and　hidden。　In　the　silent　regions　of　thought　which　has　come　to　itself　and　communes　only　with　itself；
  the　interests　which　move　the　lives　of　races　and　individuals　are　hushed。
  'In　so　many　respects'；　says　Aristotle　in　the　same　context；　'the　nature　of　man　is　in　bondage；　but　this
  science；　which　is　not　studied　for　its　utility；　is　the　only　absolutely　free　science　and　seems　therefore
  to　be　a　more　than　human　possessions　Philosophical　thinking　in　general　is　still　concerned　with
  concrete　objects…God；　nature；　spirit；　but　logic　is　concerned　only　and　solely　with　these　thoughts　as
  thoughts；　in　their　complete　abstraction。　For　this　reason　it　is　customary；　to　include　logic　in　the
  curriculum　of　youth；　for　youth　is　not　yet　involved　in　the　practical　affairs　of　life；　living　at　leisure
  so　far　as　they　are　concerned；　and　it　is　only　for　its　own　subjective　ends　that　it　has　to　busy　itself　with
  acquiring　the　means　to　enable　it　to　become　actively　engaged　with　the　objects　of　those　practical
  interests…and　still　theoretically　even　with　these。　Contrary　to　Aristotle's　view　just　mentioned；　the
  science　of　logic　is　included　in　these　means；　the　study　of　logic　is　a　preliminary　labour　to　be　carried
  out　in　school　and　it　is　not　until　later　that　the　serious　business　of　life　and　the　pursuit　of　substantial
  ends　begins。
  In　life；　the　categories　are　used；　from　the　honour　of　being　contemplated　for　their　own　sakes　they
  are　degraded　to　the　position　where　they　serve　in　the　creation　and　exchange　of　ideas　involved　in
  intellectual　exercise　on　a　living　content。　First　they　serve　as　abbreviations　through　their　universality
  （for　what　a　host　of　particulars　of　outer　existence　and　actions　is　embraced　by　a　conception　—
  battle；　war；　nation；　ocean　or　animal；　for　example　—　and　in　the　conception　of　God　or　of　love　there
  is　epitomised　in　the　simplicity　of　such　ideating　an　infinite　host　of　ideas；　actions；　states；　etc。！）。
  Secondly；　the　categories　serve　for　the　more　exact　determination　and　discovery　of　objective
  relations；　but　in　this　process　the　import　and　purpose；　the　correctness　and　truth　of　the　thought
  involved；　are　made　to　depend　entirely　on　the　subject　matter　itself　and　the　thought　determinations
  are　not　themselves　credited　with　any　active　part　in　determining　the　content。　Such　a　use　of
  categories；　which　above　was　called　natural　logic；　is　unconscious；　and　when　in　philosophical
  reflection　the　categories　are　assigned　the　role　of　serving　as　means；　then　thinking　as　such　is　treated
  as　something　subordinate　to　the　other　activities　of　mind。　We　do　not　indeed　say　of　our　feelings；
  impulses　or　interests　that　they　serve　us；　rather　do　they　count　as　independent　forces　and　powers；　so
  that　to　have　this　particular　feeling；　to　desire　this；　is　what　we　are。？　But　probably　we　are　more
  conscious　of　obeying　our　feelings；　impulses；　passions；　interests；　not　to　mention　habits；　than　of
  having　them　in　our　possession；　still　less；　in　view　of　our　intimate　union　with　them；　of　their　being　at
  our　disposal。　Such　determinations　of　feeling　and　mind　soon　show　themselves　as　particular　in
  contrast　to　the　universality　which　we　are　conscious　ourselves　of　being　and　in　which　we　have　our
  freedom；　and　we　are　disposed　to　regard　ourselves　as　caught　up　in　these　particular　states　and
  dominated　by　them。
  Consequently　it　is　much　more　difficult　to　believe　that　the　forms　of　thought　which　permeate　all　our
  ideas　—　whether　these　are　purely　theoretical　or　contain　a　matter　belonging　to　feeling；　impulse；　will
  —　are　means　for　us；　rather　than　that　we　serve　them；　that　in　fact　they　have　us　in　their　possession；
  what　is　there　more　in　us　as　against　them；　how　shall　we；　how　shall　I；　set　myself　up　as　more
  universal　than　they；　which　are　universal　as　such？
  When　we　give　ourselves　up　to　a　sensation；　a　purpose；　an　interest；　and　in　it　feel　ourselves　confined
  and　unfree；　the　place　into　which　we　can　withdraw　ourselves　back　into　freedom　is　this　region　of
  self…certainty；　of　pure　abstraction；　of　thought。　Or　again；　to　speak　of　things；　we　call　the　nature　or
  the　essence　of　things　their　notion；　and　this　is　only　for　thought；　but　still　less　shall　we　say　of　the
  notions　of　things　that　we　dominate　them；　or　that　the　determinations　of　thought　of　which　they　are　the
  complex　are　at　our　service；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　our　thinking　that　must　accommodate　itself　to　them
  and　our　caprice　or　freedom　ought　not　to　want　to　mould　them　to　suit　itself。
  Since；　therefore；　subjective　thought　is　our　very　own；　innermost；　act；　and　the　objective　notion　of
  things　constitutes　their　essential　import；　we　cannot　go　outside　this　our　act；　we　cannot　stand　above
