the　difference　between　the　Notion　and　its　actualisation。　The　Notion　in　nature　and　in　spirit　has　an
  external　presentation　in　which　its　determinateness　shows　itself　as　dependence　on　the　external；　as
  transitoriness　and　inadequacy。　Therefore；　although　any　actual　thing　no　doubt　shows　in　itself　what　it
  ought　to　be；　yet　in　accordance　with　the　negative　judgement　of　the　Notion　it　may　equally　show　that
  its　actuality　only　imperfectly　corresponds　to　this　Notion；　that　it　is　bad。　Now　the　definition　is
  supposed　to　indicate　the　determinateness　of　the　Notion　in　an　immediate　property；　yet　there　is　no
  property　against　which　an　instance　cannot　be　brought　in　which　the　total　habitus；　though　it　enables
  one　to　discern　the　concrete　thing　to　be　defined；　yet　the　property　taken　as　its　characteristic　shows
  itself　immature　or　stunted。　In　a　bad　plant；　a　poor　specimen　of　an　animal；　a　contemptible　human
  being；　a　bad　state；　aspects　of　its　concrete　existence　are　defective　or　entirely　obliterated　that
  otherwise　might　have　been　adopted　for　the　definition　as　the　distinguishing　mark　and　essential
  determinateness　in　the　existence　of　such　a　concrete。　But　for　all　that；　a　bad　plant　or　a　bad　animal；
  etc。；　still　remains　a　plant　or　an　animal。　If；　therefore；　bad　specimens　too　are　to　be　covered　by　the
  definition；　then　all　the　properties　that　we　wanted　to　regard　as　essential　elude　us　through　instances
  of　malformations　in　which　tho　se　properties　a　re　lacking。　Thus　for　example　the　essentiality　of　the
  brain　for　physical　man　is　contradicted　by　the　instance　of　acephalous　individuals；　the　essentiality　of
  the　protection　of　life　and　property　for　the　state；　by　the　instance　of　despotic　states　and　tyrannous
  governments。　If　the　Notion　is　asserted　against　such　an　instance　and　the　instance；　being　measured
  by　the　Notion；　is　declared　to　be　a　bad　specimen；　then　the　Notion　is　no　longer　attested　by
  phenomena。　But　the　self…subsistence　of　the　Notion　is　contrary　to　the　meaning　of　definition；　for
  definition　is　supposed　to　be　the　immediate　Notion；　and　therefore　can　only　draw　on　the　immediacy
  of　existence　for　its　determinations　for　objects；　and　can　justify　itself　only　in　what　it　finds　already　to
  hand。　Whether　its　content　is　in…and…for　itself　truth　or　a　contingency；　this　lies　outside　its　sphere；
  but　formal　truth；　the　agreement　between　the　Notion　subjectively　posited　in　the　definition　and　an
  actual　object　outside　it；　cannot　be　established　because　the　individual　object　may　also　be　a　bad
  specimen。
  The　content　of　definition　is　in　general　taken　from　immediate　existence；　and　being　an　immediate
  content　has　no　justification；　the　question　of　its　necessity　is　precluded　by　its　origin；　in　enunciating　the
  Notion　as　a　mere　immediate；　the　definition　refrains　from　comprehending　the　Notion　itself。　Hence　it
  represents　nothing　but　the　form　determination　of　the　Notion　in　a　given　content；　without　the
  reflection　of　the　Notion　into　itself；　that　is；　without　the　Notion's　being…for…self。
  But　immediacy　in　general　proceeds　only　from　mediation；　and　must　therefore　pass　over　into
  mediation。　Or；　in　other　words；　the　determinateness　of　the　content　contained　in　the　definition；
  because　it　is　determinateness；　is　not　merely　an　immediate；　but　is　mediated　by　its　opposite；
  consequently　definition　can　apprehend　its　subject　matter　only　through　the　opposite　determination
  and　must　therefore　pass　over　into　division。
  2。　Division
  3。　The　Theorem
  Axioms
  In　synthetic　cognition；　therefore；　the　Idea　attains　its　end　only　to　the　extent　that　the　Notion
  becomes　for　the　Notion　according　to　its　moments　of　identity　and　real　determinations；　or　of
  universality　and　particular　differences　…　further　also　as　an　identity　that　is　the　connection　and
  dependence　of　the　diverse　elements。　But　this　subject　matter　of　the　Notion　is　not　adequate　to　it；　for
  the　Notion　does　not　come　to　be　the　unity　of　itself　with　itself　in　its　subject　matter　or　its　reality；
  in　necessity　its　identity　is　for　it；　but　in　this　identity　the　necessity　is　not　itself　the　determinateness；
  but　appears　as　a　matter　external　to　the　identity；　that　is；　as　a　matter　not　determined　by　the　Notion；　a
  matter；　therefore；　in　which　the　Notion　does　not　cognise　itself。　Thus　in　general　the　Notion　is　not　for
  itself；　is　not　at　the　same　time　determined　in　and　for　itself　according　to　its　unity。　Hence　in　this
  cognition　the　Idea　which　falls　short　of　truth　on　account　of　the　inadequacy　of　the　subject　matter　to
  the　subjective　Notion。　But　the　sphere　of　necessity　is　the　apex　of　being　and　reflection；　through　its
  own　essential　nature　it　passes　into　its　manifestation；　which　is　the　Notion　as　Notion。　How　this
