The　revolution　of　the　United　States　was　the　result　of　a　mature　and　dignified　taste　for　freedom；　and　not　of　a　vague　or　ill…defined　craving　for　independence。　　It　contracted　no　alliance　with　the　turbulent　passions　of　anarchy；　but　its　course　was　marked；　on　the　contrary；　by　an　attachment　to　whatever　was　lawful　and　orderly。
  It　was　never　assumed　in　the　United　States　that　the　citizen　of　a　free　country　has　a　right　to　do　whatever　he　pleases；　on　the　contrary；　social　obligations　were　there　imposed　upon　him　more　various　than　anywhere　else。　　No　idea　was　ever　entertained　of　attacking　the　principles　or　of　contesting　the　rights　of　society；　but　the　exercise　of　its　authority　was　divided；　to　the　end　that　the　office　might　be　powerful　and　the　officer　insignificant；　and　that　the　community　should　be　at　once　regulated　and　free。　　In　no　country　in　the　world　does　the　law　hold　so　absolute　a　language　as　in　America；　and　in　no　country　is　the　right　of　applying　it　vested　in　so　many　hands。　　The　administrative　power　in　the　United　States　presents　nothing　either　central　or　hierarchical　in　its　constitution；　which　accounts　for　its　passing；　unperceived。　　The　power　exists；　but　its　representative　is　not　to　be　perceived。
  We　have　already　seen　that　the　independent　townships　of　New　England　protect　their　own　private　interests；　and　the　municipal　magistrates　are　the　persons　to　whom　the　execution　of　the　laws　of　the　State　is　most　frequently　entrusted。　*i　Besides　the　general　laws；　the　State　sometimes　passes　general　police　regulations；　but　more　commonly　the　townships　and　town　officers；　conjointly　with　justices　of　the　peace；　regulate　the　minor　details　of　social　life；　according　to　the　necessities　of　the　different　localities；　and　promulgate　such　enactments　as　concern　the　health　of　the　community；　and　the　peace　as　well　as　morality　of　the　citizens。　*j　Lastly；　these　municipal　magistrates　provide；　of　their　own　accord　and　without　any　delegated　powers；　for　those　unforeseen　emergencies　which　frequently　occur　in　society。　*k
  ＇Footnote　i：　See　〃The　Town…Officer；〃　especially　at　the　words　Selectmen；　Assessors；　Collectors；　Schools；　Surveyors　of　Highways。　　I　take　one　example　in　a　thousand：　the　State　prohibits　travelling　on　the　Sunday；　the　tything…men；　who　are　town…officers；　are　specially　charged　to　keep　watch　and　to　execute　the　law。　See　the　Laws　of　Massachusetts；　vol。　i。　p。　410。
  The　selectmen　draw　up　the　lists　of　electors　for　the　election　of　the　Governor；　and　transmit　the　result　of　the　ballot　to　the　Secretary　of　the　State。　See　Act　of　February　24；　1796：　Id。；　vol。　i。　p。　488。＇
  ＇Footnote　j：　Thus；　for　instance；　the　selectmen　authorize　the　construction　of　drains；　point　out　the　proper　sites　for　slaughter…　houses　and　other　trades　which　are　a　nuisance　to　the　neighborhood。　　See　the　Act　of　June　7；　1785：　Id。；　vol。　i。　p。　193。＇
  ＇Footnote　k：　The　selectmen　take　measures　for　the　security　of　the　public　in　case　of　contagious　diseases；　conjointly　with　the　justices　of　the　peace。　　See　Act　of　June　22；　1797；　vol。　i。　p。　539。＇
  It　results　from　what　we　have　said　that　in　the　State　of　Massachusetts　the　administrative　authority　is　almost　entirely　restricted　to　the　township；　*l　but　that　it　is　distributed　among　a　great　number　of　individuals。　　In　the　French　commune　there　is　properly　but　one　official　functionary；　namely；　the　Maire；　and　in　New　England　we　have　seen　that　there　are　nineteen。　　These　nineteen　functionaries　do　not　in　general　depend　upon　one　another。　　The　law　carefully　prescribes　a　circle　of　action　to　each　of　these　magistrates；　and　within　that　circle　they　have　an　entire　right　to　perform　their　functions　independently　of　any　other　authority。　　Above　the　township　scarcely　any　trace　of　a　series　of　official　dignitaries　is　to　be　found。　　It　sometimes　happens　that　the　county　officers　alter　a　decision　of　the　townships　or　town　magistrates；　*m　but　in　general　the　authorities　of　the　county　have　no　right　to　interfere　with　the　authorities　of　the　township；　*n　except　in　such　matters　as　concern　the　county。
  ＇Footnote　l：　I　say　almost；　for　there　are　various　circumstances　in　the　annals　of　a　township　which　are　regulated　by　the　justice　of　the　peace　in　his　individual　capacity；　or　by　the　justices　of　the　peace　assembled　in　the　chief　town　of　the　county；　thus　licenses　are　granted　by　the　justices。　　See　the　Act　of　February　28；　1787；　vol。　i。　p。　297。＇
  ＇Footnote　m：　Thus　licenses　are　only　granted　to　such　persons　as　can　produce　a　certificate　of　good　conduct　from　the　selectmen。　　If　the　selectmen　refuse　to　give　the　certificate；　the　party　may　appeal　to　the　justices　assembled　in　the　Court　of　Sessions；　and　they　may　grant　the　license。　　See　Act　of　March　12；　1808；　vol。　ii。　p。　186。
