indicates　extreme　ignorance　of　self。
  Proof。…　This　is　evident　from　Def。　of　the　Emotions：xxviii。　and　xxix。
  Prop。　LVI。　Extreme　pride　or　dejection
  indicates　extreme　infirmity　of　spirit。
  Proof。…　The　first　foundation　of　virtue　is　self…preservation
  （IV：xxii。Coroll。）　under　the　guidance　of　reason　（IV：xxiv。）。　He；　therefore；
  who　is　ignorant　of　himself；　is　ignorant　of　the　foundation　of　all　virtues；
  and　consequently　of　all　virtues。　Again；　to　act　virtuously　is　merely　to
  act　under　the　guidance　of　reason　（IV：xxiv。）：　now　he；　that　acts　under　the
  guidance　of　reason；　must　necessarily　know　that　he　so　acts　（III：xliii。）。
  Therefore　he　who　is　in　extreme　ignorance　of　himself；　and　consequently　of
  all　virtues；　acts　least　in　obedience　to　virtue；　in　other　words
  （IV：Def。viii。）；　is　most　infirm　of　spirit。　Thus　extreme　pride　or　dejection
  indicates　extreme　infirmity　of　spirit。　Q。E。D。
  Corollary。…　Hence　it　most　clearly　follows；　that　the　proud　and　the
  dejected　specially　fall　a　prey　to　the　emotions。
  Note。…　Yet　dejection　can　be　more　easily　corrected　than　pride；　for　the
  latter　being　a　pleasurable　emotion；　and　the　former　a　painful　emotion；　the
  pleasurable　is　stronger　than　the　painful　（IV：xviii。）。
  Prop。　LVII。　The　proud　man　delights　in　the
  company　of　flatterers　and　parasites；
  but　hates　the　company　of　the　high…minded。
  Proof。…　Pride　is　pleasure　arising　from　a　man's　over　estimation　of　himself
  （Def。　of　the　Emotions：xxviii。　and　vi。）；　this　estimation　the　proud　man　will
  endeavour　to　foster　by　all　the　means　in　his　power　（III：xiii。Note）；　he　will
  therefore　delight　in　the　company　of　flatterers　and　parasites　（whose
  character　is　too　well　known　to　need　definition　here）；　and　will　avoid　the
  company　of　high…minded　men；　who　value　him　according　to　his　deserts。　Q。E。D。
  Note。…　It　would　be　too　long　a　task　to　enumerate　here　all　the　evil　results
  of　pride；　inasmuch　as　the　proud　are　a；　prey　to　all　the　emotions；　though　to
  none　of　them　less　than　to　love　and　pity。　I　cannot；　however；　pass　over　in
  silence　the　fact；　that　a　man　may　be　called　proud　from　his　underestimation
  of　other　people；　and；　therefore；　pride　in　this　sense　may　be　defined　as
  pleasure　arising　from　the　false　opinion；　whereby　a　man　may　consider
  himself　superior　to　his　fellows。　The　dejection；　which　is　the　opposite
  quality　to　this　sort　of　pride；　may　be　defined　as　pain　arising　from　the
  false　opinion；　whereby　a　man　may　think　himself　inferior　to　his　fellows。
  Such　being　the　ease；　we　can　easily　see　that　a　proud　man　is　necessarily
  envious　（III：xli。Note）；　and　only　takes　pleasure　in　the　company；　who　fool
  his　weak　mind　to　the　top　of　his　bent；　and　make　him　insane　instead　of
  merely　foolish。
  Though　dejection　is　the　emotion　contrary　to　pride；　yet　is　the　dejected
  man　very　near　akin　to　the　proud　man。　For；　inasmuch　as　his　pain　arises
  from　a　comparison　between　his　own　infirmity　and　other　men's　power　or
  virtue；　it　will　be　removed；　or；　in　other　words；　he　will　feel　pleasure；　if
  his　imagination　be　occupied　in　contemplating　other　men's　faults；　whence
  arises　the　proverb；　〃The　unhappy　are　comforted　by　finding　fellow…sufferers。〃
  Contrariwise；　he　will　be　the　more　pained　in　proportion　as　he　thinks
  himself　inferior　to　others；　hence　none　are　so　prone　to　envy　as　the
  dejected；　they　are　specially　keen　in　observing　men's　actions；　with　a
  view　to　fault…finding　rather　than　correction；　in　order　to　reserve　their
  praises　for　dejection；　and　to　glory　therein；　though　all　the　time　with　a
  dejected　air。　These　effects　follow　as　necessarily　from　the　said　emotion；
  as　it　follows　from　the　nature　of　a　triangle；　that　the　three　angles　are
  equal　to　two　right　angles。　I　have　already　said　that　I　call　these　and
  similar　emotions　bad；　solely　in　respect　to　what　is　useful　to　man。　The
  laws　of　nature　have　regard　to　nature's　general　order；　whereof　man　is　but
  a　part。　I　mention　this；　in　passing；　lest　any　should　think　that　I　have
  wished　to　set　forth　the　faults　and　irrational　deeds　of　men　rather　than
  the　nature　and　properties　of　things。　For；　as　I　said　in　the　preface　to　the
  third　Part；　I　regard　human　emotions　and　their　properties　as　on　the　same
  footing　with　other　natural　phenomena。　Assuredly　human　emotions　indicate
  the　power　and　ingenuity；　of　nature；　if　not　of　human　nature；　quite　as　fully；
