ion　for　an　award　of　compensation；　or　computations　of　damages　between　nations。〃　These　claims　dismissed；　the　arbitrators　entered　into　an　examination　of　the　direct　American　claims　and　on　September　14；　1872；　decided　upon　an　award　of　fifteen　and　a　half　million　dollars　to　the　United　States。　The　Treaty　of　Washington　and　the　Geneva　Tribunal　constituted　the　longest　step　thus　far　taken　by　any　two　nations　toward　the　settlement　of　their　disputes　by　judicial　process。
  CHAPTER　III。　Alaska　And　Its　Problems
  The　impulse　for　expansion　upon　which　Buchanan　floated　his　political　raft　into　the　presidency　was　not　a　party　affair。　It　was　felt　by　men　of　all　party　creeds；　and　it　seemed　for　a　moment　to　be　the　dominant　national　ideal。　Slaveholders　and　other　men　who　had　special　interests　sought　to　make　use　of　it；　but　the　fundamental　feeling　did　not　rest　on　their　support。　American　democracy；　now　confident　of　its　growing　strength；　believed　that　the　happiness　of　the　people　and　the　success　of　the　institutions　of　the　United　States　would　prove　a　loadstone　which　would　bring　under　the　flag　all　peoples　of　the　New　World；　while　those　of　the　Old　World　would　strike　off　their　shackles　and　remold　their　governments　on　the　American　pattern。　Attraction；　not　compulsion；　was　the　method　to　be　used；　and　none　of　the　paeans　of　American　prophets　in　the　editorials　or　the　fervid　orations　of　the　fifties　proposed　an　additional　battleship　or　regiment。
  No　one　saw　this　bright　vision　more　clearly　than　did　William　H。　Seward；　who　became　Secretary　of　State　under　Lincoln。　Slight　of　build；　pleasant；　and　talkative；　he　gave　an　impression　of　intellectual　distinction；　based　upon　fertility　rather　than　consistency　of　mind。　He　was　a　disciple　of　John　Quincy　Adams；　but　his　tireless　energy　had　in　it　too　much　of　nervous　unrest　to　allow　him　to　stick　to　his　books　as　did　his　master；　and　there　was　too　wide　a　gap　between　his　beliefs　and　his　practice。　He　held　as　idealistic　views　as　any　man　of　his　generation；　but　he　believed　so　firmly　that　the　right　would　win　that　he　disliked　hastening　its　victory　at　the　expense　of　bad　feeling。　He　was　shrewd；　practical　maliciously　practical；　many　thought。　When；　in　the　heat　of　one　of　his　perorations；　a　flash　of　his　hidden　fires　would　arouse　the　distrust　of　the　conservative；　he　would　appear　to　retract　and　try　to　smother　the　flames　in　a　cloud　of　conciliatory　smoke。　Only　the　restraining　hand　of　Lincoln　prevented　him　from　committing　fatal　blunders　at　the　outset　of　the　Civil　War；　yet　his　handling　of　the　threatening　episode　of　the　French　in　Mexico　showed　a　wisdom；　a　patient　tact；　and　a　subtle　ingenuity　which　make　his　conduct　of　the　affair　a　classic　illustration　of　diplomacy　at　almost　its　best。*
  *　See　〃Abraham　Lincoln　and　the　Union〃　and　〃The　Hispanic　Nations　of　the　New　World〃　（in　〃The　Chronicles　of　America〃）。
  In　1861　Seward　said　that　he　saw　Russia　and　Great　Britain　building　on　the　Arctic　Ocean　outposts　on　territory　which　should　belong　to　his　own　country；　and　that　he　expected　the　capital　of　the　great　federal　republic　of　the　future　would　be　in　the　valley　of　Mexico。　Yet　he　nevertheless　retained　the　sentiment　he　had　expressed　in　1846：　〃I　would　not　give　one　human　life　for　all　the　continent　that　remains　to　be　annexed。〃　The　Civil　War　prevented　for　four　years　any　action　regarding　expansion；　and　the　same　conspiracy　which　resulted　in　the　assassination　of　Lincoln　brought　Seward　to　the　verge　of　the　grave。　He　recovered　rapidly；　however；　and　while　on　a　recuperating　trip　through　the　West　Indies　he　worked　for　the　peaceable　annexation　of　the　Danish　Islands　and　Santo　Domingo。　His　friend；　Charles　Sumner；　the　chairman　of　the　Senate　Committee　on　Foreign　Affairs；　was　framing　his　remarkable　project　for　the　annexation　of　Canada。　President　Johnson　and；　later；　President　Grant　endorsed　parts　of　these　plans。　Denmark　and　Santo　Domingo　were　willing　to　acquiesce　for　money；　and　Sumner　believed；　although　he　was　preposterously　wrong；　that　the　incorporation　of　Canada　in　our　Union　would　be　welcomed　by　the　best　sentiment　of　England　and　of　Canada。
