lish　the　affirmative；　but　in　1789　Congress　formally　decided　that；　as　the　President　was　responsible　for　his　actions；　he　ought　not　to　be　forced　to　employ　agents　who　had　forfeited　his　esteem。　　See　Kent's　〃Commentaries；　vol。　i。　p。　289。＇　　　＇Footnote　r：　＇This　comparison　applied　to　the　Constitutional　King　of　France　and　to　the　powers　he　held　under　the　Charter　of　1830；　till　the　overthrow　of　the　monarchy　in　1848。　…　Translator's　Note。＇＇
  Nevertheless；　the　supremacy　of　public　opinion　is　no　less　above　the　head　of　the　one　than　of　the　other。　　This　power　is　less　definite；　less　evident；　and　less　sanctioned　by　the　laws　in　France　than　in　America；　but　in　fact　it　exists。　In　America；　it　acts　by　elections　and　decrees；　in　France　it　proceeds　by　revolutions；　but　notwithstanding　the　different　constitutions　of　these　two　countries；　public　opinion　is　the　predominant　authority　in　both　of　them。　　The　fundamental　principle　of　legislation　…　a　principle　essentially　republican　…　is　the　same　in　both　countries；　although　its　consequences　may　be　different；　and　its　results　more　or　less　extensive。　　Whence　I　am　led　to　conclude　that　France　with　its　King　is　nearer　akin　to　a　republic　than　the　Union　with　its　President　is　to　a　monarchy。
  In　what　I　have　been　saying　I　have　only　touched　upon　the　main　points　of　distinction；　and　if　I　could　have　entered　into　details；　the　contrast　would　have　been　rendered　still　more　striking。　　I　have　remarked　that　the　authority　of　the　President　in　the　United　States　is　only　exercised　within　the　limits　of　a　partial　sovereignty；　whilst　that　of　the　King　in　France　is　undivided。　　I　might　have　gone　on　to　show　that　the　power　of　the　King's　government　in　France　exceeds　its　natural　limits；　however　extensive　they　may　be；　and　penetrates　in　a　thousand　different　ways　into　the　administration　of　private　interests。　　Amongst　the　examples　of　this　influence　may　be　quoted　that　which　results　from　the　great　number　of　public　functionaries；　who　all　derive　their　appointments　from　the　Government。　　This　number　now　exceeds　all　previous　limits；　it　amounts　to　138；000　*s　nominations；　each　of　which　may　be　considered　as　an　element　of　power。　　The　President　of　the　United　States　has　not　the　exclusive　right　of　making　any　public　appointments；　and　their　whole　number　scarcely　exceeds　12；000。　*t
  ＇Footnote　s：　The　sums　annually　paid　by　the　State　to　these　officers　amount　to　200；000；000　fr。　（40；000；000）。＇
  ＇Footnote　t：　This　number　is　extracted　from　the　〃National　Calendar〃　for　1833。　The　〃National　Calendar〃　is　an　American　almanac　which　contains　the　names　of　all　the　Federal　officers。　　It　results　from　this　comparison　that　the　King　of　France　has　eleven　times　as　many　places　at　his　disposal　as　the　President；　although　the　population　of　France　is　not　much　more　than　double　that　of　the　Union。
  ＇I　have　not　the　means　of　ascertaining　the　number　of　appointments　now　at　the　disposal　of　the　President　of　the　United　States；　but　his　patronage　and　the　abuse　of　it　have　largely　increased　since　1833。　…　Translator's　Note；　1875。＇＇
  Accidental　Causes　Which　May　Increase　The　Influence　Of　The　Executive　Government
  External　security　of　the　Union　…　Army　of　six　thousand　men　…　Few　ships　…　The　President　has　no　opportunity　of　exercising　his　great　prerogatives　…　In　the　prerogatives　he　exercises　he　is　weak。
  If　the　executive　government　is　feebler　in　America　than　in　France；　the　cause　is　more　attributable　to　the　circumstances　than　to　the　laws　of　the　country。
  It　is　chiefly　in　its　foreign　relations　that　the　executive　power　of　a　nation　is　called　upon　to　exert　its　skill　and　its　vigor。　　If　the　existence　of　the　Union　were　perpetually　threatened；　and　if　its　chief　interests　were　in　daily　connection　with　those　of　other　powerful　nations；　the　executive　government　would　assume　an　increased　importance　in　proportion　to　the　measures　expected　of　it；　and　those　which　it　would　carry　into　effect。　　The　President　of　the　United　States　is　the　commander…in…chief　of　the　army；　but　of　an　army　composed　of　only　six　thousand　men；　he　commands　the　fleet；　but　the　fleet　reckons　but　few　sail；　he　conducts　the　foreign　relations　of　the　Union；　but　the　United　States　are　a　nation　without　neighbors。　　Separated　from　the　rest　of　the　world　by　the　ocean；　and　too　weak　as　yet　to　aim　at　the　dominion　of　the　seas；　they　have　no　enemies；　and　their　interests　rarely　come　into　contact　with　those　of　any　other　nation　of　the　globe。
  The　practical　part　of　a　Government　must　not　be　judged　by　the　theory　of　its　constitution。　　The　President　of　the　United　States　is　in　the　possession　of　almost　royal　prerogatives；　which　he　has　no　opportunity　of　exercising；　and　those　privileges　which　he　can　at　present　use　are　very　circumscribed。　　The　laws　allow　him　to　possess　a　degree　of　influence　which　circumstances　do　not　permit　him　to　employ。
