d　it　is　only　collaterally。　　Moreover；　although　it　is　censured；　it　is　not　abolished；　its　moral　force　may　be　diminished；　but　its　cogency　is　by　no　means　suspended；　and　its　final　destruction　can　only　be　accomplished　by　the　reiterated　attacks　of　judicial　functionaries。　　It　will　readily　be　understood　that　by　connecting　the　censorship　of　the　laws　with　the　private　interests　of　members　of　the　community；　and　by　intimately　uniting　the　prosecution　of　the　law　with　the　prosecution　of　an　individual；　legislation　is　protected　from　wanton　assailants；　and　from　the　daily　aggressions　of　party　spirit。　　The　errors　of　the　legislator　are　exposed　whenever　their　evil　consequences　are　most　felt；　and　it　is　always　a　positive　and　appreciable　fact　which　serves　as　the　basis　of　a　prosecution。
  I　am　inclined　to　believe　this　practice　of　the　American　courts　to　be　at　once　the　most　favorable　to　liberty　as　well　as　to　public　order。　　If　the　judge　could　only　attack　the　legislator　openly　and　directly；　he　would　sometimes　be　afraid　to　oppose　any　resistance　to　his　will；　and　at　other　moments　party　spirit　might　encourage　him　to　brave　it　at　every　turn。　　The　laws　would　consequently　be　attacked　when　the　power　from　which　they　emanate　is　weak；　and　obeyed　when　it　is　strong。　　That　is　to　say；　when　it　would　be　useful　to　respect　them　they　would　be　contested；　and　when　it　would　be　easy　to　convert　them　into　an　instrument　of　oppression　they　would　be　respected。　　But　the　American　judge　is　brought　into　the　political　arena　independently　of　his　own　will。　　He　only　judges　the　law　because　he　is　obliged　to　judge　a　case。　　The　political　question　which　he　is　called　upon　to　resolve　is　connected　with　the　interest　of　the　suitors；　and　he　cannot　refuse　to　decide　it　without　abdicating　the　duties　of　his　post。　　He　performs　his　functions　as　a　citizen　by　fulfilling　the　precise　duties　which　belong　to　his　profession　as　a　magistrate。　　It　is　true　that　upon　this　system　the　judicial　censorship　which　is　exercised　by　the　courts　of　justice　over　the　legislation　cannot　extend　to　all　laws　indiscriminately；　inasmuch　as　some　of　them　can　never　give　rise　to　that　exact　species　of　contestation　which　is　termed　a　lawsuit；　and　even　when　such　a　contestation　is　possible；　it　may　happen　that　no　one　cares　to　bring　it　before　a　court　of　justice。　　The　Americans　have　often　felt　this　disadvantage；　but　they　have　left　the　remedy　incomplete；　lest　they　should　give　it　an　efficacy　which　might　in　some　cases　prove　dangerous。　　Within　these　limits　the　power　vested　in　the　American　courts　of　justice　of　pronouncing　a　statute　to　be　unconstitutional　forms　one　of　the　most　powerful　barriers　which　has　ever　been　devised　against　the　tyranny　of　political　assemblies。
  Other　Powers　Granted　To　American　Judges
  The　United　States　all　the　citizens　have　the　right　of　indicting　public　functionaries　before　the　ordinary　tribunals　…　How　they　use　this　right　…　Art。　75　of　the　French　Constitution　of　the　An　VIII　…　The　Americans　and　the　English　cannot　understand　the　purport　of　this　clause。
  It　is　perfectly　natural　that　in　a　free　country　like　America　all　the　citizens　should　have　the　right　of　indicting　public　functionaries　before　the　ordinary　tribunals；　and　that　all　the　judges　should　have　the　power　of　punishing　public　offences。　　The　right　granted　to　the　courts　of　justice　of　judging　the　agents　of　the　executive　government；　when　they　have　violated　the　laws；　is　so　natural　a　one　that　it　cannot　be　looked　upon　as　an　extraordinary　privilege。　Nor　do　the　springs　of　government　appear　to　me　to　be　weakened　in　the　United　States　by　the　custom　which　renders　all　public　officers　responsible　to　the　judges　of　the　land。　　The　Americans　seem；　on　the　contrary；　to　have　increased　by　this　means　that　respect　which　is　due　to　the　authorities；　and　at　the　same　time　to　have　rendered　those　who　are　in　power　more　scrupulous　of　offending　public　opinion。　　I　was　struck　by　the　small　number　of　political　trials　which　occur　in　the　United　States；　but　I　had　no　difficulty　in　accounting　for　this　circumstance。　　A　lawsuit；　of　whatever　nature　it　may　be；　is　always　a　difficult　and　expensive　undertaking。　　It　is　easy　to　attack　a　public　man　in　a　journal；　but　the　motives　which　can　warrant　an　action　at　law　must　be　serious。　　A　solid　ground　of　complaint　must　therefore　exist　to　induce　an　individual　to　prosecute　a　public　officer；　and　public　officers　are　careful　not　to　furnish　these　grounds　of　complaint　when　they　are　afraid　of　being　prosecuted。
