the　rule　that　God　is　our　highest　good　…　in　other　words；　that　the　knowledge
  and　love　of　God　is　the　ultimate　aim　to　which　all　our　actions　should　be
  directed。　（36）　The　worldling　cannot　understand　these　things；　they　appear
  foolishness　to　him。　because　he　has　too　meager　a　knowledge　of　God；　and　also
  because　in　this　highest　good　he　can　discover　nothing　which　he　can　handle　or
  eat；　or　which　affects　the　fleshly　appetites　wherein　he　chiefly　delights；　for
  it　consists　solely　in　thought　and　the　pure　reason。　（37）　They；　on　the　other
  hand；　who　know　that　they　possess　no　greater　gift　than　intellect　and　sound
  reason；　will　doubtless　accept　what　I　have　said　without　question。
  （38）　We　have　now　explained　that　wherein　the　Divine　law　chiefly　consists；　and
  what　are　human　laws；　namely；　all　those　which　have　a　different　aim
  unless　they　have　been　ratified　by　revelation；　for　in　this　respect　also
  things　are　referred　to　God　（as　we　have　shown　above）　and　in　this　sense　the
  law　of　Moses；　although　it　was　not　universal；　but　entirely　adapted　to　the
  disposition　and　particular　preservation　of　a　single　people；　may　yet　be
  called　a　law　of　God　or　Divine　law；　inasmuch　as　we　believe　that　it　was
  ratified　by　prophetic　insight。　（39）　If　we　consider　the　nature　of　natural
  Divine　law　as　we　have　just　explained　it；　we　shall　see：
  （40）　I。…　That　it　is　universal　or　common　to　all　men；　for　we　have　deduced　it　from　universal　human
  nature。
  （41）　II。　That　it　does　not　depend　on　the　truth　of　any　historical　narrative
  whatsoever；　for　inasmuch　as　this　natural　Divine　law　is　comprehended　solely
  by　the　consideration　of　human　nature；　it　is　plain　that　we　can　conceive　it　as
  existing　as　well　in　Adam　as　in　any　other　man；　as　well　in　a　man　living　among
  his　fellows；　as　in　a　man　who　lives　by　himself。
  （42）　The　truth　of　a　historical　narrative；　however　assured；　cannot　give　us
  the　knowledge　nor　consequently　the　love　of　God；　for　love　of　God　springs　from
  knowledge　of　Him；　and　knowledge　of　Him　should　be　derived　from　general　ideas；
  in　themselves　certain　and　known；　so　that　the　truth　of　a　historical　narrative
  is　very　far　from　being　a　necessary　requisite　for　our　attaining　our　highest
  good。
  （43）　Still；　though　the　truth　of　histories　cannot　give　us　the　knowledge　and
  love　of　God；　I　do　not　deny　that　reading　them　is　very　useful　with　a　view　to
  life　in　the　world；　for　the　more　we　have　observed　and　known　of　men's　customs
  and　circumstances；　which　are　best　revealed　by　their　actions；　the　more　warily
  we　shall　be　able　to　order　our　lives　among　them；　and　so　far　as　reason
  dictates　to　adapt　our　actions　to　their　dispositions。
  （44）　III。　We　see　that　this　natural　Divine　law　does　not　demand　the
  performance　of　ceremonies　…　that　is；　actions　in　themselves　indifferent；
  which　are　called　good　from　the　fact　of　their　institution；　or　actions
  symbolizing　something　profitable　for　salvation；　or　（if　one　prefers　this
  definition）　actions　of　which　the　meaning　surpasses　human　understanding。　（45）
  The　natural　light　of　reason　does　not　demand　anything　which　it　is　itself
  unable　to　supply；　but　only　such　as　it　can　very　clearly　show　to　be　good；　or　a
  means　to　our　blessedness。　（46）　Such　things　as　are　good　simply　because　they
  have　been　commanded　or　instituted；　or　as　being　symbols　of　something　good；
  are　mere　shadows　which　cannot　be　reckoned　among　actions　that　are　the
  offsprings　as　it　were；　or　fruit　of　a　sound　mind　and　of　intellect。　（47）　There
  is　no　need　for　me　to　go　into　this　now　in　more　detail。
  （48）　IV。　Lastly；　we　see　that　the　highest　reward　of　the　Divine　law　is　the　law
  itself；　namely；　to　know　God　and　to　love　Him　of　our　free　choice；　and　with　an
  undivided　and　fruitful　spirit；　while　its　penalty　is　the　absence　of　these
  things；　and　being　in　bondage　to　the　flesh　…　that　is；　having　an　inconstant
  and　wavering　spirit。
  （49）　These　points　being　noted；　I　must　now　inquire：
  （50）　I。　Whether　by　the　natural　light　of　reason　we　can　conceive　of
  God　as　a　law…giver　or　potentate　ordaining　laws　for　men？
  （51）　II。　What　is　the　teaching　of　Holy　Writ　concerning　this
  natural　light　of　reason　and　natural　law？
  （52）　III。　With　what　objects　were　ceremonies　formerly　instituted？
  （53）　IV。　Lastly；　what　is　the　good　gained　by　knowing　the
  sacred　histories　and　believing　them？
  （54）　Of　the　first　two　I　will　treat　in　this　chapter；　of　the　remaining　two　in　the　following　one。
  （55）　Our　conclusion　about　the　first　is　easily　deduced　from　the　nature　of
