Str。　You　follow　close　at　heels；　Theaetetus。　For　the　right　method；
  I　conceive；　will　be　to　call　into　our　presence　the　dualistic
  philosophers　and　to　interrogate　them。　〃Come；〃　we　will　say；　〃Ye；　who
  affirm　that　hot　and　cold　or　any　other　two　principles　are　the
  universe；
  what　is　this　term　which　you　apply　to　both　of　them；　and　what　do　you
  mean　when　you　say　that　both　and　each　of　them　'are'？　How　are　we　to
  understand　the　word　'are'？　Upon　your　view；　are　we　to　suppose　that
  there　is　a　third　principle　over　and　above　the　other　two…three　in
  all；　and　not　two？　For　clearly　you　cannot　say　that　one　of　the　two
  principles　is　being；　and　yet　attribute　being　equally　to　both　of
  them；　for；　if　you　did；　whichever　of　the　two　is　identified　with
  being；　will　comprehend　the　other；　and　so　they　will　be　one　and　not
  two。〃
  Theaet。　Very　true。
  Str。　But　perhaps　you　mean　to　give　the　name　of　〃being〃　to　both　of
  them　together？
  Theaet。　Quite　likely。
  Str。　〃Then；　friends；〃　we　shall　reply　to　them；　〃the　answer
  is　plainly
  that　the　two　will　still　be　resolved　into　one。〃
  Theaet。　Most　true。
  Str。　〃Since　then；　we　are　in　a　difficulty；　please　to　tell
  us　what　you
  mean；　when　you　speak　of　being；　for　there　can　be　no　doubt　that　you
  always　from　the　first　understood　your　own　meaning；　whereas　we　once
  thought　that　we　understood　you；　but　now　we　are　in　a　great　strait。
  Please　to　begin　by　explaining　this　matter　to　us；　and　let　us　no
  longer　fancy　that　we　understand　you；　when　we　entirely　misunderstand
  you。〃　There　will　be　no　impropriety　in　our　demanding　an　answer　to
  this　question；　either　of　the　dualists　or　of　the　pluralists？
  Theaet。　Certainly　not。
  Str。　And　what　about　the　assertors　of　the　oneness　of　the　all…must
  we　not　endeavour　to　ascertain　from　them　what　they　mean　by　〃being〃？
  Theaet。　By　all　means。
  Str。　Then　let　them　answer　this　question：　One；　you　say；　alone　is？
  〃Yes；〃　they　will　reply。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And　there　is　something　which　you　call　〃being〃？
  Theaet。　〃Yes。〃
  Str。　And　is　being　the　same　as　one；　and　do　you　apply　two
  names　to　the
  same　thing？
  Theaet。　What　will　be　their　answer；　Stranger？
  Str。　It　is　clear；　Theaetetus；　that　he　who　asserts　the
  unity　of　being
  will　find　a　difficulty　in　answering　this　or　any　other　question。
  Theaet。　Why　so？
  Str。　To　admit　of　two　names；　and　to　affirm　that　there　is　nothing
  but　unity；　is　surely　ridiculous？
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　And　equally　irrational　to　admit　that　a　name　is　anything？
  Theaet。　How　so？
  Str。　To　distinguish　the　name　from　the　thing；　implies　duality。
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　And　yet　he　who　identifies　the　name　with　the　thing　will　be
  compelled　to　say　that　it　is　the　name　of　nothing；　or　if　he
  says　that　it
  is　the　name　of　something；　even　then　the　name　will　only　be　the　name
  of　a　name；　and　of　nothing　else。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And　the　one　will　turn　out　to　be　only　one　of　one；　and　being
  absolute　unity；　will　represent　a　mere　name。
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　And　would　they　say　that　the　whole　is　other　than　the　one　that
  is；　or　the　same　with　it？
  Theaet。　To　be　sure　they　would；　and　they　actually　say　so。
  Str。　If　being　is　a　whole；　as　Parmenides　sings；…
  Every　way　like　unto　the　fullness　of　a　well…rounded　sphere；
  Evenly　balanced　from　the　centre　on　every　side；
  And　must　needs　be　neither　greater　nor　less　in　any　way；
  Neither　on　this　side　nor　on　that…
  then　being　has　a　centre　and　extremes；　and；　having　these；　must　also
  have　parts。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　Yet　that　which　has　parts　may　have　the　attribute　of
  unity　in　all
  the　parts；　and　in　this　way　being　all　and　a　whole；　may　be　one？
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　But　that　of　which　this　is　the　condition　cannot　be　absolute
  unity？
  Theaet。　Why　not？
  Str。　Because；　according　to　right　reason；　that　which　is　truly　one
  must　be　affirmed　to　be　absolutely　indivisible。
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　But　this　indivisible；　if　made　up　of　many　parts；　will
  contradict
  reason。
  Theaet。　I　understand。
  Str。　Shall　we　say　that　being　is　one　and　a　whole；　because　it　has
  the　attribute　of　unity？　Or　shall　we　say　that　being　is　not　a　whole　at
  all？
  Theaet。　That　is　a　hard　alternative　to　offer。
  Str。　Most　true；　for　being；　having　in　a　certain　sense　the　attribute
  of　one；　is　yet　proved　not　to　be　the　same　as　one；　and　the　all　is
  therefore　more　than　one。
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　And　yet　if　being　be　not　a　whole；　through　having　the　attribute
  of　unity；　and　there　be　such　a　thing　as　an　absolute　whole；　being
