who　from　personal　ties　are　dependent　on　him　for　their　comfort。　Whoever
  fails　in　the　consideration　generally　due　to　the　interests　and　feelings
  of　others；　not　being　compelled　by　some　more　imperative　duty；　or
  justified　by　allowable　self…preference；　is　a　subject　of　moral
  disapprobation　for　that　failure；　but　not　for　the　cause　of　it；　nor
  for　the　errors；　merely　personal　to　himself；　which　may　have　remotely
  led　to　it。　In　like　manner；　when　a　person　disables　himself；　by
  conduct　purely　self…regarding；　from　the　performance　of　some　definite
  duty　incumbent　on　him　to　the　public；　he　is　guilty　of　a　social　offence。
  No　person　ought　to　be　punished　simply　for　being　drunk；　but　a　soldier
  or　a　policeman　should　be　punished　for　being　drunk　on　duty。　Whenever；
  in　short；　there　is　a　definite　damage；　or　a　definite　risk　of　damage；
  either　to　an　individual　or　to　the　public；　the　case　is　taken　out　of　the
  province　of　liberty；　and　placed　in　that　of　morality　or　law。
  But　with　regard　to　the　merely　contingent；　or；　as　it　may　be　called；
  constructive　injury　which　a　person　causes　to　society；　by　conduct　which
  neither　violates　any　specific　duty　to　the　public；　nor　occasions
  perceptible　hurt　to　any　assignable　individual　except　himself；　the
  inconvenience　is　one　which　society　can　afford　to　bear；　for　the　sake　of
  the　greater　good　of　human　freedom。　If　grown　persons　are　to　be　punished
  for　not　taking　proper　care　of　themselves；　I　would　rather　it　were　for
  their　own　sake；　than　under　pretence　of　preventing　them　from
  impairing　their　capacity　or　rendering　to　society　benefits　which
  society　does　not　pretend　it　has　a　right　to　exact。　But　I　cannot　consent
  to　argue　the　point　as　if　society　had　no　means　of　bringing　its　weaker
  members　up　to　its　ordinary　standard　of　rational　conduct；　except
  waiting　till　they　do　something　irrational；　and　then　punishing　them；
  legally　or　morally；　for　it。　Society　has　had　absolute　power　over　them
  during　all　the　early　portion　of　their　existence：　it　has　had　the
  whole　period　of　childhood　and　nonage　in　which　to　try　whether　it
  could　make　them　capable　of　rational　conduct　in　life。　The　existing
  generation　is　master　both　of　the　training　and　the　entire　circumstances
  of　the　generation　to　come；　it　cannot　indeed　make　them　perfectly　wise
  and　good；　because　it　is　itself　so　lamentably　deficient　in　goodness　and
  wisdom；　and　its　best　efforts　are　not　always；　in　individual　cases；
  its　most　successful　ones；　but　it　is　perfectly　well　able　to　make　the
  rising　generation；　as　a　whole；　as　good　as；　and　a　little　better　than；
  itself。　If　society　lets　any　considerable　number　of　its　members　grow　up
  mere　children；　incapable　of　being　acted　on　by　rational　consideration
  of　distant　motives；　society　has　itself　to　blame　for　the
  consequences。　Armed　not　only　with　all　the　powers　of　education；　but
  with　the　ascendency　which　the　authority　of　a　received　opinion　always
  exercises　over　the　minds　who　are　least　fitted　to　judge　for　themselves；
  and　aided　by　the　natural　penalties　which　cannot　be　prevented　from
  falling　on　those　who　incur　the　distaste　or　the　contempt　of　those　who
  know　them；　let　not　society　pretend　that　it　needs；　besides　all　this；
  the　power　to　issue　commands　and　enforce　obedience　in　the　personal
  concerns　of　individuals；　in　which；　on　all　principles　of　justice　and
  policy；　the　decision　ought　to　rest　with　those　who　are　to　abide　the
  consequences。
  Nor　is　there　anything　which　tends　more　to　discredit　and　frustrate
  the　better　means　of　influencing　conduct　than　a　resort　to　the　worse。　If
  there　be　among　those　whom　it　is　attempted　to　coerce　into　prudence　or
  temperance　any　of　the　material　of　which　vigorous　and　independent
  characters　are　made；　they　will　infallibly　rebel　against　the　yoke。　No
  such　person　will　ever　feel　that　others　have　a　right　to　control　him
  in　his　concerns；　such　as　they　have　to　prevent　him　from　injuring　them
  in　theirs；　and　it　easily　comes　to　be　considered　a　mark　of　spirit　and
  courage　to　fly　in　the　face　of　such　usurped　authority；　and　do　with
  ostentation　the　exact　opposite　of　what　it　enjoins；　as　in　the　fashion
  of　grossness　which　succeeded；　in　the　time　of　Charles　II。；　to　the
  fanatical　moral　intolerance　of　the　Puritans。　With　respect　to　what　is
  said　of　the　necessity　of　protecting　society　from　the　bad　example　set
  to　others　by　the　vicious　or　the　self…indulgent；　it　is　true　that　bad
  example　may　have　a　pernicious　effect；　especially　the　example　of