  God's　will；　which　is　only　distinguished　from　His　understanding　in　relation
  to　our　intellect　…　that　is；　the　will　and　the　understanding　of　God　are　in
  reality　one　and　the　same；　and　are　only　distinguished　in　relation　to
  our　thoughts　which　we　form　concerning　God's　understanding。　（56）　For
  instance；　if　we　are　only　looking　to　the　fact　that　the　nature　of　a　triangle
  is　from　eternity　contained　in　the　Divine　nature　as　an　eternal　verity；　we　say
  that　God　possesses　the　idea　of　a　triangle；　or　that　He　understands　the
  nature　of　a　triangle；　but　if　afterwards　we　look　to　the　fact　that　the　nature
  of　a　triangle　is　thus　contained　in　the　Divine　nature；　solely　by　the
  necessity　of　the　Divine　nature；　and　not　by　the　necessity　of　the　nature　and
  essence　of　a　triangle　…　in　fact；　that　the　necessity　of　a　triangle's　essence
  and　nature；　in　so　far　as　they　are　conceived　of　as　eternal　verities；　depends
  solely　on　the　necessity　of　the　Divine　nature　and　intellect；　we　then　style
  God's　will　or　decree；　that　which　before　we　styled　His　intellect。　（57）
  Wherefore　we　make　one　and　the　same　affirmation　concerning　God　when　we　say
  that　He　has　from　eternity　decreed　that　three　angles　of　a　triangle　are　equal
  to　two　right　angles；　as　when　we　say　that　He　has　understood　it。
  （58）　Hence　the　affirmations　and　the　negations　of　God　always　involve
  necessity　or　truth；　so　that；　for　example；　if　God　said　to　Adam　that　He　did
  not　wish　him　to　eat　of　the　tree　of　knowledge　of　good　and　evil；　it　would　have
  involved　a　contradiction　that　Adam　should　have　been　able　to　eat　of　it；　and
  would　therefore　have　been　impossible　that　he　should　have　so　eaten；　for　the
  Divine　command　would　have　involved　an　eternal　necessity　and　truth。　（59）　But
  since　Scripture　nevertheless　narrates　that　God　did　give　this　command　to
  Adam；　and　yet　that　none　the　less　Adam　ate　of　the　tree；　we　must　perforce　say
  that　God　revealed　to　Adam　the　evil　which　would　surely　follow　if　he　should
  eat　of　the　tree；　but　did　not　disclose　that　such　evil　would　of　necessity
  come　to　pass。　（60）　Thus　it　was　that　Adam　took　the　revelation　to　be　not　an
  eternal　and　necessary　truth；　but　a　law　…　that　is；　an　ordinance　followed　by
  gain　or　loss；　not　depending　necessarily　on　the　nature　of　the　act　performed；
  but　solely　on　the　will　and　absolute　power　of　some　potentate；　so　that　the
  revelation　in　question　was　solely　in　relation　to　Adam；　and　solely　through
  his　lack　of　knowledge　a　law；　and　God　was；　as　it　were；　a　lawgiver　and
  potentate。　（61）　From　the　same　cause；　namely；　from　lack　of　knowledge；　the
  Decalogue　in　relation　to　the　Hebrews　was　a　law；　for　since　they　knew　not　the
  existence　of　God　as　an　eternal　truth；　they　must　have　taken　as　a　law　that
  which　was　revealed　to　them　in　the　Decalogue；　namely；　that　God　exists；　and
  that　God　only　should　be　worshipped。　（62）　But　if　God　had　spoken　to　them
  without　the　intervention　of　any　bodily　means；　immediately　they　would　have
  perceived　it　not　as　a　law；　but　as　an　eternal　truth。
  （63）　What　we　have　said　about　the　Israelites　and　Adam；　applies　also　to　all
  the　prophets　who　wrote　laws　in　God's　name　…　they　did　not　adequately　conceive
  God's　decrees　as　eternal　truths。　（64）　For　instance；　we　must　say　of　Moses
  that　from　revelation；　from　the　basis　of　what　was　revealed　to　him；　he
  perceived　the　method　by　which　the　Israelitish　nation　could　best　be　united　in
  a　particular　territory；　and　could　form　a　body　politic　or　state；　and　further
  that　he　perceived　the　method　by　which　that　nation　could　best　be　constrained
  to　obedience；　but　he　did　not　perceive；　nor　was　it　revealed　to　him；　that　this
  method　was　absolutely　the　best；　nor　that　the　obedience　of　the　people　in　a
  certain　strip　of　territory　would　necessarily　imply　the　end　he　had　in　view。
  （65）　Wherefore　he　perceived　these　things　not　as　eternal　truths；　but　as
  precepts　and　ordinances；　and　he　ordained　them　as　laws　of　God；　and　thus　it
  came　to　be　that　he　conceived　God　as　a　ruler；　a　legislator；　a　king；　as
  merciful；　just；　&c。；　whereas　such　qualities　are　simply　attributes　of　human
  nature；　and　utterly　alien　from　the　nature　of　the　Deity。　（66）Thus　much　we　may
  affirm　of　the　prophets　who　wrote　laws　in　the　name　of　God；　but　we　must　not
  affirm　it　of　Christ；　for　Christ；　although　He　too　seems　to　have　written　laws
  in　the　name　of　God；　must　be　taken　to　have　had　a　clear　and　adequate
  perception；　for　Christ　was　not　so　muc