第 39 节
作者:嘟嘟      更新:2021-04-30 16:07      字数:9322
  instead of being coined into five shillings and twopence; been
  coined either into pieces which bore so low a denomination as two
  shillings and sevenpence; or into pieces which bore so high a one
  as ten shillings and fourpence; it would in the one case have
  hurt the revenue of the proprietor; in the other that of the
  sovereign。
  In circumstances; therefore; somewhat different from those
  which have actually taken place; this constancy of valuation
  might have been a very great inconveniency; either to the
  contributors; or to the commonwealth。 In the course of ages such
  circumstances; however; must; at some time or other; happen。 But
  though empires; like all the other works of men; have all
  hitherto proved mortal; yet every empire aims at immortality。
  Every constitution; therefore; which it is meant should be as
  permanent as the empire itself; ought to be convenient; not in
  certain circumstances only; but in all circumstances; or ought to
  be suited; not to those circumstances which are transitory;
  occasional; or accidental; but to those which are necessary and
  therefore always the same。
  A tax upon the rent of land which varies with every
  variation of the rent; or which rises and falls according to the
  improvement or neglect of cultivation; is recommended by that
  sect of men of letters in France who call themselves The
  Economists as the most equitable of all taxes。 All taxes; they
  pretend; fall ultimately upon the rent of land; and ought
  therefore to be imposed equally upon the fund which must finally
  pay them。 That all taxes ought to fall as equally as possible
  upon the fund which must finally pay them is certainly true。 But
  without entering into the disagreeable discussion of the
  metaphysical arguments by which they support their very ingenious
  theory; it will sufficiently appear; from the following review;
  what are the taxes which fall finally upon the rent of the land;
  and what are those which fall finally upon some other fund。
  In the Venetian territory all the arable lands which are
  given in lease to farmers are taxed at a tenth of the rent。 The
  leases are recorded in a public register which is kept by the
  officers of revenue in each province or district。 When the
  proprietor cultivates his own lands; they are valued according to
  an equitable estimation; and he is allowed a deduction of
  one…fifth of the tax; so that for such lands he pays only eight
  instead of ten per cent of the supposed rent。
  A land…tax of this kind is certainly more equal than the
  land…tax of England。 It might not; perhaps; be altogether so
  certain; and the assessment of the tax might frequently occasion
  a good deal more trouble to the landlord。 It might; too; be a
  good deal more expensive in the levying。
  Such a system of administration; however; might perhaps be
  contrived as would; in a great measure; both prevent this
  uncertainty and moderate this expense。
  The landlord and tenant; for example; might jointly be
  obliged to record their lease in a public register。 Proper
  penalties might be enacted against concealing or misrepresenting
  any of the conditions; and if part of those penalties were to be
  paid to either of the two parties who informed against and
  convicted the other of such concealment or misrepresentation; it
  would effectually deter them from combining together in order to
  defraud the public revenue。 All the conditions of the lease might
  be sufficiently known from such a record。
  Some landlords; instead of raising the rent; take a fine for
  the renewal of the lease。 This practice is in most cases the
  expedient of a spendthrift; who for a sum of ready money sells a
  future revenue of much greater value。 It is in most cases;
  therefore; hurtful to the landlords。 It is frequently hurtful to
  the tenant; and it is always hurtful to the community。 It
  frequently takes from the tenant so great a part of his capital;
  and thereby diminishes so much his ability to cultivate the land;
  that he finds it more difficult to pay a small rent than it would
  otherwise have been to pay a great one。 Whatever diminishes his
  ability to cultivate; necessarily keeps down; below what it would
  otherwise have been; the most important part of the revenue of
  the community。 By rendering the tax upon such fines a good deal
  heavier than upon the ordinary rent; this hurtful practice might
  be discouraged; to the no small advantage of all the different
  parties concerned; of the landlord; of the tenant; of the
  sovereign; and of the whole community。
  Some leases prescribe to the tenant a certain mode of
  cultivation and a certain succession of crops during the whole
  continuance of the lease。 This condition; which is generally the
  effect of the landlord's conceit of his own superior knowledge (a
  conceit in most cases very ill founded); ought always to be
  considered as an additional rent; as a rent in service instead of
  a rent in money。 In order to discourage the practice; which is
  generally a foolish one; this species of rent might be valued
  rather high; and consequently taxed somewhat higher than common
  money rents。
  Some landlords; instead of a rent in money; require a rent
  in kind; in corn; cattle; poultry; wine; oil; etc。; others;
  again; require a rent in service。 Such rents are always more
  hurtful to the tenant than beneficial to the landlord。 They
  either take more or keep more out of the pocket of the former
  than they put into that of the latter。 In every country where
  they take place the tenants are poor and beggarly; pretty much
  according to the degree in which they take place。 By valuing; in
  the same manner; such rents rather high; and consequently taxing
  them somewhat higher than common money rents; a practice which is
  hurtful to the whole community might perhaps be sufficiently
  discouraged。
  When the landlord chose to occupy himself a part of his own
  lands; the rent might be valued according to an equitable
  arbitration of the farmers and landlords in the neighbourhood;
  and a moderate abatement of the tax might be granted to him; in
  the same manner as in the Venetian territory; provided the rent
  of the lands which he occupied did not exceed a certain sum。 It
  is of importance that the landlord should be encouraged to
  cultivate a part of his own land。 His capital is generally
  greater than that of the tenant; and with less skill he can
  frequently raise a greater produce。 The landlord can afford to
  try experiments; and is generally disposed to do so。 His
  unsuccessful experiments occasion only a moderate loss to
  himself。 His successful ones contribute to the improvement and
  better cultivation of the whole country。 It might be of
  importance; however; that the abatement of the tax should
  encourage him to cultivate to a certain extent only。 If the
  landlords should; the greater part of them; be tempted to farm
  the whole of their own lands; the country (instead of sober and
  industrious tenants; who are bound by their own interest to
  cultivate as well as their capital and skill will allow them)
  would be filled with idle and profligate bailiffs; whose abusive
  management would soon degrade the cultivation and reduce the
  annual produce of the land; to the diminution; not only of the
  revenue of their masters; but of the most important part of that
  of the whole society。
  Such a system of administration might; perhaps; free a tax
  of this kind from any degree of uncertainty which could occasion
  either oppression or inconveniency of the contributor; and might
  at the same time serve to introduce into the common management of
  land such a plan or policy as might contribute a good deal to the
  general improvement and good cultivation of the country。
  The expense of levying a land…tax which varied with every
  variation of the rent would no doubt be somewhat greater than
  that of levying one which was already rated according to a fixed
  valuation。 Some additional expense would necessarily be incurred
  both by the different register offices which it would be proper
  to establish in the different districts of the country; and by
  the different valuations which might occasionally be made of the
  lands which the proprietor chose to occupy himself。 The expense
  of all this; however; might be very moderate; and much below what
  is incurred in the levying of many other taxes which afford a
  very inconsiderable revenue in comparison of what might easily be
  drawn from a tax of this kind。
  The discouragement which a variable land…tax of this kind
  might give to the improvement of land seems to be the most
  important objection which can be made to it。 The landlord would
  certainly be less disposed to improve when the sovereign; who
  contributed nothing to the expense; was to share in the profit of
  the improvement。 Even this objection might perhaps be obviated by
  allowing the landlord; before he began his improvement; to
  ascertain; in conjunction with the