g　as　a　tyrannical　sovereign　or　an　exclusive　aristocracy　could　ever　exist。
  Again；　it　may　be　objected　that　the　poor　are　never　invested　with　the　sole　power　of　making　the　laws；　but　I　reply；　that　wherever　universal　suffrage　has　been　established　the　majority　of　the　community　unquestionably　exercises　the　legislative　authority；　and　if　it　be　proved　that　the　poor　always　constitute　the　majority；　it　may　be　added；　with　perfect　truth；　that　in　the　countries　in　which　they　possess　the　elective　franchise　they　possess　the　sole　power　of　making　laws。　　But　it　is　certain　that　in　all　the　nations　of　the　world　the　greater　number　has　always　consisted　of　those　persons　who　hold　no　property；　or　of　those　whose　property　is　insufficient　to　exempt　them　from　the　necessity　of　working　in　order　to　procure　an　easy　subsistence。　　Universal　suffrage　does　therefore；　in　point　of　fact；　invest　the　poor　with　the　government　of　society。
  The　disastrous　influence　which　popular　authority　may　sometimes　exercise　upon　the　finances　of　a　State　was　very　clearly　seen　in　some　of　the　democratic　republics　of　antiquity；　in　which　the　public　treasure　was　exhausted　in　order　to　relieve　indigent　citizens；　or　to　supply　the　games　and　theatrical　amusements　of　the　populace。　　It　is　true　that　the　representative　system　was　then　very　imperfectly　known；　and　that；　at　the　present　time；　the　influence　of　popular　passion　is　less　felt　in　the　conduct　of　public　affairs；　but　it　may　be　believed　that　the　delegate　will　in　the　end　conform　to　the　principles　of　his　constituents；　and　favor　their　propensities　as　much　as　their　interests。
  The　extravagance　of　democracy　is；　however；　less　to　be　dreaded　in　proportion　as　the　people　acquires　a　share　of　property；　because　on　the　one　hand　the　contributions　of　the　rich　are　then　less　needed；　and；　on　the　other；　it　is　more　difficult　to　lay　on　taxes　which　do　not　affect　the　interests　of　the　lower　classes。　　On　this　account　universal　suffrage　would　be　less　dangerous　in　France　than　in　England；　because　in　the　latter　country　the　property　on　which　taxes　may　be　levied　is　vested　in　fewer　hands。　　America；　where　the　great　majority　of　the　citizens　possess　some　fortune；　is　in　a　still　more　favorable　position　than　France。
  There　are　still　further　causes　which　may　increase　the　sum　of　public　expenditure　in　democratic　countries。　　When　the　aristocracy　governs；　the　individuals　who　conduct　the　affairs　of　State　are　exempted　by　their　own　station　in　society　from　every　kind　of　privation；　they　are　contented　with　their　position；　power　and　renown　are　the　objects　for　which　they　strive；　and；　as　they　are　placed　far　above　the　obscurer　throng　of　citizens；　they　do　not　always　distinctly　perceive　how　the　well…being　of　the　mass　of　the　people　ought　to　redound　to　their　own　honor。　　They　are　not　indeed　callous　to　the　sufferings　of　the　poor；　but　they　cannot　feel　those　miseries　as　acutely　as　if　they　were　themselves　partakers　of　them。　　Provided　that　the　people　appear　to　submit　to　its　lot；　the　rulers　are　satisfied；　and　they　demand　nothing　further　from　the　Government。　　An　aristocracy　is　more　intent　upon　the　means　of　maintaining　its　influence　than　upon　the　means　of　improving　its　condition。
  When；　on　the　contrary；　the　people　is　invested　with　the　supreme　authority；　the　perpetual　sense　of　their　own　miseries　impels　the　rulers　of　society　to　seek　for　perpetual　ameliorations。　　A　thousand　different　objects　are　subjected　to　improvement；　the　most　trivial　details　are　sought　out　as　susceptible　of　amendment；　and　those　changes　which　are　accompanied　with　considerable　expense　are　more　especially　advocated；　since　the　object　is　to　render　the　condition　of　the　poor　more　tolerable；　who　cannot　pay　for　themselves。
  Moreover；　all　democratic　communities　are　agitated　by　an　ill…　defined　excitement　and　by　a　kind　of　feverish　impatience；　that　engender　a　multitude　of　innovations；　almost　all　of　which　are　attended　with　expense。
  In　monarchies　and　aristocracies　the　natural　taste　which　the　rulers　have　for　power　and　for　renown　is　stimulated　by　the　promptings　of　ambition；　and　they　are　frequently　incited　by　these　temptations　to　very　costly　undertakings。　In　democracies；　where　the　rulers　labor　under　privations；　they　can　only　be　courted　by　such　means　as　improve　their　well…being；　and　these　improvements　cannot　take　place　without　a　sacrifice　of　money。　　When　a　people　begins　to　reflect　upon　its　situation；　it　discovers　a　multitude　of　wants　to　which　it　had　not　before　been　subject；　and　to　satisfy　these　exigencies　recourse　must　be　had　to　the　coffers　of　the　State。　　Hence　it　arises　that　the　public　charges　increase　in　proportion　as　civilization　spreads；　and　that　imposts　are　augmented　as　knowledge　pervades　the　community。
