ing　pains；　sorrows；　and　everything　of　that　type…　yield　a　greater　sum　of　misery　in　the　longer　time？　And　if　thus　in　misery　the　evil　is　augmented　by　time　why　should　not　time　equally　augment　happiness　when　all　is　well？　　　　　In　the　matter　of　sorrows　and　pains　there　is；　no　doubt；　ground　for　saying　that　time　brings　increase：　for　example；　in　a　lingering　malady　the　evil　hardens　into　a　state；　and　as　time　goes　on　the　body　is　brought　lower　and　lower。　But　if　the　constitution　did　not　deteriorate；　if　the　mischief　grew　no　worse；　then；　here　too；　there　would　be　no　trouble　but　that　of　the　present　moment：　we　cannot　tell　the　past　into　the　tale　of　unhappiness　except　in　the　sense　that　it　has　gone　to　make　up　an　actually　existing　state…　in　the　sense　that；　the　evil　in　the　sufferer's　condition　having　been　extended　over　a　longer　time；　the　mischief　has　gained　ground。　The　increase　of　ill…being　then　is　due　to　the　aggravation　of　the　malady　not　to　the　extension　of　time。　　　　　It　may　be　pointed　out　also　that　this　greater　length　of　time　is　not　a　thing　existent　at　any　given　moment；　and　surely　a　〃more〃　is　not　to　be　made　out　by　adding　to　something　actually　present　something　that　has　passed　away。　　　　　No：　true　happiness　is　not　vague　and　fluid：　it　is　an　unchanging　state。　　　　　If　there　is　in　this　matter　any　increase　besides　that　of　mere　time；　it　is　in　the　sense　that　a　greater　happiness　is　the　reward　of　a　higher　virtue：　this　is　not　counting　up　to　the　credit　of　happiness　the　years　of　its　continuance；　it　is　simply　noting　the　high…water　mark　once　for　all　attained。　　　　　7。　But　if　we　are　to　consider　only　the　present　and　may　not　call　in　the　past　to　make　the　total；　why　do　we　not　reckon　so　in　the　case　of　time　itself；　where；　in　fact；　we　do　not　hesitate　to　add　the　past　to　the　present　and　call　the　total　greater？　Why　not　suppose　a　quantity　of　happiness　equivalent　to　a　quantity　of　time？　This　would　be　no　more　than　taking　it　lap　by　lap　to　correspond　with　time…laps　instead　of　choosing　to　consider　it　as　an　indivisible；　measurable　only　by　the　content　of　a　given　instant。　　　　　There　is　no　absurdity　in　taking　count　of　time　which　has　ceased　to　be：　we　are　merely　counting　what　is　past　and　finished；　as　we　might　count　the　dead：　but　to　treat　past　happiness　as　actually　existent　and　as　outweighing　present　happiness；　that　is　an　absurdity。　For　Happiness　must　be　an　achieved　and　existent　state；　whereas　any　time　over　and　apart　from　the　present　is　nonexistent：　all　progress　of　time　means　the　extinction　of　all　the　time　that　has　been。　　　　　Hence　time　is　aptly　described　as　a　mimic　of　eternity　that　seeks　to　break　up　in　its　fragmentary　flight　the　permanence　of　its　exemplar。　Thus　whatever　time　seizes　and　seals　to　itself　of　what　stands　permanent　in　eternity　is　annihilated…　saved　only　in　so　far　as　in　some　degree　it　still　belongs　to　eternity；　but　wholly　destroyed　if　it　be　unreservedly　absorbed　into　time。　　　　　If　Happiness　demands　the　possession　of　the　good　of　life；　it　clearly　has　to　do　with　the　life　of　Authentic…Existence　for　that　life　is　the　Best。　Now　the　life　of　Authentic…Existence　is　measurable　not　by　time　but　by　eternity；　and　eternity　is　not　a　more　or　a　less　or　a　thing　of　any　magnitude　but　is　the　unchangeable；　the　indivisible；　is　timeless　Being。　　　　　We　must　not　muddle　together　Being　and　Non…Being；　time　and　eternity；　not　even　everlasting　time　with　the　eternal；　we　cannot　make　laps　and　stages　of　an　absolute　unity；　all　must　be　taken　together；　wheresoever　and　howsoever　we　handle　it；　and　it　must　be　taken　at　that；　not　even　as　an　undivided　block　of　time　but　as　the　Life　of　Eternity；　a　stretch　not　made　up　of　periods　but　completely　rounded；　outside　of　all　notion　of　time。　　　　　8。　It　may　be　urged　that　the　actual　presence　of　past　experiences；　kept　present　by　Memory；　gives　the　advantage　to　the　man　of　the　longer　felicity。　　　　　But；　Memory　of　what　sort　of　experiences？　　　　　Memory　either　of　formerly　attained　wisdom　and　virtue…　in　which　case　we　have　a　better　man　and　the　argument　from　memory　is　given　up…　or　memory　of　past　pleasures；　as　if　the　man　that　has　arrived　at　felicity　must　roam　far　and　wide　in　search　of　gratifications　and　is　not　contented　by　the　bliss　actually　within　him。　　　　　And　what　is　there　pleasant　in　the　memory　of　pleasure？　What　is　it　to　recall　yesterday's　excellent　dinner？　Still　more　ridiculous；　one　of　ten　years　ago。　So；　too；　of　last　year's　morality。　　　　　9。　But　is　there　not　something　to　be　said　for　the　memory　of　the　various　forms　of　beauty？　　　　　That　is　the　resource　of　a　man　whose　life　is　without　beauty　in　the　present；　so　that；　for　lack　of　it　now；　he　grasps　at　the　memory　of　what　has　been。　　　　　10。　