第 7 节
作者:水王      更新:2021-02-24 22:03      字数:9322
  paying for it。 The problem was destined to become insoluble。 From
  the vantage…point of a later time we can now see that nothing
  could have provided a solution short of appropriation and
  mobilization of the whole industrial power of the country along
  with the whole military powera conscription of wealth of every
  kind together with conscription of men。 But in 1862 such an idea
  was too advanced for any group of Americans。 Nor; in that year;
  was there as yet any certain evidence that the Treasury was
  facing an impossible situation。 Its endeavors were taken
  lightlyat first; almost gaily…because of the profound illusion
  which permeated Southern thought that Cotton was King。 Obviously;
  if the Southern ports could be kept open and cotton could
  continue to go to market; the Confederate financial problem was
  not serious。 When Davis; soon after his first inauguration; sent
  Yancey; Rost; and Mann as commissioners to Europe to press the
  claims of the Confederacy for recognition; very few Southerners
  had any doubt that the blockade; would be short…lived。 〃Cotton is
  King〃 was the answer that silenced all questions。 Without
  American cotton the English mills would have to shut down; the
  operatives would starve; famine and discontent would between them
  force the British ministry to intervene in American affairs。
  There were; indeed; a few far…sighted men who perceived that this
  confidence was ill…based and that cotton; though it was a power
  in the financial world; was not the commercial king。 The majority
  of the population; however; had to learn this truth from keen
  experience。
  Several events of 1861 for a time seemed to confirm this
  illusion。 The Queen's proclamation in the spring; giving the
  Confederacy the status of a belligerent; and; in the autumn; the
  demand by the British Government for the surrender of the
  commissioners; Mason and Slidell; who had been taken from a
  British packet by a Union cruiserboth these events seemed to
  indicate active British sympathy。 In England; to be sure; Yancey
  became disillusioned。 He saw that the international situation was
  not so simple as it seemed; that while the South had powerful
  friends abroad; it also had powerful foes; that the British
  anti…slavery party was a more formidable enemy than he had
  expected it to be; and that intervention was not a foregone
  conclusion。 The task of an unrecognized ambassador being too
  annoying for him; Yancey was relieved at his own request and
  Mason was sent out to take his place。 A singular little incident
  like a dismal prophecy occurred as Yancey was on his way home。 He
  passed through Havana early in 1862; when the news of the
  surrender of Fort Donelson had begun to stagger the hopes and
  impair the prestige of the Confederates。 By the advice of the
  Confederate agent in Cuba; Yancey did not call on the Spanish
  Governor but sent him word that 〃delicacy alone prompted his
  departure without the gratification of a personal interview。〃 The
  Governor expressed himself as 〃exceedingly grateful for the noble
  sentiment which prevented〃 Yancey from causing international
  complications at Havana。
  The history of the first year of Confederate foreign affairs is
  interwoven with the history of Confederate finance。 During that
  year the South became a great buyer in Europe。 Arms; powder;
  cloth; machinery; medicines; ships; a thousand things; had all to
  be bought abroad。 To establish the foreign credit of the new
  Government was the arduous task of the Confederate Secretary of
  the Treasury; Christopher G。 Memminger。 The first great campaign
  of the war was not fought by armies。 It was a commercial campaign
  fought by agents of the Federal and Confederate governments and
  having for its aim the cornering of the munitions market in
  Europe。 In this campaign the Federal agents had decisive
  advantages: their credit was never questioned; and their enormous
  purchases were never doubtful ventures for the European sellers。
  In some cases their superior credit enabled them to overbid the
  Confederate agents and to appropriate large contracts which the
  Confederates had negotiated but which they could not hold because
  of the precariousness of their credit。 And yet; all things
  considered; the Confederate agents made a good showing。 In the
  report of the Secretary of War in February; 1862; the number of
  rifles contracted for abroad was put at 91;000; of which 15;000
  had been delivered。 The chief reliance of the Confederate
  Treasury for its purchases abroad was at first the specie in the
  Southern branch of the United States Mint and in Southern banks。
