Soc。　And　is　this　notion　true　of　one　soul；　or　of　two　or　more？　　　Cal。　Equally　true　of　two　or　more。　　　Soc。　Then　a　man　may　delight　a　whole　assembly；　and　yet　have　no　regard　for　their　true　interests？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Can　you　tell　me　the　pursuits　which　delight　mankind…or　rather；　if　you　would　prefer；　let　me　ask；　and　do　you　answer；　which　of　them　belong　to　the　pleasurable　class；　and　which　of　them　not？　In　the　first　place；　what　say　you　of　flute…playing？　Does　not　that　appear　to　be　an　art　which　seeks　only　pleasure；　Callicles；　and　thinks　of　nothing　else？　　　Cal。　I　assent。　　　Soc。　And　is　not　the　same　true　of　all　similar　arts；　as；　for　example；　the　art　of　playing　the　lyre　at　festivals？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　what　do　you　say　of　the　choral　art　and　of　dithyrambic　poetry？…are　not　they　of　the　same　nature？　Do　you　imagine　that　Cinesias　the　son　of　Meles　cares　about　what　will　tend　to　the　moral　improvement　of　his　hearers；　or　about　what　will　give　pleasure　to　the　multitude？　　　Cal。　There　can　be　no　mistake　about　Cinesias；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　And　what　do　you　say　of　his　father；　Meles　the　harp…player？　Did　he　perform　with　any　view　to　the　good　of　his　hearers？　Could　he　be　said　to　regard　even　their　pleasure？　For　his　singing　was　an　infliction　to　his　audience。　And　of　harp　playing　and　dithyrambic　poetry　in　general；　what　would　you　say？　Have　they　not　been　invented　wholly　for　the　sake　of　pleasure？　　　Cal。　That　is　my　notion　of　them。　　　Soc。　And　as　for　the　Muse　of　Tragedy；　that　solemn　and　august　personage…what　are　her　aspirations？　Is　all　her　aim　and　desire　only　to　give　pleasure　to　the　spectators；　or　does　she　fight　against　them　and　refuse　to　speak　of　their　pleasant　vices；　and　willingly　proclaim　in　word　and　song　truths　welcome　and　unwelcome？…which　in　your　judgment　is　her　character？　　　Cal。　There　can　be　no　doubt；　Socrates；　that　Tragedy　has　her　face　turned　towards　pleasure　and　the　gratification　of　the　audience。　　　Soc。　And　is　not　that　the　sort　of　thing；　Callicles；　which　we　were　just　now　describing　as　flattery？　　　Cal。　Quite　true。　　　Soc。　Well　now；　suppose　that　we　strip　all　poetry　of　song　and　rhythm　and　metre；　there　will　remain　speech？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　this　speech　is　addressed　to　a　crowd　of　people？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then；　poetry　is　a　sort　of　rhetoric？　　　Cal。　True。　　　Soc。　And　do　not　the　poets　in　the　theatres　seem　to　you　to　be　rhetoricians？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　now　we　have　discovered　a　sort　of　rhetoric　which　is　addressed　to　a　crowd　of　men；　women；　and　children；　freemen　and　slaves。　And　this　is　not　much　to　our　taste；　for　we　have　described　it　as　having　the　nature　of　flattery。　　　Cal。　Quite　true。　　　Soc。　Very　good。　And　what　do　you　say　of　that　other　rhetoric　which　addresses　the　Athenian　assembly　and　the　assemblies　of　freemen　in　other　states？　Do　the　rhetoricians　appear　to　you　always　to　aim　at　what　is　best；　and　do　they　seek　to　improve　the　citizens　by　their　speeches；　or　are　they　too；　like　the　rest　of　mankind；　bent　upon　giving　them　pleasure；　forgetting　the　public　good　in　the　thought　of　their　own　interest；　playing　with　the　people　as　with　children；　and　trying　to　amuse　them；　but　never　considering　whether　they　are　better　or　worse　for　this？　　　