Soc。　May　not　〃the　wolf；〃　as　the　proverb　says；　claim　a　hearing〃？
  Phaedr。　Do　you　say　what　can　be　said　for　him。
  Soc。　He　will　argue　that　is　no　use　in　putting　a　solemn　face　on
  these　matters；　or　in　going　round　and　round；　until　you　arrive　at
  first　principles；　for；　as　I　said　at　first；　when　the　question　is　of
  justice　and　good；　or　is　a　question　in　which　men　are　concerned　who
  are　just　and　good；　either　by　nature　or　habit；　he　who　would　be　a
  skilful　rhetorician　has；　no　need　of　truth…for　that　in　courts　of　law
  men　literally　care　nothing　about　truth；　but　only　about　conviction：　and
  this　is　based　on　probability；　to　which　who　would　be　a　skilful　orator
  should　therefore　give　his　whole　attention。　And　they　say　also　that
  there　are　cases　in　which　the　actual　facts；　if　they　are　improbable；
  ought　to　be　withheld；　and　only　the　probabilities　should　be　told　either
  in　accusation　or　defence；　and　that　always　in　speaking；　the　orator
  should　keep　probability　in　view；　and　say　good…bye　to　the　truth。　And
  the　observance；　of　this　principle　throughout　a　speech　furnishes　the
  whole　art。
  Phaedr。　That　is　what　the　professors　of　rhetoric　do　actually　say；
  Socrates。　I　have　not　forgotten　that　we　have　quite　briefly　touched　upon
  this　matter　already；　with　them　the　point　is　all…important。
  Soc。　I　dare　say　that　you　are　familiar　with　Tisias。　Does　he　not
  define　probability　to　be　that　which　the　many　think？
  Phaedr。　Certainly；　he　does。
  Soc。　I　believe　that　he　has　a　clever　and　ingenious　case　of　this
  sort：…He　supposes　a　feeble　and　valiant　man　to　have　assaulted　a
  strong　and　cowardly　one；　and　to　have　robbed　him　of　his　coat　or　of
  something　or　other；　he　is　brought　into　court；　and　then　Tisias　says
  that　both　parties　should　tell　lies：　the　coward　should　say　that　he
  was　assaulted　by　more　men　than　one；　the　other　should　prove　that　they
  were　alone；　and　should　argue　thus：　〃How　could　a　weak　man　like　me
  have　assaulted　a　strong　man　like　him？〃　The　complainant　will　not　like
  to　confess　his　own　cowardice；　and　will　therefore　invent　some　other　lie
  which　his　adversary　will　thus　gain　an　opportunity　of　refuting。　And
  there　are　other　devices　of　the　same　kind　which　have　a　place　in　the
  system。　Am　I　not　right；　Phaedrus？
  Phaedr。　Certainly。
  Soc。　Bless　me；　what　a　wonderfully　mysterious　art　is　this　which
  Tisias　or　some　other　gentleman；　in　whatever　name　or　country　he
  rejoices；　has　discovered。　Shall　we　say　a　word　to　him　or　not？
  Phaedr。　What　shall　we　say　to　him？
  Soc。　Let　us　tell　him　that；　before　he　appeared；　you　and　I　were　saying
  that　the　probability　of　which　he　speaks　was　engendered　in　the　minds　of
  the　many　by　the　likeness　of　the　truth；　and　we　had　just　been
  affirming　that　he　who　knew　the　truth　would　always　know　best　how　to
  discover　the　resemblances　of　the　truth。　If　he　has　anything　else　to　say
  about　the　art　of　speaking　we　should　like　to　hear　him；　but　if　not；　we
  are　satisfied　with　our　own　view；　that　unless　a　man　estimates　the
  various　characters　of　his　heaters　and　is　able　to　divide　all　things
  into　classes　and　to　comprehend　them　under　single　ideas　he　will　never
  be　a　skilful　rhetorician　even　within　the　limits　of　human　power。　And
  this　skill　he　will　not　attain　without　a　great　deal　of　trouble；　which　a
  good　man　ought　to　undergo；　not　for　the　sake　of　speaking　and　acting
  before　men；　but　in　order　that　he　may　be　able　to　say　what　is　acceptable
  to　God　and　always　to　act　acceptably　to　Him　as　far　as　in　him　lies；
  for　there　is　a　saying　of　wiser　men　than　ourselves；　that　a　man　of　sense
  should　not　try　to　please　his　fellow…servants　（at　least　this　should　not
  be　his　first　object）　but　his　good　and　noble　masters；　and　therefore
  if　the　way　is　long　and　circuitous；　marvel　not　at　this；　for；　where
  the　end　is　great；　there　we　may　take　the　longer　road；　but　not　for
  lesser　ends　such　as　yours。　Truly；　the　argument　may　say；　Tisias；　that
  if　you　do　not　mind　going　so　far；　rhetoric　has　a　fair　beginning　here。
  Phaedr。　I　think；　Socrates；　that　this　is　admirable；　if　only
  practicable。
  Soc。　But　even　to　fail　in　an　honourable　object　is　honourable。
  Phaedr。　True。
  Soc。　Enough　appears　to　have　been　said　by　us　of　a　true　and　false
  art　of　speaking。
  Phaedr。　Certainly。
  Soc。　But　there　is　something　yet　to　be　said　of　propriety　and
