the　assembly；　but　is　one　and　the　same　in　every　use　of　language；　this
  is　the　art；　if　there　be　such　an　art；　which　is　able　to　find　a
  likeness　of　everything　to　which　a　likeness　can　be　found；　and　draws
  into　the　light　of　day　the　likenesses　and　disguises　which　are　used　by
  others？
  Phaedr。　How　do　you　mean？
  Soc。　Let　me　put　the　matter　thus：　When　will　there　be　more　chance　of
  deception…when　the　difference　is　large　or　small？
  Phaedr。　When　the　difference　is　small。
  Soc。　And　you　will　be　less　likely　to　be　discovered　in　passing　by
  degrees　into　the　other　extreme　than　when　you　go　all　at　once？
  Phaedr。　Of　course。
  Soc。　He；　then；　who　would。　deceive　others；　and　not　be　deceived；
  must　exactly　know　the　real　likenesses　and　differences　of　things？
  Phaedr。　He　must。
  Soc。　And　if　he　is　ignorant　of　the　true　nature　of　any　subject；　how
  can　he　detect　the　greater　or　less　degree　of　likeness　in　other　things
  to　that　of　which　by　the　hypothesis　he　is　ignorant？
  Phaedr。　He　cannot。
  Soc。　And　when　men　are　deceived　and　their　notions　are　at　variance
  with　realities；　it　is　clear　that　the　error　slips　in　through
  resemblances？
  Phaedr。　Yes；　that　is　the　way。
  Soc。　Then　he　who　would　be　a　master　of　the　art　must　understand　the
  real　nature　of　everything；　or　he　will　never　know　either　how　to　make
  the　gradual　departure　from　truth　into　the　opposite　of　truth　which　is
  effected　by　the　help　of　resemblances；　or　how　to　avoid　it？
  Phaedr。　He　will　not。
  Soc。　He　then；　who　being　ignorant　of　the　truth　aims　at　appearances；
  will　only　attain　an　art　of　rhetoric　which　is　ridiculous　and　is　not
  an　art　at　all？
  Phaedr。　That　may　be　expected。
  Soc。　Shall　I　propose　that　we　look　for　examples　of　art　and　want　of
  art；　according　to　our　notion　of　them；　in　the　speech　of　Lysias　which
  you　have　in　your　hand；　and　in　my　own　speech？
  Phaedr。　Nothing　could　be　better；　and　indeed　I　think　that　our
  previous　argument　has　been　too　abstract　and…wanting　in　illustrations。
  Soc。　Yes；　and　the　two　speeches　happen　to　afford　a　very　good
  example　of　the　way　in　which　the　speaker　who　knows　the　truth　may；
  without　any　serious　purpose；　steal　away　the　hearts　of　his　hearers。
  This　piece　of　good…fortune　I　attribute　to　the　local　deities；　and
  perhaps；　the　prophets　of　the　Muses　who　are　singing　over　our　heads
  may　have　imparted　their　inspiration　to　me。　For　I　do　not　imagine　that　I
  have　any　rhetorical　art　of　my　own。
  Phaedr。　Granted；　if　you　will　only　please　to　get　on。
  Soc。　Suppose　that　you　read　me　the　first　words　of　Lysias'　speech。
  Phaedr。　〃You　know　how　matters　stand　with　me；　and　how；　as　I　conceive；
  they　might　be　arranged　for　our　common　interest；　and　I　maintain　that
  I　ought　not　to　fail　in　my　suit；　because　I　am　not　your　lover。　For
  lovers　repent…〃
  Soc。　Enough：…Now；　shall　I　point　out　the　rhetorical　error　of　those
  words？
  Phaedr。　Yes。
  Soc。　Every　one　is　aware　that　about　some　things　we　are　agreed；
  whereas　about　other　things　we　differ。
  Phaedr。　I　think　that　I　understand　you；　but　will　you　explain
  yourself？
  Soc。　When　any　one　speaks　of　iron　and　silver；　is　not　the　same　thing
  present　in　the　minds　of　all？
  Phaedr。　Certainly。
  Soc。　But　when　any　one　speaks　of　justice　and　goodness　we　part　company
  and　are　at　odds　with　one　another　and　with　ourselves？
  Phaedr。　Precisely。
  Soc。　Then　in　some　things　we　agree；　but　not　in　others？
  Phaedr。　That　is　true。
  Soc。　In　which　are　we　more　likely　to　be　deceived；　and　in　which　has
  rhetoric　the　greater　power？
  Phaedr。　Clearly；　in　the　uncertain　class。
  Soc。　Then　the　rhetorician　ought　to　make　a　regular　division；　and
  acquire　a　distinct　notion　of　both　classes；　as　well　of　that　in　which
  the　many　err；　as　of　that　in　which　they　do　not　err？
  Phaedr。　He　who　made　such　a　distinction　would　have　an　excellent
  principle。
  Soc。　Yes；　and　in　the　next　place　he　must　have　a　keen　eye　for　the
  observation　of　particulars　in　speaking；　and　not　make　a　mistake　about
  the　class　to　which　they　are　to　be　referred。
  Phaedr。　Certainly。
  Soc。　Now　to　which　class　does　love　belong…to　the　debatable　or　to
  the　undisputed　class？
  Phaedr。　To　the　debatable；　clearly；　for　if　not；　do　you　think　that
  love　would　have　allowed　you　to　say　as　you　did；　that　he　is　an　evil　both
