〃If　I　could　take　one　wing　and　Lee　the　other；　I　think　we　could
  between　us　wrest　a　victory　from　those　people。〃　And　yet；　his
  military　experience　embraced　only　the　minor　actions　of　a　young
  officer　on　the　Indian　frontier　and　the　gallant　conduct　of　a
  subordinate　in　the　Mexican　War。　He　had　never　executed　a　great
  military　design。　His　desire　for　the　military　life　was；　after　all；
  his　only　ground　for　ranking　himself　with　the　victor　of　Second
  Manassas。　Davis　was　also　unfortunate　in　lacking　the　power　to
  overcome　men　and　sweep　them　along　with　himthe　power　Lee　showed
  so　conspicuously。　Nor　was　Davis　averse　to　sharp　reproof　of　the
  highest　officials　when　he　thought　them　in　the　wrong。　He　once
  wrote　to　Joseph　E。　Johnston　that　a　letter　of　his　contained
  〃arguments　and　statements　utterly　unfounded〃　and　〃insinuations　as
  unfounded　as　they　were　unbecoming。〃
  Davis　was　not　always　wise　in　his　choice　of　men。　His　confidence　in
  Bragg；　who　was　long　his　chief　military　adviser；　is　not　sustained
  by　the　military　critics　of　a　later　age。　His　Cabinet；　though　not
  the　contemptible　body　caricatured　by　the　malice　of　Pollard；　was
  not　equal　to　the　occasion。　Of　the　three　men　who　held　the　office
  of　Secretary　of　State；　Toombs　and　Hunter　had　little　if　any
  qualification　for　such　a　post；　while　the　third；　Benjamin；　is　the
  sphinx　of　Confederate　history。
  In　a　way；　Judah　P。　Benjamin　is　one　of　the　most　interesting　men　in
  American　politics。　By　descent　a　Jew；　born　in　the　West　Indies；　he
  spent　his　boyhood　mainly　at　Charleston　and　his　college　days　at
  Yale。　He　went　to　New　Orleans　to　begin　his　illustrious　career　as　a
  lawyer；　and　from　Louisiana　entered　politics。　The　facile　keenness
  of　his　intellect　is　beyond　dispute。　He　had　the　Jewish　clarity　of
  thought；　the　wonderful　Jewish　detachment　in　matters　of　pure　mind。
  But　he　was　also　an　American　of　the　middle　of　the　century。　His
  quick　and　responsive　naturea　nature　that　enemies　might　call
  simulativecaught　and　reflected　the　characteristics　of　that
  singular　and　highly　rhetorical　age。　He　lives　in　tradition　as　the
  man　of　the　constant　smile；　and　yet　there　is　no　one　in　history
  whose　state　papers　contain　passages　of　fiercer　violence　in　days
  of　tension。　How　much　of　his　violence　was　genuine；　how　much　was　a
  manner　of　speaking；　his　biographers　have　not　had　the　courage　to
  determine。　Like　so　many　American　biographers　they　have　avoided
  the　awkward　questions　and　have　glanced　over；　as　lightly　as
  possible；　the　persistent　attempts　of　Congress　to　drive　him　from
  office。
  Nothing　could　shake　the　resolution　of　Davis　to　retain　Benjamin　in
  the　Cabinet。　Among　Davis's　loftiest　qualities　was　his　sense　of
  personal　loyalty。　Once　he　had　given　his　confidence；　no　amount　of
  opposition　could　shake　his　will　but　served　rather　to　harden　him。
  When　Benjamin　as　Secretary　of　War　passed　under　a　cloud；　Davis　led
  him　forth　resplendent　as　Secretary　of　State。　Whether　he　was　wise
  in　doing　so；　whether　the　opposition　was　not　justified　in　its
  distrust　of　Benjamin；　is　still　an　open　question。　What　is　certain
  is　that　both　these　able　men；　even　before　the　crisis　that　arose　in
  the　autumn　of　1862；　had　rendered　themselves　and　their　Government
  widely　unpopular。　It　must　never　be　forgotten　that　Davis　entered
  office　without　the　backing　of　any　definite　faction。　He　was　a
  〃dark　horse；〃　a　compromise　candidate。　To　build　up　a　stanch
  following；　to　create　enthusiasm　for　his　Administration；　was　a
  prime　necessity　of　his　first　year　as　President。　Yet　he　seems　not
  to　have　realized　this　necessity。　Boldly；　firmly；　dogmatically；　he
  gave　his　whole　thought　and　his　entire　energy　to　organizing　the
  Government　in　such　a　way　that　it　could　do　its　work　efficiently。
  And　therein　may　have　been　the　proverbial　rift　within　the　lute。　To
  Davis　statecraft　was　too　much　a　thing　of　methods　and　measures；
  too　little　a　thing　of　men　and　passions。
  During　the　autumn　of　1862　and　the　following　winter　the　disputes
  over　the　conduct　of　the　war　began　to　subside　and　two　other　themes
  became　prominent：　the　sovereignty　of　the　States；　which　appeared
  to　be　menaced　by　the　Government；　and　the　personality　of　Davis；
  whom　malcontents　regarded　as　a　possible　despot。　Contrary　to
  tradition；　the　first　note　of　alarm　over　state　rights　was　not
  struck　by　its　great　apostle　Rhett；　although　the　note　was　sounded
  in　South　Carolina　in　the　early　autumn。　There　existed　in　this
  State　at　that　time　an　extra　assembly　called　the　〃Convention；〃
  which　had　been　organized　in　1860　for　the　general　purpose　of
  seeing　the　State　through　the　〃revolution。〃　In　the　Convention；　in
  September；　1862；　the　question　of　a　contest　with　the　Confederate