  On　the　other　hand；　the　great　strength　of　the　royal　prerogative　in　France　arises　from　circumstances　far　more　than　from　the　laws。　　There　the　executive　government　is　constantly　struggling　against　prodigious　obstacles；　and　exerting　all　its　energies　to　repress　them；　so　that　it　increases　by　the　extent　of　its　achievements；　and　by　the　importance　of　the　events　it　controls；　without　modifying　its　constitution。　　If　the　laws　had　made　it　as　feeble　and　as　circumscribed　as　it　is　in　the　Union；　its　influence　would　very　soon　become　still　more　preponderant。
  Why　The　President　Of　The　United　States　Does　Not　Require　The　Majority　Of　The　Two　Houses　In　Order　To　Carry　On　The　Government　　It　is　an　established　axiom　in　Europe　that　a　constitutional　King　cannot　persevere　in　a　system　of　government　which　is　opposed　by　the　two　other　branches　of　the　legislature。　　But　several　Presidents　of　the　United　States　have　been　known　to　lose　the　majority　in　the　legislative　body　without　being　obliged　to　abandon　the　supreme　power；　and　without　inflicting　a　serious　evil　upon　society。　I　have　heard　this　fact　quoted　as　an　instance　of　the　independence　and　the　power　of　the　executive　government　in　America：　a　moment's　reflection　will　convince　us；　on　the　contrary；　that　it　is　a　proof　of　its　extreme　weakness。
  A　King　in　Europe　requires　the　support　of　the　legislature　to　enable　him　to　perform　the　duties　imposed　upon　him　by　the　Constitution；　because　those　duties　are　enormous。　　A　constitutional　King　in　Europe　is　not　merely　the　executor　of　the　law；　but　the　execution　of　its　provisions　devolves　so　completely　upon　him　that　he　has　the　power　of　paralyzing　its　influence　if　it　opposes　his　designs。　He　requires　the　assistance　of　the　legislative　assemblies　to　make　the　law；　but　those　assemblies　stand　in　need　of　his　aid　to　execute　it：　these　two　authorities　cannot　subsist　without　each　other；　and　the　mechanism　of　government　is　stopped　as　soon　as　they　are　at　variance。
  In　America　the　President　cannot　prevent　any　law　from　being　passed；　nor　can　he　evade　the　obligation　of　enforcing　it。　　His　sincere　and　zealous　co…operation　is　no　doubt　useful；　but　it　is　not　indispensable；　in　the　carrying　on　of　public　affairs。　　All　his　important　acts　are　directly　or　indirectly　submitted　to　the　legislature；　and　of　his　own　free　authority　he　can　do　but　little。　　It　is　therefore　his　weakness；　and　not　his　power；　which　enables　him　to　remain　in　opposition　to　Congress。　　In　Europe；　harmony　must　reign　between　the　Crown　and　the　other　branches　of　the　legislature；　because　a　collision　between　them　may　prove　serious；　in　America；　this　harmony　is　not　indispensable；　because　such　a　collision　is　impossible。
  Election　Of　The　President
  Dangers　of　the　elective　system　increase　in　proportion　to　the　extent　of　the　prerogative　…　This　system　possible　in　America　because　no　powerful　executive　authority　is　required　…　What　circumstances　are　favorable　to　the　elective　system　…　Why　the　election　of　the　President　does　not　cause　a　deviation　from　the　principles　of　the　Government　…　Influence　of　the　election　of　the　President　on　secondary　functionaries。
  The　dangers　of　the　system　of　election　applied　to　the　head　of　the　executive　government　of　a　great　people　have　been　sufficiently　exemplified　by　experience　and　by　history；　and　the　remarks　I　am　about　to　make　refer　to　America　alone。　　These　dangers　may　be　more　or　less　formidable　in　proportion　to　the　place　which　the　executive　power　occupies；　and　to　the　importance　it　possesses　in　the　State；　and　they　may　vary　according　to　the　mode　of　election　and　the　circumstances　in　which　the　electors　are　placed。　The　most　weighty　argument　against　the　election　of　a　chief　magistrate　is；　that　it　offers　so　splendid　a　lure　to　private　ambition；　and　is　so　apt　to　inflame　men　in　the　pursuit　of　power；　that　when　legitimate　means　are　wanting　force　may　not　unfrequently　seize　what　right　denied。
  It　is　clear　that　the　greater　the　privileges　of　the　executive　authority　are；　the　greater　is　the　temptation；　the　more　the　ambition　of　the　candidates　is　excited；　the　more　warmly　are　their　interests　espoused　by　a　throng　of　partisans　who　hope　to　share　the　power　when　their　patron　has　won　the　prize。　The　dangers　of　the　elective　system　increase；　therefore；　in　the　exact　ratio　of　the　influence　exercised　by　the　executive　power　in　the　affairs　of　State。　The　revolutions　of　Poland　were　not　solely　attributable　to　the　elective　system　in　general；　but　to　the　fact　that　the　elected　monarch　was　the　sovereign　of　a　powerful　kingdom。　　Before　we　can　discuss　the　absolute　advantages　of　the　elective　system　we　must　ma