But；　it　may　be　said；　length　of　time　produces　an　abundance　of　good　actions　missed　by　the　man　whose　attainment　of　the　happy　state　is　recent…　if　indeed　we　can　think　at　all　of　a　state　of　happiness　where　good　actions　have　been　few。　　　　　Now　to　make　multiplicity；　whether　in　time　or　in　action；　essential　to　Happiness　is　to　put　it　together　by　combining　non…existents；　represented　by　the　past；　with　some　one　thing　that　actually　is。　This　consideration　it　was　that　led　us　at　the　very　beginning　to　place　Happiness　in　the　actually　existent　and　on　that　basis　to　launch　our　enquiry　as　to　whether　the　higher　degree　was　determined　by　the　longer　time。　It　might　be　thought　that　the　Happiness　of　longer　date　must　surpass　the　shorter　by　virtue　of　the　greater　number　of　acts　it　included。　　　　　But；　to　begin　with；　men　quite　outside　of　the　active　life　may　attain　the　state　of　felicity；　and　not　in　a　less　but　in　a　greater　degree　than　men　of　affairs。　　　　　Secondly；　the　good　does　not　derive　from　the　act　itself　but　from　the　inner　disposition　which　prompts　the　noble　conduct：　the　wise　and　good　man　in　his　very　action　harvests　the　good　not　by　what　he　does　but　by　what　he　is。　　　　　A　wicked　man　no　less　than　a　Sage　may　save　the　country；　and　the　good　of　the　act　is　for　all　alike；　no　matter　whose　was　the　saving　hand。　The　contentment　of　the　Sage　does　not　hang　upon　such　actions　and　events：　it　is　his　own　inner　habit　that　creates　at　once　his　felicity　and　whatever　pleasure　may　accompany　it。　　　　　To　put　Happiness　in　actions　is　to　put　it　in　things　that　are　outside　virtue　and　outside　the　Soul；　for　the　Soul's　expression　is　not　in　action　but　in　wisdom；　in　a　contemplative　operation　within　itself；　and　this；　this　alone；　is　Happiness。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SIXTH　TRACTATE。
  BEAUTY。
  1。　Beauty　addresses　itself　chiefly　to　sight；　but　there　is　a　beauty　for　the　hearing　too；　as　in　certain　combinations　of　words　and　in　all　kinds　of　music；　for　melodies　and　cadences　are　beautiful；　and　minds　that　lift　themselves　above　the　realm　of　sense　to　a　higher　order　are　aware　of　beauty　in　the　conduct　of　life；　in　actions；　in　character；　in　the　pursuits　of　the　intellect；　and　there　is　the　beauty　of　the　virtues。　What　loftier　beauty　there　may　be；　yet；　our　argument　will　bring　to　light。　　　　　What；　then；　is　it　that　gives　comeliness　to　material　forms　and　draws　the　ear　to　the　sweetness　perceived　in　sounds；　and　what　is　the　secret　of　the　beauty　there　is　in　all　that　derives　from　Soul？　　　　　Is　there　some　One　Principle　from　which　all　take　their　grace；　or　is　there　a　beauty　peculiar　to　the　embodied　and　another　for　the　bodiless？　Finally；　one　or　many；　what　would　such　a　Principle　be？　　　　　Consider　that　some　things；　material　shapes　for　instance；　are　gracious　not　by　anything　inherent　but　by　something　communicated；　while　others　are　lovely　of　themselves；　as；　for　example；　Virtue。　　　　　The　same　bodies　appear　sometimes　beautiful；　sometimes　not；　so　that　there　is　a　good　deal　between　being　body　and　being　beautiful。　　　　　What；　then；　is　this　something　that　shows　itself　in　certain　material　forms？　This　is　the　natural　beginning　of　our　enquiry。　　　　　What　is　it　that　attracts　the　eyes　of　those　to　whom　a　beautiful　object　is　presented；　and　calls　them；　lures　them；　towards　it；　and　fills　them　with　joy　at　the　sight？　If　we　possess　ourselves　of　this；　we　have　at　once　a　standpoint　for　the　wider　survey。　　　　　Almost　everyone　declares　that　the　symmetry　of　parts　towards　each　other　and　towards　a　whole；　with；　besides；　a　certain　charm　of　colour；　constitutes　the　beauty　recognized　by　the　eye；　that　in　visible　things；　as　indeed　in　all　else；　universally；　the　beautiful　thing　is　essentially　symmetrical；　patterned。　　　　　But　think　what　this　means。　　　　　Only　a　compound　can　be　beautiful；　never　anything　devoid　of　parts；　and　only　a　whole；　the　several　parts　will　have　beauty；　not　in　themselves；　but　only　as　working　together　to　give　a　comely　total。　Yet　beauty　in　an　aggregate　demands　beauty　in　details；　it　cannot　be　constructed　out　of　ugliness；　its　law　must　run　throughout。　　　　　All　the　loveliness　of　colour　and　even　the　light　of　the　sun；　being　devoid　of　parts　and　so　not　beautiful　by　symmetry；　must　be　ruled　out　of　the　realm　of　beauty。　And　how　comes　gold　to　be　a　beautiful　thing？　And　lightning　by　night；　and　the　stars；　why　are　these　so　fair？　　　　　In　sounds　also　the　simple　must　be　proscribed；　though　often　in　a　whole　noble　composition　each　several　tone　is　delicious　in　itself。　　　　　Again　since　the　one　face；　constant　in　symmetry；　appears　sometimes　fair　and　sometimes　not；　can　we　doubt　that　beauty　is　something　more　than　symmetry；　that　symmetry　itself　owes　its　beauty　to　a　remoter　principle？　　　　　Turn　to　what　is　attractive　in　methods　of　life　or　in　the　expression　of　thought；　are　we　to　call　in　symmetry　he