for Scholasticism; like
  these metaphysical systems; accepted its facts; and accepted them as a dogma from the authority
  of the Church。 We moderns; too; by our whole upbringing; have been initiated into ideas which it
  is extremely difficult to overstep; on account of their far…reaching significance。 But the ancient
  philosophers were in a different position。 They were men who lived wholly in the perceptions of
  the senses; and who; after their rejection of mythology and its fancies; presupposed nothing but the
  heaven above and the earth around。 In these material; non…metaphysical surroundings; thought is
  free and enjoys its own privacy … cleared of everything material and thoroughly at home。 This
  feeling that we are all our own is characteristic of free thought … of that voyage into the open;
  where nothing is below us or above us; and we stand in solitude with ourselves alone。
  §32
  (3) In the third place; this system of metaph