  doing　wrong　to　others　with　impunity　to　the　wrong…doer。　But　we　are
  now　speaking　of　conduct　which；　while　it　does　no　wrong　to　others；　is
  supposed　to　do　great　harm　to　the　agent　himself：　and　I　do　not　see　how
  those　who　believe　this　can　think　otherwise　than　that　the　example；　on
  the　whole；　must　be　more　salutary　than　hurtful；　since；　if　it　displays
  the　misconduct；　it　displays　also　the　painful　or　degrading　consequences
  which；　if　the　conduct　is　justly　censured；　must　be　supposed　to　be　in
  all　or　most　cases　attendant　on　it。
  But　the　strongest　of　all　the　arguments　against　the　interference　of
  the　public　with　purely　personal　conduct　is　that；　when　it　does
  interfere；　the　odds　are　that　it　interferes　wrongly；　and　in　the　wrong
  place。　On　questions　of　social　morality；　of　duty　to　others；　the　opinion
  of　the　public；　that　is；　of　an　overruling　majority；　though　of　wrong；　is
  likely　to　be　still　oftener　right；　because　on　such　questions　they　are
  only　required　to　judge　of　their　own　interests；　of　the　manner　in
  which　some　mode　of　conduct；　if　allowed　to　be　practised；　would　effect
  themselves。　But　the　opinion　of　a　similar　majority；　imposed　as　a　law　on
  the　minority；　on　questions　of　self…regarding　conduct；　is　quite　as
  likely　to　be　wrong　as　right；　for　in　these　cases　public　opinion
  means；　at　the　best；　some　people's　opinion　of　what　is　good　or　bad　for
  other　people；　while　very　of　it　does　not　even　mean　that；　the　public；
  with　the　most　perfect　indifference；　passing　over　the　pleasure　or
  convenience　of　those　whose　conduct　they　censure；　and　considering
  only　their　own　preference。　There　are　many　who　consider　as　an　injury　to
  themselves　any　conduct　which　they　have　a　distaste　for；　and　resent　it
  as　an　outrage　to　their　feelings；　as　a　religious　bigot；　when　charged
  with　disregarding　the　religious　feelings　of　others；　has　been　known
  to　retort　that　they　disregard　his　feelings；　by　persisting　in　their
  abominable　worship　or　creed。　But　there　is　no　parity　between　the
  feeling　of　a　person　for　his　own　opinion；　and　the　feeling　of　another
  who　is　offended　at　his　holding　it；　no　more　than　between　the　desire
  of　a　thief　to　take　a　purse；　and　the　desire　of　the　right　owner　to
  keep　it。　And　a　person's　taste　is　as　much　his　own　peculiar　concern　as
  his　opinion　or　his　purse。　It　is　easy　for　any　one　to　imagine　an　ideal
  public　which　leaves　the　freedom　and　choice　of　individuals　in　all
  uncertain　matters　undisturbed；　and　only　requires　them　to　abstain
  from　modes　of　conduct　which　universal　experience　has　condemned。　But
  where　has　there　been　seen　a　public　which　set　any　such　limit　to　its
  censorship？　or　when　does　the　public　trouble　itself　about　universal
  experience？　In　its　interferences　with　personal　conduct　it　is　seldom
  thinking　of　anything　but　the　enormity　of　acting　or　feeling　differently
  from　itself；　and　this　standard　of　judgment；　thinly　disguised；　is
  held　up　to　mankind　as　the　dictate　of　religion　and　philosophy；　by
  nine…tenths　of　all　moralists　and　speculative　writers。　These　teach　that
  things　are　right　because　they　are　right；　because　we　feel　them　to　be
  so。　They　tell　us　to　search　in　our　own　minds　and　hearts　for　laws　of
  conduct　binding　on　ourselves　and　on　all　others。　What　can　the　poor
  public　do　but　apply　these　instructions；　and　make　their　own　personal
  feelings　of　good　and　evil；　if　they　are　tolerably　unanimous　in　them；
  obligatory　on　all　the　world？
  The　evil　here　pointed　out　is　not　one　which　exists　only　in　theory；
  and　it　may　perhaps　be　expected　that　I　should　specify　the　instances
  in　which　the　public　of　this　age　and　country　improperly　invests　its　own
  preferences　with　the　character　of　moral　laws。　I　am　not　writing　an
  essay　on　the　aberrations　of　existing　moral　feeling。　That　is　too
  weighty　a　subject　to　be　discussed　parenthetically；　and　by　way　of
  illustration。　Yet　examples　are　necessary　to　show　that　the　principle
  I　maintain　is　of　serious　and　practical　moment；　and　that　I　am　not
  endeavouring　to　erect　a　barrier　against　imaginary　evils。　And　it　is　not
  difficult　to　show；　by　abundant　instances；　that　to　extend　the　bounds　of
  what　may　be　called　moral　police；　until　it　encroaches　on　the　most
  unquestionably　legitimate　liberty　of　the　individual；　is　one　of　the
  most　universal　of　all　human　propensities。
  As　a　first　instance；　consider　the　antipathies　which　men　cherish　on
  no　better　grounds　than　that　persons　whose　religious　opinions　are
  different　from　theirs　do　not　practise