  impropriety　of　writing。
  Phaedr。　Yes。
  Soc。　Do　you　know　how　you　can　speak　or　act　about　rhetoric　in　a　manner
  which　will　be　acceptable　to　God？
  Phaedr。　No；　indeed。　Do　you？
  Soc。　I　have　heard　a　tradition　of　the　ancients；　whether　true　or　not
  they　only　know；　although　if　we　had　found　the　truth　ourselves；　do　you
  think　that　we　should　care　much　about　the　opinions　of　men？
  Phaedr。　Your　question　needs　no　answer；　but　I　wish　that　you　would
  tell　me　what　you　say　that　you　have　heard。
  Soc。　At　the　Egyptian　city　of　Naucratis；　there　was　a　famous　old
  god；　whose　name　was　Theuth；　the　bird　which　is　called　the　Ibis　is
  sacred　to　him；　and　he　was　the　inventor　of　many　arts；　such　as
  arithmetic　and　calculation　and　geometry　and　astronomy　and　draughts　and
  dice；　but　his　great　discovery　was　the　use　of　letters。　Now　in　those
  days　the　god　Thamus　was　the　king　of　the　whole　country　of　Egypt；　and　he
  dwelt　in　that　great　city　of　Upper　Egypt　which　the　Hellenes　call
  Egyptian　Thebes；　and　the　god　himself　is　called　by　them　Ammon。　To　him
  came　Theuth　and　showed　his　inventions；　desiring　that　the　other
  Egyptians　might　be　allowed　to　have　the　benefit　of　them；　he　enumerated
  them；　and　Thamus　enquired　about　their　several　uses；　and　praised　some
  of　them　and　censured　others；　as　he　approved　or　disapproved　of　them。　It
  would　take　a　long　time　to　repeat　all　that　Thamus　said　to　Theuth　in
  praise　or　blame　of　the　various　arts。　But　when　they　came　to　letters；
  This；　said　Theuth；　will　make　the　Egyptians　wiser　and　give　them
  better　memories；　it　is　a　specific　both　for　the　memory　and　for　the　wit。
  Thamus　replied：　O　most　ingenious　Theuth；　the　parent　or　inventor　of
  an　art　is　not　always　the　best　judge　of　the　utility　or　inutility　of　his
  own　inventions　to　the　users　of　them。　And　in　this　instance；　you　who　are
  the　father　of　letters；　from　a　paternal　love　of　your　own　children
  have　been　led　to　attribute　to　them　a　quality　which　they　cannot　have；
  for　this　discovery　of　yours　will　create　forgetfulness　in　the　learners'
  souls；　because　they　will　not　use　their　memories；　they　will　trust　to
  the　external　written　characters　and　not　remember　of　themselves。　The
  specific　which　you　have　discovered　is　an　aid　not　to　memory；　but　to
  reminiscence；　and　you　give　your　disciples　not　truth；　but　only　the
  semblance　of　truth；　they　will　be　hearers　of　many　things　and　will
  have　learned　nothing；　they　will　appear　to　be　omniscient　and　will
  generally　know　nothing；　they　will　be　tiresome　company；　having　the　show
  of　wisdom　without　the　reality。
  Phaedr。　Yes；　Socrates；　you　can　easily　invent　tales　of　Egypt；　or　of
  any　other　country。
  Soc。　There　was　a　tradition　in　the　temple　of　Dodona　that　oaks　first
  gave　prophetic　utterances。　The　men　of　old；　unlike　in　their
  simplicity　to　young　philosophy；　deemed　that　if　they　heard　the　truth
  even　from　〃oak　or　rock；〃　it　was　enough　for　them；　whereas　you　seem　to
  consider　not　whether　a　thing　is　or　is　not　true；　but　who　the　speaker　is
  and　from　what　country　the　tale　comes。
  Phaedr。　I　acknowledge　the　justice　of　your　rebuke；　and　I　think　that
  the　Theban　is　right　in　his　view　about　letters。
  Soc。　He　would　be　a　very　simple　person；　and　quite　a　stranger　to　the
  oracles　of　Thamus　or　Ammon；　who　should　leave　in　writing　or　receive
  in　writing　any　art　under　the　idea　that　the　written　word　would　be
  intelligible　or　certain；　or　who　deemed　that　writing　was　at　all
  better　than　knowledge　and　recollection　of　the　same　matters？
  Phaedr。　That　is　most　true。
  Soc。　I　cannot　help　feeling；　Phaedrus；　that　writing　is
  unfortunately　like　painting；　for　the　creations　of　the　painter　have　the
  attitude　of　life；　and　yet　if　you　ask　them　a　question　they　preserve　a
  solemn　silence。　And　the　same　may　be　said　of　speeches。　You　would
  imagine　that　they　had　intelligence；　but　if　you　want　to　know　anything
  and　put　a　question　to　one　of　them；　the　speaker　always　gives　one
  unvarying　answer。　And　when　they　have　been　once　written　down　they　are
  tumbled　about　anywhere　among　those　who　may　or　may　not　understand　them；
  and　know　not　to　whom　they　should　reply；　to　whom　not：　and；　if　they
  are　maltreated　or　abused；　they　have　no　parent　to　protect　them；　and
  they　cannot　protect　or　defend　themselves。
  Phaedr。　That　again　is　most　true。
  Soc。　Is　there　not　another　kind　of　w