nd　a　House　of　Representatives。　　A　spirit　of　conciliation　prescribed　the　observance　of　distinct　principles　in　the　formation　of　these　two　assemblies。　　I　have　already　shown　that　two　contrary　interests　were　opposed　to　each　other　in　the　establishment　of　the　Federal　Constitution。　　These　two　interests　had　given　rise　to　two　opinions。　　It　was　the　wish　of　one　party　to　convert　the　Union　into　a　league　of　independent　States；　or　a　sort　of　congress；　at　which　the　representatives　of　the　several　peoples　would　meet　to　discuss　certain　points　of　their　common　interests。　　The　other　party　desired　to　unite　the　inhabitants　of　the　American　colonies　into　one　sole　nation；　and　to　establish　a　Government　which　should　act　as　the　sole　representative　of　the　nation；　as　far　as　the　limited　sphere　of　its　authority　would　permit。　　The　practical　consequences　of　these　two　theories　were　exceedingly　different。
  The　question　was；　whether　a　league　was　to　be　established　instead　of　a　national　Government；　whether　the　majority　of　the　State；　instead　of　the　majority　of　the　inhabitants　of　the　Union；　was　to　give　the　law：　for　every　State；　the　small　as　well　as　the　great；　would　then　remain　in　the　full　enjoyment　of　its　independence；　and　enter　the　Union　upon　a　footing　of　perfect　equality。　If；　however；　the　inhabitants　of　the　United　States　were　to　be　considered　as　belonging　to　one　and　the　same　nation；　it　would　be　just　that　the　majority　of　the　citizens　of　the　Union　should　prescribe　the　law。　　Of　course　the　lesser　States　could　not　subscribe　to　the　application　of　this　doctrine　without；　in　fact；　abdicating　their　existence　in　relation　to　the　sovereignty　of　the　Confederation；　since　they　would　have　passed　from　the　condition　of　a　co…equal　and　co…legislative　authority　to　that　of　an　insignificant　fraction　of　a　great　people。　　But　if　the　former　system　would　have　invested　them　with　an　excessive　authority；　the　latter　would　have　annulled　their　influence　altogether。　　Under　these　circumstances　the　result　was；　that　the　strict　rules　of　logic　were　evaded；　as　is　usually　the　case　when　interests　are　opposed　to　arguments。　　A　middle　course　was　hit　upon　by　the　legislators；　which　brought　together　by　force　two　systems　theoretically　irreconcilable。
  The　principle　of　the　independence　of　the　States　prevailed　in　the　formation　of　the　Senate；　and　that　of　the　sovereignty　of　the　nation　predominated　in　the　composition　of　the　House　of　Representatives。　　It　was　decided　that　each　State　should　send　two　senators　to　Congress；　and　a　number　of　representatives　proportioned　to　its　population。　*n　It　results　from　this　arrangement　that　the　State　of　New　York　has　at　the　present　day　forty　representatives　and　only　two　senators；　the　State　of　Delaware　has　two　senators　and　only　one　representative；　the　State　of　Delaware　is　therefore　equal　to　the　State　of　New　York　in　the　Senate；　whilst　the　latter　has　forty　times　the　influence　of　the　former　in　the　House　of　Representatives。　　Thus；　if　the　minority　of　the　nation　preponderates　in　the　Senate；。　it　may　paralyze　the　decisions　of　the　majority　represented　in　the　other　House；　which　is　contrary　to　the　spirit　of　constitutional　government。
  ＇Footnote　n：　Every　ten　years　Congress　fixes　anew　the　number　of　representatives　which　each　State　is　to　furnish。　　The　total　number　was　69　in　1789；　and　240　in　1833。　　（See　〃American　Almanac；〃　1834；　p。　194。）　The　Constitution　decided　that　there　should　not　be　more　than　one　representative　for　every　30；000　persons；　but　no　minimum　was　fixed　on。　　The　Congress　has　not　thought　fit　to　augment　the　number　of　representatives　in　proportion　to　the　increase　of　population。　　The　first　Act　which　was　passed　on　the　subject　（April　14；　1792：　see　〃Laws　of　the　United　States；〃　by　Story；　vol。　i。　p。　235）　decided　that　there　should　be　one　representative　for　every　33；000　inhabitants。　　The　last　Act；　which　was　passed　in　1832；　fixes　the　proportion　at　one　for　48；000。　The　population　represented　is　composed　of　all　the　free　men　and　of　three…fifths　of　the　slaves。
  ＇The　last　Act　of　apportionment；　passed　February　2；　1872；　fixes　the　representation　at　one　to　134；684　inhabitants。　　There　are　now　（1875）　283　members　of　the　lower　House　of　Congress；　and　9　for　the　States　at　large；　making　in　all　292　members。　　The　old　States　have　of　course　lost　the　representatives　which　the　new　States　have　gained。　…　　Translator's　Note。＇＇
