第 35 节
作者:嘟嘟      更新:2021-04-30 16:07      字数:9322
  necessary for supporting that higher dignity。 We naturally expect
  more splendour in the court of a king than in the mansion…house
  of a doge or burgomaster。
  CONCLUSION
  The expense of defending the society; and that of supporting
  the dignity of the chief magistrate; are both laid out for the
  general benefit of the whole society。 It is reasonable;
  therefore; that they should be defrayed by the general
  contribution of the whole society; all the different members
  contributing; as nearly as possible; in proportion to their
  respective abilities。
  The expense of the administration of justice; too; may; no
  doubt; be considered as laid out for the benefit of the whole
  society。 There is no impropriety; therefore; in its being
  defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society。 The
  persons; however; who gave occasion to this expense are those
  who; by their injustice in one way or another; make it necessary
  to seek redress or protection from the courts of justice。 The
  persons again most immediately benefited by this expense are
  those whom the courts of justice either restore to their rights
  or maintain in their rights。 The expense of the administration of
  justice; therefore; may very properly be defrayed by the
  particular contribution of one or other; or both; of those two
  different sets of persons; according as different occasions may
  require; that is; by the fees of court。 It cannot be necessary to
  have recourse to the general contribution of the whole society;
  except for the conviction of those criminals who have not
  themselves any estate or fund sufficient for paying those fees。
  Those local or provincial expenses of which the benefit is
  local or provincial (what is laid out; for example; upon the
  police of a particular town or district) ought to be defrayed by
  a local or provincial revenue; and ought to be no burden upon the
  general revenue of the society。 It is unjust that the whole
  society should contribute towards an expense of which the benefit
  is confined to a part of the society。
  The expense of maintaining good roads and communications is;
  no doubt; beneficial to the whole society; and may; therefore;
  without any injustice。 be defrayed by the general contribution of
  the whole society。 This expense; however; is most immediately and
  directly beneficial to those who travel or carry goods from one
  place to another; and to those who consume such goods。 The
  turnpike tolls in England; and the duties called peages in other
  countries; lay it altogether upon those two different sets of
  people; and thereby discharge the general revenue of the society
  from a very considerable burden。
  The expense of the institutions for education and religious
  instruction is likewise; no doubt; beneficial to the whole
  society; and may; therefore; without injustice; be defrayed by
  the general contribution of the whole society。 This expense;
  however; might perhaps with equal propriety; and even with some
  advantage; be defrayed altogether by those who receive the
  immediate benefit of such education and instruction; or by the
  voluntary contribution of those who think they have occasion for
  either the one or the other。
  When the institutions or public works which are beneficial
  to the whole society either cannot be maintained altogether; or
  are not maintained altogether by the contribution of such
  particular members of the society as are most immediately
  benefited by them; the deficiency must in most cases be made up
  by the general contribution of the whole society。 The general
  revenue of the society; over and above defraying the expense of
  defending the society; and of supporting the dignity of the chief
  magistrate; must make up for the deficiency of many particular
  branches of revenue。 The sources of this general or public
  revenue I shall endeavour to explain in the following chapter。
  CHAPTER II   Of the Sources of the
  General or Public Revenue of the Society
  THE revenue which must defray; not only the expense of
  defending the society and of supporting the dignity of the chief
  magistrate; but all the other necessary expenses of government
  for which the constitution of the state has not provided any
  particular revenue; may be drawn either; first; from some fund
  which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth; and
  which is independent of the revenue of the people; or; secondly;
  from the revenue of the people。
  PART 1
  Of the Funds or Sources of Revenue which may peculiarly
  belong to the Sovereign or Commonwealth
  THE funds or sources of revenue which may peculiarly belong
  to the sovereign or commonwealth must consist either in stock or
  in land。
  The sovereign; like any other owner of stock; may derive a
  revenue from it; either by employing it himself; or by lending
  it。 His revenue is in the one case profit; in the other interest。
  The revenue of a Tartar or Arabian chief consists in profit。
  It arises principally from the milk and increase of his own herds
  and flocks; of which he himself superintends the management; and
  is the principal shepherd or herdsman of his own horde or tribe。
  It is; however; in this earliest and rudest state of civil
  government only that profit has ever made the principal part of
  the public revenue of a monarchial state。
  Small republics have sometimes derived a considerable
  revenue from the profit of mercantile projects。 The republic of
  Hamburg is said to do so from the profits of a public wine cellar
  and apothecary's shop。 The state cannot be very great of which
  the sovereign has leisure to carry on the trade of a wine
  merchant or apothecary。 The profit of a public bank has been a
  source of revenue to more considerable states。 It has been so not
  only to Hamburg; but to Venice and Amsterdam。 A revenue of this
  kind has even by some people been thought not below the attention
  of so great an empire as that of Great Britain。 Reckoning the
  ordinary dividend of the Bank of England at five and a half per
  cent and its capital at ten millions seven hundred and eighty
  thousand pounds; the net annual profit; after paying the expense
  of management; must amount; it is said; to five hundred and
  ninety…two thousand nine hundred pounds。 Government; it is
  pretended; could borrow this capital at three per cent interest;
  and by taking the management of the bank into its own hands;
  might make a clear profit of two hundred and sixty…nine thousand
  five hundred pounds a year。 The orderly; vigilant; and
  parsimonious administration of such aristocracies as those of
  Venice and Amsterdam is extremely proper; it appears from
  experience; for the management of a mercantile project of this
  kind。 But whether such a government as that of England… which;
  whatever may be its virtues; has never been famous for good
  economy; which; in time of peace; has generally conducted itself
  with the slothful and negligent profusion that is perhaps natural
  to monarchies; and in time of war has constantly acted with all
  the thoughtless extravagance that democracies are apt to fall
  into… could be safely trusted with the management of such a
  project; must at least be good deal more doubtful。
  The post office is properly a mercantile project。 The
  government advances the expense of establishing the different
  offices; and of buying or hiring the necessary horses or
  carriages; and is repaid with a large profit by the duties upon
  what is carried。 It is perhaps the only mercantile project which
  has been successfully managed by; I believe; every sort of
  government。 The capital to be advanced is not very considerable。
  There is no mystery in the business。 The returns are not only
  certain; but immediate。
  Princes; however; have frequently engaged in many other
  mercantile projects; and have been willing; like private persons;
  to mend their fortunes by becoming adventurers in the common
  branches of trade。 They have scarce ever succeeded。 The profusion
  with which the affairs of princes are always managed renders it
  almost impossible that they should。 The agents of a prince regard
  the wealth of their master as inexhaustible; are careless at what
  price they buy; are careless at what price they sell; are
  careless at what expense they transport his goods from one place
  to another。 Those agents frequently live with the profusion of
  princes; and sometimes too; in spite of that profusion; and by a
  proper method of making up their accounts; acquire the fortunes
  of princes。 It was thus; as we are told by Machiavel; that the
  agents of Lorenzo of Medicis; not a prince of mean abilities;
  carried on his trade。 The republic of Florence was several times
  obliged to pay the debt into which their extravagance had
  involved him。 He found it convenient; accordingly; to give up the
  business of merchant; the business to which