第 12 节
作者:阎王      更新:2021-12-07 09:36      字数:9322
  other and the whole of which they are parts; but as the parts of the
  face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another; and
  have each of them a distinct function。 I should like to know whether
  this is still your opinion; or if not; I will ask you to define your
  meaning; and I shall not take you to task if you now make a
  different statement。 For I dare say that you may have said what you
  did only in order to make trial of me。
  I answer; Socrates; he said; that all these qualities are parts of
  virtue; and that four out of the five are to some extent similar;
  and that the fifth of them; which is courage; is very different from
  the other four; as I prove in this way: You may observe that many
  men are utterly unrighteous; unholy; intemperate; ignorant; who are
  nevertheless remarkable for their courage。
  Stop; I said; I should like to think about that。 When you speak of
  brave men; do you mean the confident; or another sort of nature?
  Yes; he said; I mean the impetuous; ready to go at that which others
  are afraid to approach。
  In the next place; you would affirm virtue to be a good thing; of
  which good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher。
  Yes; he said; I should say the best of all things; if I am in my
  right mind。
  And is it partly good and partly bad; I said; or wholly good?
  Wholly good; and in the highest degree。
  Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a
  well?
  I should say; the divers。
  And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?
  Yes; that is the reason。
  And who have confidence when fighting on horseback…the skilled
  horseman or the unskilled?
  The skilled。
  And who when fighting with light shields…the peltasts or the
  nonpeltasts?
  The peltasts。 And that is true of all other things; he said; if that
  is your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than
  those who have no knowledge; and they are more confident after they
  have learned than before。
  And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant; I said; of these
  things; and yet confident about them?
  Yes; he said; I have seen such persons far too confident。
  And are not these confident persons also courageous?
  In that case; he replied; courage would be a base thing; for the men
  of whom we are speaking are surely madmen。
  Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident?
  Yes; he said; to that statement I adhere。
  And those; I said; who are thus confident without knowledge are
  really not courageous; but mad; and in that case the wisest are also
  the most confident; and being the most confident are also the bravest;
  and upon that view again wisdom will be courage。
  Nay; Socrates; he replied; you are mistaken in your remembrance of
  what was said by me。 When you asked me; I certainly did say that the
  courageous are the confident; but I was never asked whether the
  confident are the courageous; if you had asked me; I should have
  answered 〃Not all of them〃: and what I did answer you have not
  proved to be false; although you proceeded to show that those who have
  knowledge are more courageous than they were before they had
  knowledge; and more courageous than others who have no knowledge;
  and were then led on to think that courage is the same as wisdom。
  But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that strength
  is wisdom。 You might begin by asking whether the strong are able;
  and I should say 〃Yes〃; and then whether those who know how to wrestle
  are not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to
  wrestle; and more able after than before they had learned; and I
  should assent。 And when I had admitted this; you might use my
  admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is
  strength; whereas in that case I should not have admitted; any more
  than in the other; that the able are strong; although I have
  admitted that the strong are able。 For there is a difference between
  ability and strength; the former is given by knowledge as well as by
  madness or rage; but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of
  the body。 And in like manner I say of confidence and courage; that
  they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are
  confident; but not all the confident courageous。 For confidence may be
  given to men by art; and also; like ability; by madness and rage;
  but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the
  soul。
  I said: You would admit; Protagoras; that some men live well and
  others ill?
  He assented。
  And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?
  He does not。
  But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life; will he not in
  that case have lived well?
  He will。
  Then to live pleasantly is a good; and to live unpleasantly an evil?
  Yes; he said; if the pleasure be good and honourable。
  And do you; Protagoras; like the rest of the world; call some
  pleasant things evil and some painful things good?…for I am rather
  disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant;
  if they have no consequences of another sort; and in as far as they
  are painful they are bad。
  I do not know; Socrates; he said; whether I can venture to assert in
  that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the
  painful the evil。 Having regard not only to my present answer; but
  also to the whole of my life; I shall be safer; if I am not
  mistaken; in saying that there are some pleasant things which are
  not good; and that there are some painful things which are good; and
  some which are not good; and that there are some which are neither
  good nor evil。
  And you would call pleasant; I said; the things which participate in
  pleasure or create pleasure?
  Certainly; he said。
  Then my meaning is; that in as far as they are pleasant they are
  good; and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself。
  According to your favourite mode of speech; Socrates; 〃Let us
  reflect about this;〃 he said; and if the reflection is to the point;
  and the result proves that pleasure and good are really the same; then
  we will agree; but if not; then we will argue。
  And would you wish to begin the enquiry?
  I said; or shall I begin?
  You ought to take the lead; he said; for you are the author of the
  discussion。
  May I employ an illustration? I said。 Suppose some one who is
  enquiring into the health or some other bodily quality of
  another:…he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers; and then
  he says; Uncover your chest and back to me that I may have a better
  view:…that is the sort of thing which I desire in this speculation。
  Having seen what your opinion is about good and pleasure; I am
  minded to say to you: Uncover your mind to me; Protagoras; and
  reveal your opinion about knowledge; that I may know whether you agree
  with the rest of the world。 Now the rest of the world are of opinion
  that knowledge is a principle not of strength; or of rule; or of
  command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge; and yet that
  the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger; or
  pleasure; or pain; or love; or perhaps by fear;…just as if knowledge
  were a slave; and might be dragged about anyhow。 Now is that your
  view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding
  thing; which cannot be overcome; and will not allow a man; if he
  only knows the difference of good and evil; to do anything which is
  contrary to knowledge; but that wisdom will have strength to help him?
  I agree with you; Socrates; said Protagoras; and not only so; but I;
  above all other men; am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the
  highest of human things。
  Good; I said; and true。 But are you aware that the majority of the
  world are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to
  know the things which are best; and not to do them when they might?
  And most persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that
  when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain; or
  pleasure; or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning。
  Yes; Socrates; he replied; and that is not the only point about
  which mankind are in error。
  Suppose; then; that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform
  them what is the nature of this affection which they call 〃being
  overcome by pleasure;〃 and which they affirm to be the reason why they
  do not always do what is best。 When we say to them: Friends; you are
  mistaken; and are saying what is not true; they would probably
  reply: Socrates and Protagoras; if this affection of the soul is not
  to be called 〃being overcome by pleasure;〃 pray; what is it; and by
  what name would you d