  The　last　cause　which　frequently　renders　a　democratic　government　dearer　than　any　other　is；　that　a　democracy　does　not　always　succeed　in　moderating　its　expenditure；　because　it　does　not　understand　the　art　of　being　economical。　　As　the　designs　which　it　entertains　are　frequently　changed；　and　the　agents　of　those　designs　are　still　more　frequently　removed；　its　undertakings　are　often　ill　conducted　or　left　unfinished：　in　the　former　case　the　State　spends　sums　out　of　all　proportion　to　the　end　which　it　proposes　to　accomplish；　in　the　second；　the　expense　itself　is　unprofitable。　*f
  ＇Footnote　f：　The　gross　receipts　of　the　Treasury　of　the　United　States　in　1832　were　about　28；000；000；　in　1870　they　had　risen　to　411；000；000。　　The　gross　expenditure　in　1832　was　30；000；000；　in　1870；　309；000；000。＇
  Tendencies　Of　The　American　Democracy　As　Regards　The　Salaries　Of　Public　Officers
  In　the　democracies　those　who　establish　high　salaries　have　no　chance　of　profiting　by　them　…　Tendency　of　the　American　democracy　to　increase　the　salaries　of　subordinate　officers　and　to　lower　those　of　the　more　important　functionaries　…　Reason　of　this　…　Comparative　statement　of　the　salaries　of　public　officers　in　the　United　States　and　in　France。
  There　is　a　powerful　reason　which　usually　induces　democracies　to　economize　upon　the　salaries　of　public　officers。　　As　the　number　of　citizens　who　dispense　the　remuneration　is　extremely　large　in　democratic　countries；　so　the　number　of　persons　who　can　hope　to　be　benefited　by　the　receipt　of　it　is　comparatively　small。　　In　aristocratic　countries；　on　the　contrary；　the　individuals　who　fix　high　salaries　have　almost　always　a　vague　hope　of　profiting　by　them。　　These　appointments　may　be　looked　upon　as　a　capital　which　they　create　for　their　own　use；　or　at　least　as　a　resource　for　their　children。
  It　must；　however；　be　allowed　that　a　democratic　State　is　most　parsimonious　towards　its　principal　agents。　　In　America　the　secondary　officers　are　much　better　paid；　and　the　dignitaries　of　the　administration　much　worse；　than　they　are　elsewhere。
  These　opposite　effects　result　from　the　same　cause；　the　people　fixes　the　salaries　of　the　public　officers　in　both　cases；　and　the　scale　of　remuneration　is　determined　by　the　consideration　of　its　own　wants。　　It　is　held　to　be　fair　that　the　servants　of　the　public　should　be　placed　in　the　same　easy　circumstances　as　the　public　itself；　*g　but　when　the　question　turns　upon　the　salaries　of　the　great　officers　of　State；　this　rule　fails；　and　chance　alone　can　guide　the　popular　decision。　　The　poor　have　no　adequate　conception　of　the　wants　which　the　higher　classes　of　society　may　feel。　　The　sum　which　is　scanty　to　the　rich　appears　enormous　to　the　poor　man　whose　wants　do　not　extend　beyond　the　necessaries　of　life；　and　in　his　estimation　the　Governor　of　a　State；　with　his　twelve　or　fifteen　hundred　dollars　a　year；　is　a　very　fortunate　and　enviable　being。　*h　If　you　undertake　to　convince　him　that　the　representative　of　a　great　people　ought　to　be　able　to　maintain　some　show　of　splendor　in　the　eyes　of　foreign　nations；　he　will　perhaps　assent　to　your　meaning；　but　when　he　reflects　on　his　own　humble　dwelling；　and　on　the　hard…　earned　produce　of　his　wearisome　toil；　he　remembers　all　that　he　could　do　with　a　salary　which　you　say　is　insufficient；　and　he　is　startled　or　almost　frightened　at　the　sight　of　such　uncommon　wealth。　　Besides；　the　secondary　public　officer　is　almost　on　a　level　with　the　people；　whilst　the　others　are　raised　above　it。　　The　former　may　therefore　excite　his　interest；　but　the　latter　begins　to　arouse　his　envy。
  ＇Footnote　g：　The　easy　circumstances　in　which　secondary　functionaries　are　placed　in　the　United　States　result　also　from　another　cause；　which　is　independent　of　the　general　tendencies　of　democracy；　every　kind　of　private　business　is　very　lucrative；　and　the　State　would　not　be　served　at　all　if　it　did　not　pay　its　servants。　　The　country　is　in　the　position　of　a　commercial　undertaking；　which　is　obliged　to　sustain　an　expensive　competition；　notwithstanding　its　tastes　for　economy。＇
  ＇Footnote　h：　The　State　of　Ohio；　which　contains　a　million　of　inhabitants；　gives　its　Governor　a　salary　of　only　1；200　a　year。＇
  This　is　very　clearly　seen　in　the　United　States；　where　the　salaries　seem　to　decrease　as　the　authority　of　those　who　receive　them　augments　*i
  ＇Footnote　i：　To　render　this　assertion　perfectly　evident；　it　will　suffice　to　examine　the　scale　of　salaries　of　the　agents　of　the　Federal　Government。　　I　have　added　the　salaries　attached　to　the　corresponding　officers　in　France　under　the　constitutional　monarchy　to　complete　the　comparison。
  United　States　　　　　Treasury　Department　Messenger