  transition　from　the　sphere　of　necessity　into　the　Notion　is　effected　in　principle　has　been　shown　in
  treating　of　necessity；　the　same　transition　also　presented　itself　as　the　genesis　of　the　Notion　at　the
  beginning　of　this　Book。
  Here　necessity　has　the　position　of　being　the　reality　or　subject　matter　of　the　Notion；　just　as　the
  Notion　into　which　it　passes　now　appears　as　the　Notion's　subject　matter。　But　the　transition　itself　is
  the　same。　Here　too　it　is　only　at　first　implicit　and　lies　as　yet　outside　cognition　in　our　reflection；　that
  is；　it　is　still　the　inner　necessity　of　the　cognition　itself。　It　is　only　the　result　that　is　for　it。
  The　Idea；　in　so　far　as　the　Notion　is　now　explicitly　determined　in　and　for　itself；　is　the　practical
  Idea；　or　action。
  BOOK　III。　The　Doctrine　of　the　Notion
  Section　3　（The　Idea）；　continued
  Chapter　2　The　Idea　of　Cognition　（continued）
  B　The　Idea　of　the　Good
  The　Notion；　which　is　its　own　subject　matter；　being　determined　in　and　for　itself；　the　subject　is
  determined　for　itself　as　an　individual。　As　subjective　it　again　presupposes　an　implicit　otherness；　it　is
  the　urge　to　realise　itself；　the　end　that　wills　by　means　of　itself　to　give　itself　objectivity　and　to　realise
  itself　in　the　objective　world。
  In　the　theoretical　Idea　the　subjective　Notion；　as　the　universal　that　lacks　any　determination　of　its
  own；　stands　opposed　to　the　objective　world　from　which　it　takes　to　itself　a　determinate　content　and
  filling。　But　in　the　practical　Idea　it　is　as　actual　that　it　confronts　the　actual；　but　the　certainty　of　itself
  which　the　subject　possesses　in　being　determinate　in　and　for　itself　is　a　certainty　of　its　own　actuality
  and　the　non…actuality　of　the　world；　it　is　not　only　the　world's　otherness　as　an　abstract　universality
  that　is　a　nullity　for　the　subject；　but　the　world's　individuality　and　the　determination　of　its　individuality。
  The　subject　has　here　vindicated　objectivity　for　itself；　its　immanent　determinateness　is　the
  objective；　for　it　is　the　universality　that　is　just　as　much　absolutely　determined；　the　formerly　objective
  world；　on　the　contrary；　is　now　only　something　posited；　something　immediately　determined　in
  various　ways；　but　because　it　is　only　immediately　determined；　the　unity　of　the　Notion　is　lacking　in　it
  and　it　is；　by　itself；　a　nullity。
  This　determinateness　contained　in　the　Notion　and　in　the　likeness　of　the　Notion；　and　including
  within　it　the　demand　for　an　individual　external　actuality；　is　the　good。　It　comes　upon　the　scene　with
  the　worth　of　being　absolute；　because　it　is　within　itself　the　totality　of　the　Notion；　the　objective　that　is
  at　the　same　time　in　the　form　of　free　unity　and　subjectivity。
  This　Idea　is　superior　to　the　Idea　of　cognition　already　considered；　for　it　possesses　not　only　the
  worth　of　the　universal　but　also　of　the　out…and…out　actual。　It　is　an　urge　in　so　far　as　this　actuality　is
  still　subjective；　positing　its　own　self　and　not　having　at　the　same　time　the　form　of　immediate
  presupposition；　its　urge　to　realise　itself　is；　strictly　speaking；　not　to　give　itself　objectivity　this　it
  possesses　within　itself　but　merely　this　empty　form　of　immediacy。　Hence　the　activity　of　the　end　is
  not　directed　against　itself　in　order　to　adopt　and　appropriate　a　given　determination　and　by　sublating
  the　determinateness　of　the　external　world　to　give　itself　reality　in　the　form　of　external　actuality。　The
  Idea　of　the　will　as　explicitly　self…determining　possesses　the　content　within　itself。　Now　it　is　true　tat
  this　is　a　determinate　content　and　to　that　extent　something　finite　and　limited；　self…determination　is
  essentially　particularisation；　since　the　reflection　of　the　will　into　itself　as　a　negative　unity　in　general
  is　also　individuality　in　the　sense　of　the　exclusion　and　presupposition　of　an　other。　Nevertheless；　the
  particularity　of　the　content　is　in　the　first　instance　infinite　through　the　form　of　the　Notion；　whose　own
  determinateness　it　is；　and　in　this　content　the　Notion　possesses　its　negative　self…identity；　and
  therefore　not　merely　a　particular；　but　its　own　infinite　individuality。　Consequently；　the
  above…mentioned　finitude　of　the　content　in　the　practical　Idea　is　tantamount　to　the　latter　being　in
  the　first　instance　the　not　yet　realised　Idea；　the　Notion　is；　for　the　content；　something　that　is　in　and
  for　itself；　it　is　here　the　Idea　in　the　form　of　objectivity　that　is　for　itself；　on　the　one　hand；　the
  subjective　is　for　this　reason　no　longer　something　merely　posited；　arbitrary　or　contingent；　but　an
  absolute；　but　on　the　other　hand；　this　form　of　concrete　existence；　being…for…self；　has　not　yet　the
  form　of