  These　facts　show　how　rare　and　how　difficult　it　is　rationally　and　logically　to　combine　all　the　several　parts　of　legislation。　　In　the　course　of　time　different　interests　arise；　and　different　principles　are　sanctioned　by　the　same　people；　and　when　a　general　constitution　is　to　be　established；　these　interests　and　principles　are　so　many　natural　obstacles　to　the　rigorous　application　of　any　political　system；　with　all　its　consequences。　　The　early　stages　of　national　existence　are　the　only　periods　at　which　it　is　possible　to　maintain　the　complete　logic　of　legislation；　and　when　we　perceive　a　nation　in　the　enjoyment　of　this　advantage；　before　we　hasten　to　conclude　that　it　is　wise；　we　should　do　well　to　remember　that　it　is　young。　　When　the　Federal　Constitution　was　formed；　the　interests　of　independence　for　the　separate　States；　and　the　interest　of　union　for　the　whole　people；　were　the　only　two　conflicting　interests　which　existed　amongst　the　Anglo…Americans；　and　a　compromise　was　necessarily　made　between　them。
  It　is；　however；　just　to　acknowledge　that　this　part　of　the　Constitution　has　not　hitherto　produced　those　evils　which　might　have　been　feared。　　All　the　States　are　young　and　contiguous；　their　customs；　their　ideas；　and　their　exigencies　are　not　dissimilar；　and　the　differences　which　result　from　their　size　or　inferiority　do　not　suffice　to　set　their　interests　at　variance。　　The　small　States　have　consequently　never　been　induced　to　league　themselves　together　in　the　Senate　to　oppose　the　designs　of　the　larger　ones；　and　indeed　there　is　so　irresistible　an　authority　in　the　legitimate　expression　of　the　will　of　a　people　that　the　Senate　could　offer　but　a　feeble　opposition　to　the　vote　of　the　majority　of　the　House　of　Representatives。
  It　must　not　be　forgotten；　on　the　other　hand；　that　it　was　not　in　the　power　of　the　American　legislators　to　reduce　to　a　single　nation　the　people　for　whom　they　were　making　laws。　　The　object　of　the　Federal　Constitution　was　not　to　destroy　the　independence　of　the　States；　but　to　restrain　it。　　By　acknowledging　the　real　authority　of　these　secondary　communities　（and　it　was　impossible　to　deprive　them　of　it）；　they　disavowed　beforehand　the　habitual　use　of　constraint　in　enforcing　g　the　decisions　of　the　majority。　Upon　this　principle　the　introduction　of　the　influence　of　the　States　into　the　mechanism　of　the　Federal　Government　was　by　no　means　to　be　wondered　at；　since　it　only　attested　the　existence　of　an　acknowledged　power；　which　was　to　be　humored　and　not　forcibly　checked。
  A　Further　Difference　Between　The　Senate　And　The　House　Of　Representatives
  The　Senate　named　by　the　provincial　legislators；　the　Representatives　by　the　people　…　Double　election　of　the　former；　single　election　of　the　latter　…　Term　of　the　different　offices　…　Peculiar　functions　of　each　House。
  The　Senate　not　only　differs　from　the　other　House　in　the　principle　which　it　represents；　but　also　in　the　mode　of　its　election；　in　the　term　for　which　it　is　chosen；　and　in　the　nature　of　its　functions。　　The　House　of　Representatives　is　named　by　the　people；　the　Senate　by　the　legislators　of　each　State；　the　former　is　directly　elected；　the　latter　is　elected　by　an　elected　body；　the　term　for　which　the　representatives　are　chosen　is　only　two　years；　that　of　the　senators　is　six。　　The　functions　of　the　House　of　Representatives　are　purely　legislative；　and　the　only　share　it　takes　in　the　judicial　power　is　in　the　impeachment　of　public　officers。　　The　Senate　co…operates　in　the　work　of　legislation；　and　tries　those　political　offences　which　the　House　of　Representatives　submits　to　its　decision。　　It　also　acts　as　the　great　executive　council　of　the　nation；　the　treaties　which　are　concluded　by　the　President　must　be　ratified　by　the　Senate；　and　the　appointments　he　may　make　must　be　definitely　approved　by　the　same　body。　*o
  ＇Footnote　o：　See　〃The　Federalist；〃　Nos。　52…56；　inclusive；　Story；　pp。　199…314；　Constitution　of　the　United　States；　sects。　2　and　3。＇　　The　Executive　Power　*p
  ＇Footnote　p：　See　〃The　Federalist；〃　Nos。　67…77；　Constitution　of　the　United　States；　art。　2；　Story；　p。　315；　pp。　615…780；　Kent's　〃Commentaries；〃　p。　255。＇
  Dependence　of　the　President　…　He　is　elective　and　responsible　…　He　is　free　to　act　in　his　own　sphere　under　the　inspection；　but　not　under　the　direction；　of　the　Senate　…　His　salary　fixed　at　his　entry　into　office　…　Suspensive　veto。
  The　American　legislators　undertook　a　difficult　task　in　attempting　to　create　an　executive　power　dependent　on　the　majority　of　the　people；　and　nevertheless　sufficiently　strong　to　act　without　restraint　in　its　own　sphere。　It　was　indispensable　to　the　maintenance　of　the　republican　form　of　government　that　the　representative　of　the　executive　power　should　be　subject　to　the　will　of　the　nation。
  The　President　is　an　elective　magistrate。　　His　honor；　his　property；　his　liberty；　and　his　life　are　the　securities　which　the　people　has　for　the　temperate　use　of　his　power。　　But　in　the　exercise　of　his　authority　he　cannot　be　said　to　be　perfectly　independent；　the　Senate　takes　cognizance　of　h