  it；　and　just　as　little　can　we　go　beyond　the　nature　of　things。　We　can　however　disregard　the　latter
  determination；　in　so　far　as　it　coincides　with　the　first　it　would　yield　a　relation　of　our　thoughts　to　the
  object；　but　this　would　be　a　valueless　result　because　it　would　imply　that　the　thing；　the　object；　would
  be　set　up　as　a　criterion　for　our　notions　and　yet　for　us　the　object　can　be　nothing　else　but　our　notions
  of　it。　The　way　in　which　the　critical　philosophy　understands　the　relationship　of　these　three　terms　is
  that　we　place　our　thoughts　as　a　medium　instead　of　connecting　us　with　the　objects　rather　cuts　us　off
  from　them。　But　this　view　can　be　countered　by　the　simple　observation　that　these　very　things　which
  are　supposed　to　stand　beyond　us；　and　at　the　other　extreme；　beyond　the　thoughts　referring　to　them；
  are　themselves　figments　of　subjective　thought；　and　as　wholly　indeterminate　they　are　only　a　single
  thought…thing　—　the　so…called　thing…in…itself　of　empty　abstraction。？
  Still；　sufficient　has　been　said　of　the　point　of　view　which　no　longer　takes　the　determinations　of
  thought　to　be　only　an　instrument　and　a　means；　more　important　is　the　further　point　connected　with
  it；　namely　that　it　is　usual　to　regard　them　as　an　external　form。　The　activity　of　thought　which　is　at
  work　in　all　our　ideas；　purposes；　interests　and　actions　is；　as　we　have　said；　unconsciously　busy
  （natural　logic）；　what　we　consciously　attend　to　is　the　contents；　the　objects　of　our　ideas；　that　in
  which　we　are　interested；　on　this　basis；　the　determinations　of　thought　have　the　significance　of　forms
  which　are　only　attached　to　the　content；　but　are　not　the　content　itself。　But　if　the　truth　of　the　matter　is
  what　we　have　already　stated　and　also　is　generally　admitted；　namely　that　the　nature；　the　peculiar
  essence；　that　which　is　genuinely　permanent　and　substantial　in　the　complexity　and　contingency　of
  appearance　and　fleeting　manifestation；　is　the　notion　of　the　thing；　the　immanent　universal；　and
  that　each　human　being　though　infinitely　unique　is　so　primarily　because　he　is　a　man；　and　each
  individual　animal　is　such　individual　primarily　because　it　is　an　animal：　if　this　is　true；　then　it　would　be
  impossible　to　say　what　such　an　individual　could　still　be　if　this
  foundation　were　removed；　no　matter　how　richly　endowed　the　individual　might　be　with　other
  predicates；　if；　that　is；　this　foundation　can　equally　be　called　a　predicate　like　the　others。　The
  indispensable　foundation；　the　notion；　the　universal　which　is　the　thought　itself；　in　so　far　as　one　can
  make　abstraction　from　the　general　idea　expressed　by　the　word　'thought'；　cannot　be　regarded　as
  only　an　indifferent　form　attached　to　a　content。　But　these　thoughts　of　everything　natural　and
  spiritual；　even　the　substantial　content　；　still　contain　a　variety　of　determinatenesses　and　are　still
  charged　with　the　difference　of　a　soul　and　a　body；　of　the　notion　and　a　relative　reality；　the
  profounder　basis　is　the　soul　itself；　the　pure　Notion　which　is　the　very　heart　of　things；　their　simple
  life…pulse；　even　of　subjective　thinking　of　them。
  To　focus　attention　on　this　logical　nature　which　animates　mind；　moves　and　works　in　it；　this　is　the
  task。　The　broad　distinction　between　the　instinctive　act　and　the　intelligent　and　free　act　is　that　the
  latter　is　performed　with　an　awareness　of　what　is　being　done；　when　the　content　of　the　interest　in
  which　one　is　absorbed　is　drawn　out　of　its　immediate　unity　with　oneself　and　becomes　an
  independent　object　of　one's　thinking；　then　it　is　that　spirit　begins　to　be　free；　whereas　when　thinking
  is　an　instinctive　activity；　spirit　is　enmeshed　in　the　bonds　of　its　categories　and　is　broken　up　into　an
  infinitely　varied　material。
  Here　and　there　in　this　mesh　there　are　firm　knots　which　give　stability　and　direction　to　the　life　and
  consciousness　of　spirit；　these　knots　or　nodes　owe　their　fixity　and　power　to　the　simple　fact　that
  having　been　brought　before　consciousness；　they　are　independent；　self…existent　Notions　of　its
  essential　nature。　The　most　important　point　for　the　nature　of　spirit　is　not　only　the　relation　of　what　it
  is　in　itself　to　what　it　is　actually；　but　the　relation　of　what　it　knows　itself　to　be　to　what　it　actually　is；
  because　spirit　is　essentially　consciousness；　this　self…knowing　is　a　fundamental　determination　of　its
  actuality。
  As　impulses　the　categories　are　only　instinctively　active。　At　first　they　enter　consciousness　separately
  and　so　are　variable　and　mutually　confusing；　consequently　they　afford　to　mind　only　a　fragmentary
  and　uncertain　actuality；　the　loftier　business　of　logic　therefore　is　to　clarify　these　categories　and　in
  them　to　raise　mind　to　freedom　and　truth。
  What　we　indicated　as　the　b