  lacks　something　of　its　own　nature？
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　Upon　this　view；　again；　being；　having　a　defect　of　being；　will
  become　not…being？
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And；　again；　the　all　becomes　more　than　one；　for　being　and　the
  whole　will　each　have　their　separate　nature。
  Theaet。　Yes。
  Str。　But　if　the　whole　does　not　exist　at　all；　all　the　previous
  difficulties　remain　the　same；　and　there　will　be　the　further
  difficulty；　that　besides　having　no　being；　being　can　never　have　come
  into　being。
  Theaet。　Why　so？
  Str。　Because　that　which　comes　into　being　always　comes　into　being
  as　a　whole；　so　that　he　who　does　not　give　whole　a　place　among　beings；
  cannot　speak　either　of　essence　or　generation　as　existing。
  Theaet。　Yes；　that　certainly　appears　to　be　true。
  Str。　Again；　how　can　that　which　is　not　a　whole　have　any
  quantity？　For
  that　which　is　of　a　certain　quantity　must　necessarily　be　the　whole　of
  that　quantity。
  Theaet。　Exactly。
  Str。　And　there　will　be　innumerable　other　points；　each　of　them
  causing　infinite　trouble　to　him　who　says　that　being　is　either；　one
  or　two。
  Theaet。　The　difficulties　which　are　dawning　upon　us　prove　this；　for
  one　objection　connects　with　another；　and　they　are　always　involving
  what　has　preceded　in　a　greater　and　worse　perplexity。
  Str。　We　are　far　from　having　exhausted　the　more　exact　thinkers　who
  treat　of　being　and　not…being。　But　let　us　be　content　to　leave
  them；　and
  proceed　to　view　those　who　speak　less　precisely；　and　we　shall　find　as
  the　result　of　all；　that　the　nature　of　being　is　quite　as　difficult　to
  comprehend　as　that　of　not…being。
  Theaet。　Then　now　we　will　go　to　the　others。
  Str。　There　appears　to　be　a　sort　of　war　of　Giants　and　Gods　going　on
  amongst　them；　they　are　fighting　with　one　another　about　the　nature　of
  essence。
  Theaet。　How　is　that？
  Str。　Some　of　them　are　dragging　down　all　things　from　heaven　and
  from　the　unseen　to　earth；　and　they　literally　grasp　in　their　hands
  rocks　and　oaks；　of　these　they　lay　hold；　and　obstinately
  maintain；　that
  the　things　only　which　can　be　touched　or　handled　have　being
  or　essence；
  because　they　define　being　and　body　as　one；　and　if　any　one　else　says
  that　what　is　not　a　body　exists　they　altogether　despise　him；　and　will
  hear　of　nothing　but　body。
  Theaet。　I　have　often　met　with　such　men；　and　terrible　fellows　they
  are。
  Str。　And　that　is　the　reason　why　their　opponents　cautiously　defend
  themselves　from　above；　out　of　an　unseen　world；　mightily　contending
  that　true　essence　consists　of　certain　intelligible　and　incorporeal
  ideas；　the　bodies　of　the　materialists；　which　by　them　are
  maintained　to
  be　the　very　truth；　they　break　up　into　little　bits　by　their
  arguments；　and　affirm　them　to　be；　not　essence；　but　generation　and
  motion。　Between　the　two　armies；　Theaetetus；　there　is　always
  an　endless
  conflict　raging　concerning　these　matters。
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　Let　us　ask　each　party　in　turn；　to　give　an　account　of
  that　which
  they　call　essence。
  Theaet。　How　shall　we　get　it　out　of　them？
  Str。　With　those　who　make　being　to　consist　in　ideas；　there　will　be
  less　difficulty；　for　they　are　civil　people　enough；　but　there　will　be
  very　great　difficulty；　or　rather　an　absolute　impossibility；
  in　getting
  an　opinion　out　of　those　who　drag　everything　down　to　matter。　Shall　I
  tell　you　what　we　must　do？
  Theaet。　What？
  Str。　Let　us；　if　we　can；　really　improve　them；　but　if　this　is　not
  possible；　let　us　imagine　them　to　be　better　than　they　are；　and　more
  willing　to　answer　in　accordance　with　the　rules　of　argument；　and　then
  their　opinion　will　be　more　worth　having；　for　that　which　better　men
  acknowledge　has　more　weight　than　that　which　is　acknowledged　by
  inferior　men。　Moreover　we　are　no　respecters　of　persons；　but　seekers
  after　time。
  Theaet。　Very　good。
  Str。　Then　now；　on　the　supposition　that　they　are　improved；
  let　us　ask
  them　to　state　their　views；　and　do　you　interpret　them。
  Theaet。　Agreed。
  Str。　Let　them　say　whether　they　would　admit　that　there　is　such　a
  thing　as　a　mortal　animal。
  Theaet。　Of　course　they　would。
  Str。　And　do　they　not　acknowledge　this　to　be　a　body　having　a　soul？
  Theaet。　Certainly　they　do。
  Str。　Meaning　to　say　the　soul　is　something　which　exists？
  Theaet。　True。
  Str。　And　do　they　not　say　that　one　soul　is　just；　and　another
  unjust；　and　that　one　soul　is　wise；　and　another　foolish？
  Theaet。　Certainly。
  Str。　And　that　the　just　and　wise　soul　becomes　just　and　wise　by　the
  possession　of　justice　and　wisdom；　and　the　opposite　under　opposite
  circumstances？
  Theaet。　Yes；　they　do。
  Str。　But　surely　that　which　may　be　present　or　may　be　absent　will　be
  admitted