  This　does　not　depend　upon　the　republican　form　of　American　institutions；　for　the　same　facts　present　themselves　in　England。　　These　two　nations　do　not　regard　the　impeachment　of　the　principal　officers　of　State　as　a　sufficient　guarantee　of　their　independence。　　But　they　hold　that　the　right　of　minor　prosecutions；　which　are　within　the　reach　of　the　whole　community；　is　a　better　pledge　of　freedom　than　those　great　judicial　actions　which　are　rarely　employed　until　it　is　too　late。
  In　the　Middle　Ages；　when　it　was　very　difficult　to　overtake　offenders；　the　judges　inflicted　the　most　dreadful　tortures　on　the　few　who　were　arrested；　which　by　no　means　diminished　the　number　of　crimes。　　It　has　since　been　discovered　that　when　justice　is　more　certain　and　more　mild；　it　is　at　the　same　time　more　efficacious。　　The　English　and　the　Americans　hold　that　tyranny　and　oppression　are　to　be　treated　like　any　other　crime；　by　lessening　the　penalty　and　facilitating　conviction。
  In　the　year　VIII　of　the　French　Republic　a　constitution　was　drawn　up　in　which　the　following　clause　was　introduced：　〃Art。　75。　　All　the　agents　of　the　government　below　the　rank　of　ministers　can　only　be　prosecuted　for　offences　relating　to　their　several　functions　by　virtue　of　a　decree　of　the　Conseil　d'Etat；　in　which　the　case　the　prosecution　takes　place　before　the　ordinary　tribunals。〃　This　clause　survived　the　〃Constitution　de　l'An　VIII；〃　and　it　is　still　maintained　in　spite　of　the　just　complaints　of　the　nation。　　I　have　always　found　the　utmost　difficulty　in　explaining　its　meaning　to　Englishmen　or　Americans。　　They　were　at　once　led　to　conclude　that　the　Conseil　d'Etat　in　France　was　a　great　tribunal；　established　in　the　centre　of　the　kingdom；　which　exercised　a　preliminary　and　somewhat　tyrannical　jurisdiction　in　all　political　causes。　　But　when　I　told　them　that　the　Conseil　d'Etat　was　not　a　judicial　body；　in　the　common　sense　of　the　term；　but　an　administrative　council　composed　of　men　dependent　on　the　Crown；　so　that　the　king；　after　having　ordered　one　of　his　servants；　called　a　Prefect；　to　commit　an　injustice；　has　the　power　of　commanding　another　of　his　servants；　called　a　Councillor　of　State；　to　prevent　the　former　from　being　punished；　when　I　demonstrated　to　them　that　the　citizen　who　has　been　injured　by　the　order　of　the　sovereign　is　obliged　to　solicit　from　the　sovereign　permission　to　obtain　redress；　they　refused　to　credit　so　flagrant　an　abuse；　and　were　tempted　to　accuse　me　of　falsehood　or　of　ignorance。　　It　frequently　happened　before　the　Revolution　that　a　Parliament　issued　a　warrant　against　a　public　officer　who　had　committed　an　offence；　and　sometimes　the　proceedings　were　stopped　by　the　authority　of　the　Crown；　which　enforced　compliance　with　its　absolute　and　despotic　will。　　It　is　painful　to　perceive　how　much　lower　we　are　sunk　than　our　forefathers；　since　we　allow　things　to　pass　under　the　color　of　justice　and　the　sanction　of　the　law　which　violence　alone　could　impose　upon　them。
  Chapter　VII：　Political　Jurisdiction　In　The　United　States
  Chapter　Summary
  Definition　of　political　jurisdiction　…　What　is　understood　by　political　jurisdiction　in　France；　in　England；　and　in　the　United　States　…　In　America　the　political　judge　can　only　pass　sentence　on　public　officers　…　He　more　frequently　passes　a　sentence　of　removal　from　office　than　a　penalty　…　Political　jurisdiction　as　it　exists　in　the　United　States　is；　notwithstanding　its　mildness；　and　perhaps　in　consequence　of　that　mildness；　a　most　powerful　instrument　in　the　hands　of　the　majority。
  Political　Jurisdiction　In　The　United　States
  I　understand；　by　political　jurisdiction；　that　temporary　right　of　pronouncing　a　legal　decision　with　which　a　political　body　may　be　invested。
  In　absolute　governments　no　utility　can　accrue　from　the　introduction　of　extraordinary　forms　of　procedure；　the　prince　in　whose　name　an　offender　is　prosecuted　is　as　much　the　sovereign　of　the　courts　of　justice　as　of　everything　else；　and　the　idea　which　is　entertained　of　his　power　is　of　itself　a　sufficient　security。　　The　only　thing　he　has　to　fear　is；　that　the　external　formalities　of　justice　should　be　neglected；　and　that　his　authority　should　be　dishonored　from　a　wish　to　render　it　more　absolute。　　But　in　most　free　countries；　in　which　the　majority　can　never　exercise　the　same　influence　upon　the　tribunals　as　an　absolute　monarch；　the　judicial　power　has　occasionally　been　vested　for　a　time　in　the　representatives　of　the　nation。　　It　has　been　thought　better　to　introduce　a　temporary　confusion　between　the　functions　of　the　different　authorities　than　to　violate　the　necessary　principle　of　the　unity　of　government。
  England；　France；　and　the　United　States　have　established　this　political　jurisdiction　by　law；　and　it　is　curious　to　examine　the　different　adaptations　which　these　three　great　nations　have　made　of　the　principle。　　In　England　and　in　France　the　House　of　Lords　and　the　Chambre　des　Paris　*a　constitute