  to　the　lover　and　the　beloved；　and　also　the　greatest　possible　good？
  Soc。　Capital。　But　will　you　tell　me　whether　I　defined　love　at　the
  beginning　of　my　speech？　for；　having　been　in　an　ecstasy；　I　cannot
  well　remember。
  Phaedr。　Yes；　indeed；　that　you　did；　and　no　mistake。
  Soc。　Then　I　perceive　that　the　Nymphs　of　Achelous　and　Pan　the　son
  of　Hermes；　who　inspired　me；　were　far　better　rhetoricians　than　Lysias
  the　son　of　Cephalus。　Alas！　how　inferior　to　them　he　is！　But　perhaps　I
  am　mistaken；　and　Lysias　at　the　commencement　of　his　lover's　speech
  did　insist　on　our　supposing　love　to　be　something　or　other　which　he
  fancied　him　to　be；　and　according　to　this　model　he　fashioned　and　framed
  the　remainder　of　his　discourse。　Suppose　we　read　his　beginning　over
  again：
  Phaedr。　If　you　please；　but　you　will　not　find　what　you　want。
  Soc；　Read；　that　I　may　have　his　exact　words。
  Phaedr。　〃You　know　how　matters　stand　with　and　how；　as　I　conceive；
  they　might　be　arranged　for　our　common　interest；　and　I　maintain　I　ought
  not　to　fail　in　my　suit　because　I　am　not　your　lover；　for　lovers
  repent　of　the　kindnesses　which　they　have　shown；　when　their　love　is
  over。〃
  Soc。　Here　he　appears　to　have　done　just　the　reverse　of　what　he　ought；
  for　he　has　begun　at　the　end；　and　is　swimming　on　his　back　through　the
  flood　to　the　place　of　starting。　His　address　to　the　fair　youth　begins
  where　the　lover　would　have　ended。　Am　I　not　right；　sweet　Phaedrus？
  Phaedr。　Yes；　indeed；　Socrates；　he　does　begin　at　the　end。
  Soc。　Then　as　to　the　other　topics…are　they　not　thrown　down　anyhow？　Is
  there　any　principle　in　them？　Why　should　the　next　topic　follow　next
  in　order；　or　any　other　topic？　I　cannot　help　fancying　in　my　ignorance
  that　he　wrote　off　boldly　just　what　came　into　his　head；　but　I　dare
  say　that　you　would　recognize　a　rhetorical　necessity　in　the
  succession　of　the　several　parts　of　the　composition？
  Phaedr。　You　have　too　good　an　opinion　of　me　if　you　think　that　I
  have　any　such　insight　into　his　principles　of　composition。
  Soc。　At　any　rate；　you　will　allow　that　every　discourse　ought　to　be
  a　living　creature；　having　a　body　of　its　own　and　a　head　and　feet；　there
  should　be　a　middle；　beginning；　and　end；　adapted　to　one　another　and
  to　the　whole？
  Phaedr。　Certainly。
  Soc。　Can　this　be　said　of　the　discourse　of　Lysias？　See　whether　you
  can　find　any　more　connexion　in　his　words　than　in　the　epitaph　which
  is　said　by　some　to　have　been　inscribed　on　the　grave　of　Midas　the
  Phrygian。
  Phaedr。　What　is　there　remarkable　in　the　epitaph？
  Soc。　It　is　as　follows：…
  I　am　a　maiden　of　bronze　and　lie　on　the　tomb　of　Midas；
  So　long　as　water　flows　and　tall　trees　grow；
  So　long　here　on　this　spot　by　his　sad　tomb　abiding；
  I　shall　declare　to　passers…by　that　Midas　sleeps　below。
  Now　in　this　rhyme　whether　a　line　comes　first　or　comes　last；　as　you
  will　perceive；　makes　no　difference。
  Phaedr。　You　are　making　fun　of　that　oration　of　ours。
  Soc。　Well；　I　will　say　no　more　about　your　friend's　speech　lest　I
  should　give　offence　to　you；　although　I　think　that　it　might　furnish
  many　other　examples　of　what　a　man　ought　rather　to　avoid。　But　I　will
  proceed　to　the　other　speech；　which；　as　I　think；　is　also　suggestive
  to　students　of　rhetoric。
  Phaedr。　In　what　way？
  Soc。　The　two　speeches；　as　you　may　remember；　were　unlike…I　the　one
  argued　that　the　lover　and　the　other　that　the　non…lover　ought　to　be
  accepted。
  Phaedr。　And　right　manfully。
  Soc。　You　should　rather　say　〃madly〃；　and　madness　was　the　argument
  of　them；　for；　as　I　said；　〃love　is　a　madness。〃
  Phaedr。　Yes。
  Soc。　And　of　madness　there　were　two　kinds；　one　produced　by　human
  infirmity；　the　other　was　a　divine　release　of　the　soul　from　the　yoke　of
  custom　and　convention。
  Phaedr。　True。
  Soc。　The　divine　madness　was　subdivided　into　four　kinds；　prophetic；
  initiatory；　poetic；　erotic；　having　four　gods　presiding　over　them；
  the　first　was　the　inspiration　of　Apollo；　the　second　that　of
  Dionysus；　the　third　that　of　the　Muses；　the　fourth　that　of　Aphrodite
  and　Eros。　In　the　description　of　the　last　kind　of　madness；　which　was
  also　said　to　be　the　best；　we　spoke　of　the　affection　of　love　in　a
  figure；　into　whi