  as　other　things　which　we　admire；　and　which　we　delight　to　contemplate。
  But　I　pass　on　to　note　those　qualities　in　the　emotions；　which　bring
  advantage　to　man；　or　inflict　injury　upon　him。
  Prop。　LVIII。　Honour　（gloria）　is　not　repugnant
  to　reason；　but　may　arise　therefrom。
  Proof。…This　is　evident　from　Def。　of　the　Emotions：xxx。；　and　also　from　the
  definition　of　an　honourable　man　（IV：xxxvii。Note。i。）。
  Note。…　Empty　honour；　as　it　is　styled；　is　self…　approval；　fostered　only　by
  the　good　opinion　of　the　populace；　when　this　good　opinion　ceases　there
  ceases　also　the　self…approval；　in　other　words；　the　highest　object　of　each
  man's　love　（IV：lii。Note）；　consequently；　he　whose　honour　is　rooted　in
  popular　approval　must；　day　by　day；　anxiously　strive；　act；　and　scheme　in
  order　to　retain　his　reputation。　For　the　populace　is　variable　and
  inconstant；　so　that；　if　a　reputation　be　not　kept　up；　it　quickly　withers
  away。　Everyone　wishes　to　catch　popular　applause　for　himself；　and　readily
  represses　the　fame　of　others。　The　object　of　the　strife　being　estimated　as
  the　greatest　of　all　goods；　each　combatant　is　seized　with　a　fierce　desire
  to　put　down　his　rivals　in　every　possible　way；　till　he　who　at　last　comes
  out　victorious　is　more　proud　of　having　done　harm　to　others　than　of　having
  done　good　to　himself。　This　sort　of　honour；　then；　is　really　empty；　being
  nothing。
  The　points　to　note　concerning　shame　（pudor）　may　easily　be　inferred
  from　what　was　said　on　the　subject　of　mercy　and　repentance。　I　will　only
  add　that　shame；　like　compassion；　though　not　a　virtue；　is　yet　good；　in　so
  far　as　it　shows；　that　the　feeler　of　shame　is　really　imbued　with　the
  desire　to　live　honourably；　in　the　same　way　as　suffering　is　good；　as
  showing　that　the　injured　part　is　not　mortified。　Therefore；　though　a　man
  who　feels　shame　is　sorrowful；　he　is　yet　more　perfect　than　he；　who　is
  shameless；　and　has　no　desire　to　live　honourably。
  Such　are　the　points　which　I　undertook　to　remark　upon　concerning　the
  emotions　of　pleasure　and　pain；　as　for　the　desires；　they　are　good　or　bad
  according　as　they　spring　from　good　or　evil　emotions。　But　all；　in　so　far
  as　they　are　engendered　in　us　by；　emotions　wherein　the　mind　is　passive；
  are　blind　（as　is　evident　from　what　was　said　in　IV：xliv。Note）；　and　would
  be　useless；　if　men　could　easily；　be　induced　to　live　by　the　guidance　of
  reason　only；　as　I　will　now　briefly；　show。
  Prop。　LIX。　To　all　the　actions；　whereto　we
  are　determined　by　emotion　wherein　the　mind
  is　passive；　we　can　be　determined　without
  emotion　by　reason。
  Proof。…　To　act　rationally；　is　nothing　else　（III：iii。　and　III：Def。ii。）
  but　to　perform　those　actions；　which　follow　from　the　necessity；　of　our
  nature　｛to　persist｝　considered　in　itself　alone。　But　pain　is　bad；　in　so
  far　as　it　diminishes　or　checks　the　power　of　action　（IV：xli。）；　wherefore
  we　cannot　by　pain　be　determined　to　any　action；　which　we　should　be　unable
  to　perform　under　the　guidance　of　reason。　Again；　pleasure　is　bad　only
  in　so　far　as　it　hinders　a　man's　capability　for　action　（IV：xli。；　IV：xliii。）；
  therefore　to　this　extent　we　could　not　be　determined　by；　it　to　any　action；
  which　we　could　not　perform　under　the　guidance　of　reason。　Lastly；　pleasure；
  in　so　far　as　it　is　good；　is　in　harmony　with　reason　（for　it　consists　in　the
  fact　that　a　man's　capability　for　action　is　increased　or　aided）；　nor　is　the
  mind　passive　therein；　except　in　so　far　as　a　man's　power　of　action　is　not
  increased　to　the　extent　of　affording　him　an　adequate　conception　of
  himself　and　his　actions　（III：iii。；　&Note）。
  Wherefore；　if　a　man　who　is　pleasurably　affected　be　brought　to　such　a
  state　of　perfection；　that　he　gains　an　adequate　conception　of　himself　and
  his　own　actions；　he　will　be　equally；　nay　more；　capable　of　those　actions；
  to　which　he　is　determined　by　emotion　wherein　the　mind　is　passive。　But　all
  emotions　are　attributable　to　pleasure；　to　pain；　or　to　desire　（Def。　of　the
  Emotions：iv。　explanation）；　and　desire　（Def。　of　the　Emotions：i。）　is　nothing
  else　but　the　attempt　to　act；　therefore；　to　all　actions；　&c。　Q。E。D。
  Another　Proof。…　A　given　action　is　called　bad；　in　so　far　as　it　arises
  from　one　being　affected　by　hatred　or　any　evil　emotion。　But　no　action；
  considered　in　itself　alone；　is　either　good　or　bad　（as　we　pointed　out　in
  the　preface　to　Pt。　IV。）；　one　and　the　same　act