  The　townships　have　the　right　to　make　by…laws；　and　to　enforce　them　by　fines　which　are　fixed　by　law；　but　these　by…laws　must　be　approved　by　the　Court　of　Sessions。　　See　Act　of　March　23；　1786；　vol。　i。　p。　254。＇
  ＇Footnote　n：　In　Massachusetts　the　county　magistrates　are　frequently　called　upon　to　investigate　the　acts　of　the　town　magistrates；　but　it　will　be　shown　further　on　that　this　investigation　is　a　consequence；　not　of　their　administrative；　but　of　their　judicial　power。＇
  The　magistrates　of　the　township；　as　well　as　those　of　the　county；　are　bound　to　communicate　their　acts　to　the　central　government　in　a　very　small　number　of　predetermined　cases。　*o　But　the　central　government　is　not　represented　by　an　individual　whose　business　it　is　to　publish　police　regulations　and　ordinances　enforcing　the　execution　of　the　laws；　to　keep　up　a　regular　communication　with　the　officers　of　the　township　and　the　county；　to　inspect　their　conduct；　to　direct　their　actions；　or　to　reprimand　their　faults。　There　is　no　point　which　serves　as　a　centre　to　the　radii　of　the　administration。
  ＇Footnote　o：　The　town　committees　of　schools　are　obliged　to　make　an　annual　report　to　the　Secretary　of　the　State　on　the　condition　of　the　school。　　See　Act　of　March　10；　1827；　vol。　iii。　p。　183。＇
  Chapter　V：　Necessity　Of　Examining　The　Condition　Of　The　States　…　Part　II
  What；　then；　is　the　uniform　plan　on　which　the　government　is　conducted；　and　how　is　the　compliance　of　the　counties　and　their　magistrates　or　the　townships　and　their　officers　enforced？　　In　the　States　of　New　England　the　legislative　authority　embraces　more　subjects　than　it　does　in　France；　the　legislator　penetrates　to　the　very　core　of　the　administration；　the　law　descends　to　the　most　minute　details；　the　same　enactment　prescribes　the　principle　and　the　method　of　its　application；　and　thus　imposes　a　multitude　of　strict　and　rigorously　defined　obligations　on　the　secondary　functionaries　of　the　State。　The　consequence　of　this　is　that　if　all　the　secondary　functionaries　of　the　administration　conform　to　the　law；　society　in　all　its　branches　proceeds　with　the　greatest　uniformity：　the　difficulty　remains　of　compelling　the　secondary　functionaries　of　the　administration　to　conform　to　the　law。　　It　may　be　affirmed　that；　in　general；　society　has　only　two　methods　of　enforcing　the　execution　of　the　laws　at　its　disposal：　a　discretionary　power　may　be　entrusted　to　a　superior　functionary　of　directing　all　the　others；　and　of　cashiering　them　in　case　of　disobedience；　or　the　courts　of　justice　may　be　authorized　to　inflict　judicial　penalties　on　the　offender：　but　these　two　methods　are　not　always　available。
  The　right　of　directing　a　civil　officer　presupposes　that　of　cashiering　him　if　he　does　not　obey　orders；　and　of　rewarding　him　by　promotion　if　he　fulfils　his　duties　with　propriety。　　But　an　elected　magistrate　can　neither　be　cashiered　nor　promoted。　　All　elective　functions　are　inalienable　until　their　term　is　expired。　　In　fact；　the　elected　magistrate　has　nothing　either　to　expect　or　to　fear　from　his　constituents；　and　when　all　public　offices　are　filled　by　ballot　there　can　be　no　series　of　official　dignities；　because　the　double　right　of　commanding　and　of　enforcing　obedience　can　never　be　vested　in　the　same　individual；　and　because　the　power　of　issuing　an　order　can　never　be　joined　to　that　of　inflicting　a　punishment　or　bestowing　a　reward。
  The　communities　therefore　in　which　the　secondary　functionaries　of　the　government　are　elected　are　perforce　obliged　to　make　great　use　of　judicial　penalties　as　a　means　of　administration。　　This　is　not　evident　at　first　sight；　for　those　in　power　are　apt　to　look　upon　the　institution　of　elective　functionaries　as　one　concession；　and　the　subjection　of　the　elected　magistrate　to　the　judges　of　the　land　as　another。　　They　are　equally　averse　to　both　these　innovations；　and　as　they　are　more　pressingly　solicited　to　grant　the　former　than　the　latter；　they　accede　to　the　election　of　the　magistrate；　and　leave　him　independent　of　the　judicial　power。　　Nevertheless；　the　second　of　these　measures　is　the　only　thing　that　can　possibly　counterbalance　the　first；　and　it　will　be　found　that　an　elective　authority　which　is　not　subject　to　judicial　power　will；　sooner　or　later；　either　elude　all　control　or　be　destroyed。　　The　courts　of　justice　are　the　only　possible　medium　between　the　central　power　and　the　administrative　bodies；　they　alone　can　compel　the　elected　functionary　to　obey；　without　violating　the　rights　of　the　elector。　　The　extension　of　judicial　power　in　the　political　world　ought　therefore　to　be　in　the　exact　ratio　of　the　extension　of　elective　offices：　if　these　two　institutions　do　not　go　hand　in　hand；　the　State　must　fal