Cal。　I　must　distinguish。　There　are　some　who　have　a　real　care　of　the　public　in　what　they　say；　while　others　are　such　as　you　describe。　　　Soc。　I　am　contented　with　the　admission　that　rhetoric　is　of　two　sorts；　one；　which　is　mere　flattery　and　disgraceful　declamation；　the　other；　which　is　noble　and　aims　at　the　training　and　improvement　of　the　souls　of　the　citizens；　and　strives　to　say　what　is　best；　whether　welcome　or　unwelcome；　to　the　audience；　but　have　you　ever　known　such　a　rhetoric；　or　if　you　have；　and　can　point　out　any　rhetorician　who　is　of　this　stamp；　who　is　he？　　　Cal。　But；　indeed；　I　am　afraid　that　I　cannot　tell　you　of　any　such　among　the　orators　who　are　at　present　living。　　　Soc。　Well；　then；　can　you　mention　any　one　of　a　former　generation；　who　may　be　said　to　have　improved　the　Athenians；　who　found　them　worse　and　made　them　better；　from　the　day　that　he　began　to　make　speeches？　for；　indeed；　I　do　not　know　of　such　a　man。　　　Cal。　What！　did　you　never　hear　that　Themistocles　was　a　good　man；　and　Cimon　and　Miltiades　and　Pericles；　who　is　just　lately　dead；　and　whom　you　heard　yourself？　　　Soc。　Yes；　Callicles；　they　were　good　men；　if；　as　you　said　at　first；　true　virtue　consists　only　in　the　satisfaction　of　our　own　desires　and　those　of　others；　but　if　not；　and　if；　as　we　were　afterwards　compelled　to　acknowledge；　the　satisfaction　of　some　desires　makes　us　better；　and　of　others；　worse；　and　we　ought　to　gratify　the　one　and　not　the　other；　and　there　is　an　art　in　distinguishing　them…can　you　tell　me　of　any　of　these　statesmen　who　did　distinguish　them？　　　Cal。　No；　indeed；　I　cannot。　　　Soc。　Yet；　surely；　Callicles；　if　you　look　you　will　find　such　a　one。　Suppose　that　we　just　calmly　consider　whether　any　of　these　was　such　as　I　have　described。　Will　not　the　good　man；　who　says　whatever　he　says　with　a　view　to　the　best；　speak　with　a　reference　to　some　standard　and　not　at　random；　just　as　all　other　artists；　whether　the　painter；　the　builder；　the　shipwright；　or　any　other　look　all　of　them　to　their　own　work；　and　do　not　select　and　apply　at　random　what　they　apply；　but　strive　to　give　a　definite　form　to　it？　The　artist　disposes　all　things　in　order；　and　compels　the　one　part　to　harmonize　and　accord　with　the　other　part；　until　he　has　constructed　a　regular　and　systematic　whole；　and　this　is　true　of　all　artists；　and　in　the　same　way　the　trainers　and　physicians；　of　whom　we　spoke　before；　give　order　and　regularity　to　the　body：　do　you　deny　this？　　　Cal。　No；　I　am　ready　to　admit　it。　　　Soc。　Then　the　house　in　which　order　and　regularity　prevail　is　good；　that　in　which　there　is　disorder；　evil？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　the　same　is　true　of　a　ship？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　the　same　may　be　said　of　the　human　body？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　what　would　you　say　of　the　soul？　Will　the　good　soul　be　that　in　which　disorder　is　prevalent；　or　that　in　which　there　is　harmony　and　order？　　　Cal。　The　latter　follows　from　our　previous　admissions。　　　Soc。　What　is　the　name　which　is　given　to　the　effect　of　harmony　and　order　in　the　body？　　　Cal。　I　suppose　that　you　mean　health　and　strength？　　　Soc。　