  Government　on　the　subject　of　a　state　army　was　definitely　raised。
  It　was　proposed　to　organize　a　state　army　and　to　instruct　the
  Legislature　to　〃take　effectual　measures　to　prevent　the　agents　of
  the　Confederate　Government　from　raising　troops　in　South　Carolina
  except　by　voluntary　enlistment　or　by　applying　to　the　Executive　of
  the　State　to　call　out　the　militia　as　by　law　organized；　or　some
  part　of　it　to　be　mustered　into　the　Confederate　service。〃　This
  proposal　brought　about　a　sharp　debate　upon　the　Confederate
  Government　and　its　military　policy。　Rhett　made　a　remarkable
  address；　which　should　of　itself　quiet　forever　the　old　tale　that
  he　was　animated　in　his　opposition　solely　by　the　pique　of　a
  disappointed　candidate　for　the　presidency。　Though　as　sharp　as
  ever　against　the　Government　and　though　agreeing　wholly　with　the
  spirit　of　the　state　army　plan；　he　took　the　ground　that
  circumstances　at　the　moment　rendered　the　organization　of　such　an
  army　inopportune。　A　year　earlier　he　would　have　strongly　supported
  the　plan。　In　fact；　in　opposition　to　Davis　he　had　at　that　time；　he
  said；　urged　an　obligatory　army　which　the　States　should　be
  required　to　raise。　The　Confederate　Administration；　however；　had
  defeated　his　scheme。　Since　then　the　situation　had　changed　and　had
  become　so　serious　that　now　there　was　no　choice　but　to　submit　to
  military　necessity。　He　regarded　the　general　conscription　law　as
  〃absolutely　necessary　to　save〃　the　Confederacy　〃from　utter
  devastation　if　not　final　subjugation。　Right　or　wrong；　the　policy
  of　the　Administration　had　left　us　no　other　alternative。。。。〃
  The　dominant　attitude　in　South　Carolina　in　the　autumn　of　1862　is
  in　strong　contrast；　because　of　its　firm　grasp　upon　fact；　with　the
  attitude　of　the　Brown　faction　in　Georgia。　An　extended　history　of
  the　Confederate　movementone　of　those　vast　histories　that
  delight　the　recluse　and　scare　away　the　man　of　the　worldwould
  labor　to　build　up　images　of　what　might　be　called　the
  personalities　of　the　four　States　that　continued　from　the
  beginning　to　the　end　parts　of　the　effective　Confederate
  systemVirginia；　the　two　Carolinas；　and　Georgia。　We　are　prone　to
  forget　that　the　Confederacy　was　practically　divided　into　separate
  units　as　early　as　the　capture　of　New　Orleans　by　Farragut；　but　a
  great　history　of　the　time　would　have　a　special　and　thrilling
  story　of　the　conduct　of　the　detached　western　unit；　the　isolated
  world　of　Louisiana；　Arkansas；　and　Texasthe　〃Department　of　the
  Trans…Mississippi〃cut　off　from　the　main　body　of　the　Confederacy
  and　hemmed　in　between　the　Federal　army　and　the　deep　sea。　Another
  group　of　StatesTennessee；　Mississippi；　Alabamabecame　so　soon；
  and　remained　so　long；　a　debatable　land；　on　which　the　two　armies
  fought；　that　they　also　had　scant　opportunity　for　genuine
  political　life。　Florida；　small　and　exposed；　was　absorbed　in　its
  gallant　achievement　of　furnishing　to　the　armies　a　number　of
  soldiers　larger　than　its　voting　population。
  Thus；　after　the　loss　of　New　Orleans；　one　thing　with　another
  operated　to　confine　the　area　of　full　political　life　to　Virginia
  and　her　three　neighbors　to　the　South。　And　yet　even　among　these
  States　there　was　no　political　solidarity　or　unanimity　of　opinion；
  for　the　differences　in　their　past　experience；　social　structure；
  and　economic　conditions　made　for　distinct　points　of　view。　In
  South　Carolina；　particularly；　the　prevailing　view　was　that　of
  experienced；　disillusioned　men　who　realized　from　the　start　that
  secession　had　burnt　their　bridges；　and　that　now　they　must　win　the
  fight　or　change　the　whole　current　of　their　lives。　In　the　midst　of
  the　extraordinary　conditions　of　war；　they　never　talked　as　if
  their　problems　were　the　problems　of　peace。　Brown；　on　the　other
  hand；　had　but　one　way　of　reasoningif　we　are　to　call　it
  reasoningand；　with　Hannibal　at　the　gates；　talked　as　if　the
  control　of　the　situation　were　still　in　his　own　hands。
  While　South　Carolina；　so　grimly　conscious　of　the　reality　of　war
  and　the　danger　of　internal　discord；　held　off　from　the　issue　of
  state　sovereignty；　the　Brown　faction　in　Georgia　blithely　pressed
  it　home。　A　bill　for　extending　the　conscription　age　which　was
  heartily　advocated　by　the　Mercury　was　as　heartily　condemned　by
  Brown。　To　the　President　he　wrote　announcing　his　continued
  opposition　to　a　law　which　he　declared　〃encroaches　upon　the
  reserved　rights　of　the　State　and　strikes　down　her　sovereignty　at
  a　single　blow。〃　Though　the　Supreme　Court　of　Georgia　pronounced
  the　conscription　acts　constitutional；　the　Governor　and　his
  faction　did　not　cease　to　condemn　them。　Linton　Stephens；　as　well
  as　his　famous　kinsman；　took　up　the　cudgels。　In　a　speech　before
  the　Georgia　Legislature