as　the　emoluments　of　justice；　or　what　may　be　called　the　fees　of
  court；　constituted　in　this　manner　the　whole　ordinary　revenue
  which　the　sovereign　derived　from　his　sovereignty；　it　could　not
  well　be　expected；　it　could　not　even　decently　be　proposed；　that　he
  should　give　them　up　altogether。　It　might；　and　it　frequently　was
  proposed；　that　he　should　regulate　and　ascertain　them。　But　after
  they　had　been　so　regulated　and　ascertained；　how　to　hinder　a
  person　who　was　all…powerful　from　extending　them　beyond　those
  regulations　was　still　very　difficult；　not　to　say　impossible。
  During　the　continuance　of　this　state　of　things；　therefore；　the
  corruption　of　justice；　naturally　resulting　from　the　arbitrary　and
  uncertain　nature　of　those　presents；　scarce　admitted　of　any
  effectual　remedy。
  But　when　from　different　causes；　chiefly　from　the　continually
  increasing　expenses　of　defending　the　nation　against　the　invasion
  of　other　nations；　the　private　estate　of　the　sovereign　had　become
  altogether　insufficient　for　defraying　the　expense　of　the
  sovereignty；　and　when　it　had　become　necessary　that　the　people
  should；　for　their　own　security；　contribute　towards　this　expense
  by　taxes　of　different　kinds；　it　seems　to　have　been　very　commonly
  stipulated　that　no　present　for　the　administration　of　justice
  should；　under　any　pretence；　be　accepted　either　by　the　sovereign；
  or　by　his　bailiffs　and　substitutes；　the　judges。　Those　presents；
  it　seems　to　have　been　supposed；　could　more　easily　be　abolished
  altogether　than　effectually　regulated　and　ascertained。　Fixed
  salaries　were　appointed　to　the　judges；　which　were　supposed　to
  compensate　to　them　the　loss　of　whatever　might　have　been　their
  share　of　the　ancient　emoluments　of　justice；　as　the　taxes　more
  than　compensated　to　the　sovereign　the　loss　of　his。　Justice　was
  then　said　to　be　administered　gratis。
  Justice；　however；　never　was　in　reality　administered　gratis
  in　any　country。　Lawyers　and　attorneys；　at　least；　must　always　be
  paid　by　the　parties；　and；　if　they　were　not；　they　would　perform
  their　duty　still　worse　than　they　actually　perform　it。　The　fees
  annually　paid　to　lawyers　and　attorneys　amount；　in　every　court；　to
  a　much　greater　sum　than　the　salaries　of　the　judges。　The
  circumstance　of　those　salaries　being　paid　by　the　crown　can
  nowhere　much　diminish　the　necessary　expense　of　a　law…suit。　But　it
  was　not　so　much　to　diminish　the　expense；　as　to　prevent　the
  corruption　of　justice；　that　the　judges　were　prohibited　from
  receiving　any　present　or　fee　from　the　parties。
  The　office　of　judge　is　in　itself　so　very　honourable　that　men
  are　willing　to　accept　of　it；　though　accompanied　with　very　small
  emoluments。　The　inferior　office　of　justice　of　peace；　though
  attended　with　a　good　deal　of　trouble；　and　in　most　cases　with　no
  emoluments　at　all；　is　an　object　of　ambition　to　the　greater　part
  of　our　country　gentlemen。　The　salaries　of　all　the　different
  judges；　high　and　low；　together　with　the　whole　expense　of　the
  administration　and　execution　of　justice；　even　where　it　is　not
  managed　with　very　good　economy；　makes；　in　any　civilised　country；
  but　a　very　inconsiderable　part　of　the　whole　expense　of
  government。
  The　whole　expense　of　justice；　too；　might　easily　be　defrayed
  by　the　fees　of　court；　and；　without　exposing　the　administration　of
  justice　to　any　real　hazard　of　corruption；　the　public　revenue
  might　thus　be　discharged　from　a　certain；　though；　perhaps；　but　a
  small　incumbrance。　It　is　difficult　to　regulate　the　fees　of　court
  effectually　where　a　person　so　powerful　as　the　sovereign　is　to
  share　in　them；　and　to　derive　any　considerable　part　of　his　revenue
  from　them。　It　is　very　easy　where　the　judge　is　the　principal
  person　who　can　reap　any　benefit　from　them。　The　law　can　very
  easily　oblige　the　judge　to　respect　the　regulation；　though　it
  might　not　always　be　able　to　make　the　sovereign　respect　it。　Where
  the　fees　of　court　are　precisely　regulated　and　ascertained；　where
  they　are　paid　all　at　once；　at　a　certain　period　of　every　process；
  into　the　hands　of　a　cashier　or　receiver；　to　be　by　him　distributed
  in　certain　known　proportions　among　the　different　judges　after　the
  process　is　decided；　and　not　till　it　is　decided；　there　seems　to　be
  no　more　danger　of　corruption　than　where　such　fees　are　prohibited
  altogether。　Those　fees；　without　occasioning　any　considerable
  increase　in　the　expense　of　a　lawsuit；　might　be　rendered　fully
  sufficient　for　defraying　the　whole　expense　of　justice。　By　not
  being　paid　to　the　judges　till　the　process　was　determined；　they
