instead　of　being　coined　into　five　shillings　and　twopence；　been
  coined　either　into　pieces　which　bore　so　low　a　denomination　as　two
  shillings　and　sevenpence；　or　into　pieces　which　bore　so　high　a　one
  as　ten　shillings　and　fourpence；　it　would　in　the　one　case　have
  hurt　the　revenue　of　the　proprietor；　in　the　other　that　of　the
  sovereign。
  In　circumstances；　therefore；　somewhat　different　from　those
  which　have　actually　taken　place；　this　constancy　of　valuation
  might　have　been　a　very　great　inconveniency；　either　to　the
  contributors；　or　to　the　commonwealth。　In　the　course　of　ages　such
  circumstances；　however；　must；　at　some　time　or　other；　happen。　But
  though　empires；　like　all　the　other　works　of　men；　have　all
  hitherto　proved　mortal；　yet　every　empire　aims　at　immortality。
  Every　constitution；　therefore；　which　it　is　meant　should　be　as
  permanent　as　the　empire　itself；　ought　to　be　convenient；　not　in
  certain　circumstances　only；　but　in　all　circumstances；　or　ought　to
  be　suited；　not　to　those　circumstances　which　are　transitory；
  occasional；　or　accidental；　but　to　those　which　are　necessary　and
  therefore　always　the　same。
  A　tax　upon　the　rent　of　land　which　varies　with　every
  variation　of　the　rent；　or　which　rises　and　falls　according　to　the
  improvement　or　neglect　of　cultivation；　is　recommended　by　that
  sect　of　men　of　letters　in　France　who　call　themselves　The
  Economists　as　the　most　equitable　of　all　taxes。　All　taxes；　they
  pretend；　fall　ultimately　upon　the　rent　of　land；　and　ought
  therefore　to　be　imposed　equally　upon　the　fund　which　must　finally
  pay　them。　That　all　taxes　ought　to　fall　as　equally　as　possible
  upon　the　fund　which　must　finally　pay　them　is　certainly　true。　But
  without　entering　into　the　disagreeable　discussion　of　the
  metaphysical　arguments　by　which　they　support　their　very　ingenious
  theory；　it　will　sufficiently　appear；　from　the　following　review；
  what　are　the　taxes　which　fall　finally　upon　the　rent　of　the　land；
  and　what　are　those　which　fall　finally　upon　some　other　fund。
  In　the　Venetian　territory　all　the　arable　lands　which　are
  given　in　lease　to　farmers　are　taxed　at　a　tenth　of　the　rent。　The
  leases　are　recorded　in　a　public　register　which　is　kept　by　the
  officers　of　revenue　in　each　province　or　district。　When　the
  proprietor　cultivates　his　own　lands；　they　are　valued　according　to
  an　equitable　estimation；　and　he　is　allowed　a　deduction　of
  one…fifth　of　the　tax；　so　that　for　such　lands　he　pays　only　eight
  instead　of　ten　per　cent　of　the　supposed　rent。
  A　land…tax　of　this　kind　is　certainly　more　equal　than　the
  land…tax　of　England。　It　might　not；　perhaps；　be　altogether　so
  certain；　and　the　assessment　of　the　tax　might　frequently　occasion
  a　good　deal　more　trouble　to　the　landlord。　It　might；　too；　be　a
  good　deal　more　expensive　in　the　levying。
  Such　a　system　of　administration；　however；　might　perhaps　be
  contrived　as　would；　in　a　great　measure；　both　prevent　this
  uncertainty　and　moderate　this　expense。
  The　landlord　and　tenant；　for　example；　might　jointly　be
  obliged　to　record　their　lease　in　a　public　register。　Proper
  penalties　might　be　enacted　against　concealing　or　misrepresenting
  any　of　the　conditions；　and　if　part　of　those　penalties　were　to　be
  paid　to　either　of　the　two　parties　who　informed　against　and
  convicted　the　other　of　such　concealment　or　misrepresentation；　it
  would　effectually　deter　them　from　combining　together　in　order　to
  defraud　the　public　revenue。　All　the　conditions　of　the　lease　might
  be　sufficiently　known　from　such　a　record。
  Some　landlords；　instead　of　raising　the　rent；　take　a　fine　for
  the　renewal　of　the　lease。　This　practice　is　in　most　cases　the
  expedient　of　a　spendthrift；　who　for　a　sum　of　ready　money　sells　a
  future　revenue　of　much　greater　value。　It　is　in　most　cases；
  therefore；　hurtful　to　the　landlords。　It　is　frequently　hurtful　to
  the　tenant；　and　it　is　always　hurtful　to　the　community。　It
  frequently　takes　from　the　tenant　so　great　a　part　of　his　capital；
  and　thereby　diminishes　so　much　his　ability　to　cultivate　the　land；
  that　he　finds　it　more　difficult　to　pay　a　small　rent　than　it　would
  otherwise　have　been　to　pay　a　great　one。　Whatever　diminishes　his
  ability　to　cultivate；　necessarily　keeps　down；　below　what　it　would
  otherwise　have　been；　the　most　important　part　of　the　revenue　of
  the　community。　By　rendering　the　tax　upon　such　fines　a　good　deal
  heavier　than　upon　the　ordinary　rent；　this　hurtful　practice　might
  be　discouraged；　to　the　no　small　advantage　of　all　the　different
  parties　concerned；　of　the　landlord；　of　the　tenant；　of　the