Yes；　I　do；　and　what　is　the　name　which　you　would　give　to　the　effect　of　harmony　and　order　in　the　soul？　Try　and　discover　a　name　for　this　as　well　as　for　the　other。　　　Cal。　Why　not　give　the　name　yourself；　Socrates？　　　Soc。　Well；　if　you　had　rather　that　I　should；　I　will；　and　you　shall　say　whether　you　agree　with　me；　and　if　not；　you　shall　refute　and　answer　me。　〃Healthy；〃　as　I　conceive；　is　the　name　which　is　given　to　the　regular　order　of　the　body；　whence　comes　health　and　every　other　bodily　excellence：　is　that　true　or　not？　　　Cal。　True。　　　Soc。　And　〃lawful〃　and　〃law〃　are　the　names　which　are　given　to　the　regular　order　and　action　of　the　soul；　and　these　make　men　lawful　and　orderly：…and　so　we　have　temperance　and　justice：　have　we　not？　　　Cal。　Granted。　　　Soc。　And　will　not　the　true　rhetorician　who　is　honest　and　understands　his　art　have　his　eye　fixed　upon　these；　in　all　the　words　which　he　addresses　to　the　souls　of　men；　and　in　all　his　actions；　both　in　what　he　gives　and　in　what　he　takes　away？　Will　not　his　aim　be　to　implant　justice　in　the　souls　of　his　citizens　mind　take　away　injustice；　to　implant　temperance　and　take　away　intemperance；　to　implant　every　virtue　and　take　away　every　vice？　Do　you　not　agree？　　　Cal。　I　agree。　　　Soc。　For　what　use　is　there；　Callicles；　in　giving　to　the　body　of　a　sick　man　who　is　in　a　bad　state　of　health　a　quantity　of　the　most　delightful　food　or　drink　or　any　other　pleasant　thing；　which　may　be　really　as　bad　for　him　as　if　you　gave　him　nothing；　or　even　worse　if　rightly　estimated。　Is　not　that　true？　　　Cal。　I　will　not　say　No　to　it。　　　Soc。　For　in　my　opinion　there　is　no　profit　in　a　man's　life　if　his　body　is　in　an　evil　plight…in　that　case　his　life　also　is　evil：　am　I　not　right？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　When　a　man　is　in　health　the　physicians　will　generally　allow　him　to　eat　when　he　is　hungry　and　drink　when　he　is　thirsty；　and　to　satisfy　his　desires　as　he　likes；　but　when　he　is　sick　they　hardly　suffer　him　to　satisfy　his　desires　at　all：　even　you　will　admit　that？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　does　not　the　same　argument　hold　of　the　soul；　my　good　sir？　While　she　is　in　a　bad　state　and　is　senseless　and　intemperate　and　unjust　and　unholy；　her　desires　ought　to　be　controlled；　and　she　ought　to　be　prevented　from　doing　anything　which　does　not　tend　to　her　own　improvement。　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Such　treatment　will　be　better　for　the　soul　herself？　　　Cal。　To　be　sure。　　　Soc。　And　to　restrain　her　from　her　appetites　is　to　chastise　her？　　　Cal。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　restraint　or　chastisement　is　better　for　the　soul　than　intemperance　or　the…absence　of　control；　which　you　were　just　now　preferring？　　　Cal。　I　do　not　understand　you；　Socrates；　and　I　wish　that　you　would　ask　some　one　who　does。　　　Soc。　Here　is　a　gentleman　who　cannot　endure　to　be　improved　or：　to　subject　himself　to　that　very　chastisement　of　which　the　argument　speaks！　　　Cal。　I　do　not　heed　a　word　of　what　you　are　saying；　and　have　only　answered　hitherto　out　of　civility　to　Gorgias。　　　Soc。　What　are　we　to　do；　then？　Shall　we　break　off　in　the　middle？　　　Cal。　You　shall　judge　for　yourself。　　　Soc。　Well；　but　people　say　that　〃a　tale　should　have　a　head　and　not　break　off　in　the　middle；〃　and　I　should　not　like　to　have　the　argume