第 8 节
作者:匆匆      更新:2021-02-27 02:11      字数:9315
  appeal to such and such as recognised facts; or rather the plea can be advanced that such and
  such could be accepted as recognised facts。 There will always be someone who will adduce a
  case; an instance; according to which something more and different is to be understood by certain
  terms the definition of which must therefore be made more precise or more general and the
  science too; must be accommodated thereto。 This again involves argumentation about what should
  be admitted or excluded and within what limits and to what extent; but argumentation is open to
  the most manifold and various opinions; on which a decision can finally be determined only
  arbitrarily。 In this method of beginning a science with its definition; no mention is made of the need
  to demonstrate the necessity of its subject matter and therefore of the science itself。
  The Notion of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so
  far as the Phenomenology of Spirit is nothing other than the deduction of it。 Absolute knowing is
  the truth of every mode of consciousness because; as the course of the Phenomenology showed;
  it is only in absolute knowing that separation of the object from the certainty of itself is
  completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and this certainty with truth。
  Thus pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness。 It contains
  thought in so far as this is just as much the object in its own self; or the object in its own
  self in so far as it is equally pure thought。 As science; truth is pure self…consciousness in its
  self…development and has the shape of the self; so that the absolute truth of being is the known
  Notion and the Notion as such is the absolute truth of being。
  This objective thinking then; is the content of pure science。 Consequently; far from it being formal;
  far from it standing in need of a matter to constitute an actual and true cognition; it is its content
  alone which has absolute truth; or; if one still wanted to employ the word matter; it is the veritable
  matter — but a matter which is not external to the form; since this matter is rather pure thought and
  hance the absolute form itself。 Accordingly; logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason;
  as the realm of pure thought。 This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature。
  It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence
  before the creation of nature and a finite mind。
  Anaxagoras is praised as the man who first declared that Nous; thought; is the principle of the
  world; that the essence of the world is to be defined as thought。 In so doing he laid the foundation
  for an intellectual view of the universe; the pure form of which must be logic。
  What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists independently as
  a base for our thinking and apart from it; nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or
  distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary; the necessary forms and self…consciousness of
  thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself。
  To get some idea of this one must discard the prejudice that truth must be something tangible。
  Such tangibility is; for example; imported even into the Platonic Ideas which are in God's thinking;
  as if they are; as it were; existing things but in another world or region; while the world of actuality
  exists outside that region and has a substantial existence distinct from those Ideas and only through
  this distinction is a substantial reality。 The Platonic Idea is the universal; or more definitely the
  Notion of an object; only in its Notion does something possess actuality and to the extent that it is
  distinct from its Notion it ceases to be actual and is a non…entity; the side of tangibility and
  sensuous self…externality belongs to this null aspect。 But on the other side; one can appeal to the
  conceptions of ordinary logic itself; for it is assumed; for example; that the determinations
  contained in definitions do not belong only to the knower; but are determinations of the object;
  constituting its innermost essence and its very own nature。 Or; if from given determinations others
  are inferred; it is assumed that what is inferred is not something external and alien to the object; but
  rather that it belongs to the object itself; that to the thought there is a correspondent being。
  It is implied generally in the use of forms of the Notion; of judgement; syllogism; definition;
  division; etc。; that they are not merely forms of self…conscious thinking but also of the objective
  understanding。
  Thought is an expression which attributes the determination contained therein primarily to
  consciousness。 But inasmuch as it is said that understanding; reason; is in the objective world; that
  mind and nature have universal laws to which their life and changes conform; then it is conceded
  that the determinations of thought equally have objective value and existence。
  The critical philosophy had; it is true; already turned metaphysics into logic but it; like the later
  idealism; as previously remarked; was overawed by the object; and so the logical determinations
  were given an essentially subjective significance with the result that these philosophies remained
  burdened with the object they had avoided and were left with the residue of a thing…in…itself; an
  infinite obstacle; as a beyond。 But the liberation from the opposition of consciousness which the
  science of logic must be able to presuppose lifts the determinations of thought above this timid;
  incomplete standpoint and demands that they be considered not with any such limitation and
  reference but as they are in their own proper character; as logic; as pure reason。
  Kant moreover considers logic; that is; the aggregate of definitions and propositions which
  ordinarily passes for logic; to be fortunate in having attained so early to completion before the
  other sciences; since Aristotle; it has not lost any ground; but neither has it gained any; the latter
  because to all appearances it seems to be finished and complete。 Now if logic has not undergone
  any change since Aristotle — and in fact; judging by modern compendiums of logic the changes
  frequently consist mainly in omissions — then surely the conclusion which should be drawn is that it
  is all the more in need of a total reconstruction; for spirit; after its labours over two thousand years;
  must have attained to a higher consciousness about its thinking and about its own pure; essential
  nature。
  A comparison of the forms to which spirit has raised itself in the practical and religious sphere and
  in every branch of science both physical and mental; with the form presented by logic which is
  spirit's consciousness of its own pure essence; reveals so vast a difference that the utter
  inadequacy and unworthiness of the latter consciousness in comparison with the higher
  consciousness displayed in those other spheres cannot fail to strike the most superficial observer。
  In point of fact the need for a reconstruction of logic has long since been felt。 In form and in
  content; logic; as exhibited in the text…books; may be said to have fallen into contempt。 It is still
  dragged in; but more from a feeling that one cannot dispense with logic altogether and because the
  tradition of its importance still survives; rather than from a conviction that such commonplace
  content and occupation with such empty forms is valuable and useful。
  The additions of psychological; pedagogic and even physiological material which logic received in
  the past have subsequently been recognised almost universally as disfigurements。 A great part of
  these psychological; pedagogic and physiological observations; laws and rules; whether they occur
  in logic or anywhere else; must appear very shallow and trivial in themselves; and without
  exception all those rules such as; for example; that one must think out and test what one reads in
  books or hears by word of mouth; that when one's sight is not good one should help one's eyes by
  wearing spectacles — rules which in textbooks of so…called applied logic were solemnly set out in
  paragraphs and put forward as aids to the attainment of truth — these must strike everyone as
  superfluous — except only the writer or teacher who finds difficulty in expanding by some means
  or other the otherwise scanty and life…less content of logic。'
  Regarding this content; the reason why logic is so dull and spiritless has already been given above。
  Its determinations are accepted in their unmoved fixity and are brought only into external relation
  with each other。 In judgments and syllogisms the operations are in the main reduced to and
  founded on the quantitative aspect of the determinations; consequently everything rests on an
  external difference; on mere comparison and becomes a completely analytical procedure and
  mechanical calculation。 The deduction of the so…called rules and laws; chiefly of inference; is not
  much better than a manipulation of rods of unequal length in order to sort and group them
  according to size — than a childish game of fitting together the