  might　be　some　incitement　to　the　diligence　of　the　court　in
  examining　and　deciding　it。　In　courts　which　consisted　of　a
  considerable　number　of　judges；　by　proportioning　the　share　of　each
  judge　to　the　number　of　hours　and　days　which　he　had　employed　in
  examining　the　process；　either　in　the　court　or　in　a　committee　by
  order　of　the　court；　those　fees　might　give　some　encouragement　to
  the　diligence　of　each　particular　judge。　Public　services　are　never
  better　performed　than　when　their　reward　comes　only　in　consequence
  of　their　being　performed；　and　is　proportioned　to　the　diligence
  employed　in　performing　them。　In　the　different　parliaments　of
  France；　the　fees　of　court　（called　epices　and　vacations）
  constitute　the　far　greater　part　of　the　emoluments　of　the　judges。
  After　all　deductions　are　made；　the　net　salary　paid　by　the　crown
  to　a　counsellor　or　judge　in　the　Parliament　of　Toulouse；　in　rank
  and　dignity　the　second　parliament　of　the　kingdom；　amounts　only　to
  a　hundred　and　fifty　livres；　about　six　pounds　eleven　shillings
  sterling　a　year。　About　seven　years　ago　that　sum　was　in　the　same
  place　the　ordinary　yearly　wages　of　a　common　footman。　The
  distribution　of　those　epices；　too；　is　according　to　the　diligence
  of　the　judges。　A　diligent　judge　gains　a　comfortable；　though
  moderate；　revenue　by　his　office：　an　idle　one　gets　little　more
  than　his　salary。　Those　Parliaments　are　perhaps；　in　many　respects；
  not　very　convenient　courts　of　justice；　but　they　have　never　been
  accused；　they　seem　never　even　to　have　been　suspected；　of
  corruption。
  The　fees　of　court　seem　originally　to　have　been　the　principal
  support　of　the　different　courts　of　justice　in　England。　Each　court
  endeavoured　to　draw　to　itself　as　much　business　as　it　could；　and
  was；　upon　that　account；　willing　to　take　cognisance　of　many　suits
  which　were　not　originally　intended　to　fall　under　its
  jurisdiction。　The　Court　of　King's　Bench；　instituted　for　the　trial
  of　criminal　causes　only；　took　cognisance　of　civil　suits；　the
  plaintiff　pretending　that　the　defendant；　in　not　doing　him
  justice；　had　been　guilty　of　some　trespass　or　misdemeanour。　The
  Court　of　Exchequer；　instituted　for　the　levying　of　the　king's
  revenue；　and　for　enforcing　the　payment　of　such　debts　only　as　were
  due　to　the　king；　took　cognisance　of　all　other　contract　debts；　the
  plaintiff　alleging　that　he　could　not　pay　the　king　because　the
  defendant　would　not　pay　him。　In　consequence　of　such　fictions　it
  came；　in　many　cases；　to　depend　altogether　upon　the　parties　before
  what　court　they　would　choose　to　have　their　cause　tried；　and　each
  court　endeavoured；　by　superior　dispatch　and　impartiality；　to　draw
  to　itself　as　many　causes　as　it　could。　The　present　admirable
  constitution　of　the　courts　of　justice　in　England　was；　perhaps；
  originally　in　a　great　measure　formed　by　this　emulation　which
  anciently　took　place　between　their　respective　judges；　each　judge
  endeavouring　to　give；　in　his　own　court；　the　speediest　and　most
  effectual　remedy　which　the　law　would　admit　for　every　sort　of
  injustice。　Originally　the　courts　of　law　gave　damages　only　for
  breach　of　contract。　The　Court　of　Chancery；　as　a　court　of
  conscience；　first　took　upon　it　to　enforce　the　specific
  performance　of　agreements。　When　the　breach　of　contract　consisted
  in　the　non…payment　of　money；　the　damage　sustained　could　be
  compensated　in　no　other　way　than　by　ordering　payment；　which　was
  equivalent　to　a　specific　performance　of　the　agreement。　In　such
  cases；　therefore；　the　remedy　of　the　courts　of　law　was　sufficient。
  It　was　not　so　in　others。　When　the　tenant　sued　his　lord　for　having
  unjustly　outed　him　of　his　lease；　the　damages　which　he　recovered
  were　by　no　means　equivalent　to　the　possession　of　the　land。　Such
  causes；　therefore；　for　some　time；　went　all　to　the　Court　of
  Chancery；　to　the　no　small　loss　of　the　courts　of　law。　It　was　to
  draw　back　such　causes　to　themselves　that　the　courts　of　law　are
  said　to　have　invented　the　artificial　and　fictitious　Writ　of
  Ejectment；　the　most　effectual　remedy　for　an　unjust　outer　or
  dispossession　of　land。
  A　stamp…duty　upon　the　law　proceedings　of　each　particular
  court；　to　be　levied　by　that　court；　and　applied　towards　the
  maintenance　of　the　judges　and　other　officers　belonging　to　it；
  might；　in　the　same　manner；　afford　revenue　sufficient　for
  defraying　the　expense　of　the　administration　of　justice；　without
  bringing　any　burden　upon　the　general　revenue　of　the　society。　The
  judges　indeed　might；　in　this　case；　be　under　the　temptation　of
  multiplying　unnecessa