  sovereign；　and　of　the　whole　community。
  Some　leases　prescribe　to　the　tenant　a　certain　mode　of
  cultivation　and　a　certain　succession　of　crops　during　the　whole
  continuance　of　the　lease。　This　condition；　which　is　generally　the
  effect　of　the　landlord's　conceit　of　his　own　superior　knowledge　（a
  conceit　in　most　cases　very　ill　founded）；　ought　always　to　be
  considered　as　an　additional　rent；　as　a　rent　in　service　instead　of
  a　rent　in　money。　In　order　to　discourage　the　practice；　which　is
  generally　a　foolish　one；　this　species　of　rent　might　be　valued
  rather　high；　and　consequently　taxed　somewhat　higher　than　common
  money　rents。
  Some　landlords；　instead　of　a　rent　in　money；　require　a　rent
  in　kind；　in　corn；　cattle；　poultry；　wine；　oil；　etc。；　others；
  again；　require　a　rent　in　service。　Such　rents　are　always　more
  hurtful　to　the　tenant　than　beneficial　to　the　landlord。　They
  either　take　more　or　keep　more　out　of　the　pocket　of　the　former
  than　they　put　into　that　of　the　latter。　In　every　country　where
  they　take　place　the　tenants　are　poor　and　beggarly；　pretty　much
  according　to　the　degree　in　which　they　take　place。　By　valuing；　in
  the　same　manner；　such　rents　rather　high；　and　consequently　taxing
  them　somewhat　higher　than　common　money　rents；　a　practice　which　is
  hurtful　to　the　whole　community　might　perhaps　be　sufficiently
  discouraged。
  When　the　landlord　chose　to　occupy　himself　a　part　of　his　own
  lands；　the　rent　might　be　valued　according　to　an　equitable
  arbitration　of　the　farmers　and　landlords　in　the　neighbourhood；
  and　a　moderate　abatement　of　the　tax　might　be　granted　to　him；　in
  the　same　manner　as　in　the　Venetian　territory；　provided　the　rent
  of　the　lands　which　he　occupied　did　not　exceed　a　certain　sum。　It
  is　of　importance　that　the　landlord　should　be　encouraged　to
  cultivate　a　part　of　his　own　land。　His　capital　is　generally
  greater　than　that　of　the　tenant；　and　with　less　skill　he　can
  frequently　raise　a　greater　produce。　The　landlord　can　afford　to
  try　experiments；　and　is　generally　disposed　to　do　so。　His
  unsuccessful　experiments　occasion　only　a　moderate　loss　to
  himself。　His　successful　ones　contribute　to　the　improvement　and
  better　cultivation　of　the　whole　country。　It　might　be　of
  importance；　however；　that　the　abatement　of　the　tax　should
  encourage　him　to　cultivate　to　a　certain　extent　only。　If　the
  landlords　should；　the　greater　part　of　them；　be　tempted　to　farm
  the　whole　of　their　own　lands；　the　country　（instead　of　sober　and
  industrious　tenants；　who　are　bound　by　their　own　interest　to
  cultivate　as　well　as　their　capital　and　skill　will　allow　them）
  would　be　filled　with　idle　and　profligate　bailiffs；　whose　abusive
  management　would　soon　degrade　the　cultivation　and　reduce　the
  annual　produce　of　the　land；　to　the　diminution；　not　only　of　the
  revenue　of　their　masters；　but　of　the　most　important　part　of　that
  of　the　whole　society。
  Such　a　system　of　administration　might；　perhaps；　free　a　tax
  of　this　kind　from　any　degree　of　uncertainty　which　could　occasion
  either　oppression　or　inconveniency　of　the　contributor；　and　might
  at　the　same　time　serve　to　introduce　into　the　common　management　of
  land　such　a　plan　or　policy　as　might　contribute　a　good　deal　to　the
  general　improvement　and　good　cultivation　of　the　country。
  The　expense　of　levying　a　land…tax　which　varied　with　every
  variation　of　the　rent　would　no　doubt　be　somewhat　greater　than
  that　of　levying　one　which　was　already　rated　according　to　a　fixed
  valuation。　Some　additional　expense　would　necessarily　be　incurred
  both　by　the　different　register　offices　which　it　would　be　proper
  to　establish　in　the　different　districts　of　the　country；　and　by
  the　different　valuations　which　might　occasionally　be　made　of　the
  lands　which　the　proprietor　chose　to　occupy　himself。　The　expense
  of　all　this；　however；　might　be　very　moderate；　and　much　below　what
  is　incurred　in　the　levying　of　many　other　taxes　which　afford　a
  very　inconsiderable　revenue　in　comparison　of　what　might　easily　be
  drawn　from　a　tax　of　this　kind。
  The　discouragement　which　a　variable　land…tax　of　this　kind
  might　give　to　the　improvement　of　land　seems　to　be　the　most
  important　objection　which　can　be　made　to　it。　The　landlord　would
  certainly　be　less　disposed　to　improve　when　the　sovereign；　who
  contributed　nothing　to　the　expense；　was　to　share　in　the　profit　of
  the　improvement。　Even　this　objection　might　perhaps　be　obviated　by
  allowing　the　landlord；　before　he　began　his　improvement；　to
  ascertain；　in　conjunction　with　the