  The former the Confederacy seized and converted to its own use。
  Of the latter it lured into its own hands a very large proportion
  by what is commonly called 〃the fifteen million loan〃an issue
  of
  eight percent bonds authorized in February; 1861。 Most of this
  specie seems to have been taken out of the country by the
  purchase of European commodities。 A little; to be sure; remained;
  for there was some gold still at home when the Confederacy fell。
  But the sum was small。
  In addition to this loan Memminger also persuaded Congress on
  August 19; 1861; to lay a direct taxthe 〃war tax;〃 as it was
  calledof one…half of one per cent on all property except
  Confederate bonds and money。 As required by the Constitution this
  tax was apportioned among the States; but if it assumed its
  assessment before April 1; 1862; each State was to have a
  reduction of ten per cent。 As there was a general aversion to the
  idea of Confederate taxation and a general faith in loans; what
  the States did; as a rule; was to assume their assessment; agree
  to pay it into the Treasury; and then issue bonds to raise the
  necessary funds; thus converting the war tax into a loan。
  The Confederate; like the Union; Treasury did not have the
  courage to force the issue upon taxation and leaned throughout
  the war largely upon loans。 It also had recourse to the perilous
  device of paper money; the gold value of which was not
  guaranteed。 Beginning in March; 1861; it issued under successive
  laws great quantities of paper notes; some of them interest
  bearing; some not。 It used these notes in payment of its domestic
  obligations。 The purchasing value of the notes soon started on a
  disastrous downward course; and in 1864 the gold dollar was worth
  thirty paper dollars。 The Confederate Government thus became
  involved in a problem of self…preservation that was but half
  solved by the system of tithes and impressment which we shall
  encounter later。 The depreciation of these notes left
  governmental clerks without adequate salaries and soldiers
  without the means of providing for their families。 During most of
  the war; women and other noncombatants had to support the
  families or else rely upon local charity organized by state or
  county boards。
  Long before all the evils of paper money were experienced; the
  North; with great swiftness; concentrated its naval forces so as
  to dominate the Southern ports which had trade relations with
  Europe。 The shipping ports were at once congested with cotton to
  the great embarrassment of merchants and planters。 Partly to
  relieve them; the Confederate Congress instituted in May; 1861;
  what is known today as 〃the hundred million loan。〃 It was the
  first of a series of 〃produce loans。〃 The Treasury was authorized
  to issue eight percent bonds; to fall due in twenty years; and
  to sell them for specie or to exchange them for produce or
  manufactured articles。 In the course of the remaining months of
  1861 there were exchanged for these bonds great quantities of
  produce including some 400;000 bales of cotton。
  In spite of the distress of the planters; however; the illusion
  of King Cotton's power does not seem to have been seriously
  impaired during 1861。 In fact; strange as it now seems; the frame
  of mind of the leaders appears to have been proof; that year;
  against alarm over the blockade。 For two reasons; the Confederacy
  regarded the blockade at first as a blessing in disguise。 It was
  counted on to act as a protective tariff in stimulating
  manufactures; and at the same time the South expected
  interruption of the flow of cotton towards Europe to make England
  feel her dependence upon the Confederacy。 In this way there would
  be exerted an economic coercion which would compel intervention。
  Such reasoning lay behind a law passed in May forbidding the
  export of cotton except through the seaports of the Confederacy。
  Similar laws were enacted by the States。 During the summer; many
  cotton factors joined in advising the planters to hold their
  cotton until the blockade broke down。 In the autumn; the Governor
  of Louisiana forbade the export of cotton from New Orleans。 So
  unshakeable was the illusion in 1861; that King Cotton had
  England in his grip! The illusion died hard。 Throughout 1862; and
  even in 1863; the newspapers published appeals to the planters to
  give up growing cotton for a time; and even to destroy what they
  had; so as to coerce the obdurate Englishmen。
  Meanwhile; Mason had been accorded by the British upper classes
  that generous welcome which they have always extended to the
  representative; of a people fighting gallantly against odds。
  During the hopeful days o