  To　willing　ears；　therefore；　came　in　1867　the　offer　of　the　Russian　Minister；　Baron　Stoeckl；　to　sell　Alaska。　The　proposal　did　not　raise　a　question　which　had　been　entirely　unthought　of。　Even　before　the　Civil　War；　numbers　of　people　on　the　Pacific　coast；　far　from　being　overawed　by　the　responsibility　of　developing　the　immense　territories　which　they　already　possessed；　had　petitioned　the　Government　to　obtain　Alaska；　and　even　the　proper　purchase　price　had　been　discussed。　The　reasons　for　Russia's　decision　to　sell；　however；　have　not　been　sufficiently　investigated。　It　is　apparent　from　the　conduct　of　the　negotiation　that　it　was　not　a　casual　proposal　but　one　in　which　Baron　Stoeckl；　at　least；　was　deeply　interested。　It　is　to　be　remembered　that　at　this　time　Russia's　ambitions　were　in　Asia；　and　that　her　chief　rival　was　Great　Britain。　Russia's　power　was　on　land；　the　seas　she　could　not　hope　to　control。　The　first　moment　of　war　would　put　Russian　rule　in；　Alaska　at　the　mercy　of　the　British　fleet。　In　those　days　when　a　Siberian　railroad　was　an　idle　dream；　this　icebound　region　in　America　was　so　remote　from　the　center　of　Russian　power　that　it　could　be　neither　enjoyed　nor　protected。　As　Napoleon　in　1803　preferred　to　see　Louisiana　in　the　hands　of　the　United　States　rather　than　in　those　of　his　rival　England；　so　Russia　preferred　Alaska　to　fall　to　the　United　States　rather　than　to　Canada；　especially　as　she　could　by　peaceful　cession　obtain　money　into　the　bargain。
  Seward　was　delighted　with　the　opportunity；　but　diplomatically　concealed　his　satisfaction　and　bargained　closely。　Stoeckl　asked　ten　million　dollars；　Seward　offered　five。　Stoeckl　proposed　to　split　the　difference；　Seward　agreed；　if　Stoeckl　would　knock　off　the　odd　half　million。　Stoeckl　accepted；　on　condition　that　Seward　add　two　hundred　thousand　as　special　compensation　to　the　Russian　American　Company。　It　was　midnight　of　the　29th　of　March　when　7；200；000　was　made　the　price。　Seward　roused　Sumner　from　bed；　and　the　three　worked　upon　the　form　of　a　treaty　until　four　o'clock　in　the　morning。　No　captains　of　industry　could　show　greater　decision。
  The　treaty；　however；　was　not　yet　a　fact。　The　Senate　must　approve；　and　its　approval　could　not　be　taken　for　granted。　The　temper　of　the　majority　of　Americans　toward　expansion　had　changed。　The　experiences　of　the　later　fifties　had　caused　many　to　look　upon　expansion　as　a　Southern　heresy。　Carl　Schurz　a　little　later　argued　that　we　had　already　taken　in　all　those　regions　the　climate　of　which　would　allow　healthy　self…government　and　that　we　should　annex　no　tropics。　Hamilton　Fish；　then　Secretary　of　State；　wrote　in　1873　that　popular　sentiment　was；　for　the　time　being；　against　all　expansion。　In　fact；　among　the　people　of　the　United　States　the　idea　was　developing　that　expansion　was　contrary　to　their　national　policy；　and　their　indisposition　to　expand　became　almost　a　passion。　They　rejected　Santo　Domingo　and　the　Danish　Islands　and　would　not　press　any　negotiations　for　Canada。
  What　saved　the　Alaska　Treaty　from　a　similar　disapproval　was　not　any　conviction　that　Alaska　was　worth　seven　million　dollars；　although　Sumner　convinced　those　who　took　the　trouble　to　read；　that　the　financial　bargain　was　not　a　bad　one。　The　chief　factor　in　the　purchase　of　Alaska　was　almost　pure　sentiment。　Throughout　American　history　there　has　been　a　powerful　tradition　of　friendliness　between　Russia　and　the　United　States；　yet　surely　no　two　political　systems　have　been　in　the　past　more　diametrically　opposed。　The　chief　ground　for　friendship　has　doubtless　been　the　great　intervening　distance　which　has　reduced　intercourse　to　a　minimum。　Some　slight　basis　for　congeniality　existed　in　the　fact　that　the　interests　of　both　countries　favored　a　similar　policy　of　freedom　upon　the　high　seas。　What　chiefly　influenced　the　public　mind；　however；　was　the　attitude　which　Russia　had　taken　during　the　Civil　War。　When　the　Grand　Duke　Alexis　visited　the　United　States　in　1871；　Oliver　Wendell　Holmes　greeted　him　with　the　lines：
  Bleak　are　our　coasts　with　the　blasts　of　December；　Thrilling　and　warm　are　the　hearts　that　remember　Who　was　our　friend　when　the　world　was　our　foe。
  This　Russian　friendship　had　presented　itself　dramatically　to　the　public　at　a　time　when　American　relations　with　Great　Britain　were　strained；　for　Russian　fleets　had　in　1863　suddenly　appeared　in　the　harbors　of　New　York　and　San　Francisco。　These　visits　were　actually　made　with　a　sole　regard　for　Russian　interests　and　in　anticipation　of　the　outbreak　of　a　general　European　war；　which　the　Czar　then　feared。　The　appearance　of　the　fleets；　however；　was　for　many　years　popularly　supposed　to　signify　sympathy　with　the　Union　and　a　willingness　to　defend　it　from　attack　by　Great　Britain　and　France。　Many　conceived　the　ingenuous　idea　that　the　purchase　price　of　Alaska　was　really　the　American　half　of　a　secret　bargain　of　which　the　fleets　were　the　Russian　part。　Public　opinion；　therefore；　regarded　the　purchase　of　Alaska　in　the　light　of　a　favor　to　Russia　and　demanded　that　the　favor　be　granted。
  Thus　of　all　the　schemes　of　expansion　in　the　fifty　years　between　the　Mexican　and　the　Spanish　wars；　for　the　Gadsden　Purchase　of　1853　was　really　only　a　rectification　of　boundary；　this　alone　came　to　fruition。　Seward　could　well　congratulate　himself　on　his　alertness　in　sei