letter；　yet　as　regards　the　effect　it　may　always　be　attained　in
  practice；　by　due　regard　being　given　to　the　disposition　and　sentiment
  of　the　parties　in　the　higher　social　sphere。　Thus　a　pecuniary　penalty
  on　account　of　a　verbal　injury　may　have　no　direct　proportion　to　the
  injustice　of　slander；　for　one　who　is　wealthy　may　be　able　to　indulge
  himself　in　this　offence　for　his　own　gratification。　Yet　the　attack
  committed　on　the　honour　of　the　party　aggrieved　may　have　its　equivalent
  in　the　pain　inflicted　upon　the　pride　of　the　aggressor；　especially　if
  he　is　condemned　by　the　judgement　of　the　court；　not　only　to　retract　and
  apologize；　but　to　submit　to　some　meaner　ordeal；　as　kissing　the　hand　of
  the　injured　person。　In　like　manner；　if　a　man　of　the　highest　rank　has
  violently　assaulted　an　innocent　citizen　of　the　lower　orders；　he　may　be
  condemned　not　only　to　apologize　but　to　undergo　a　solitary　and
  painful　imprisonment；　whereby；　in　addition　to　the　discomfort
  endured；　the　vanity　of　the　offender　would　be　painfully　affected；　and
  the　very　shame　of　his　position　would　constitute　an　adequate
  retaliation　after　the　principle　of　〃like　with　like。〃　But　how　then
  would　we　render　the　statement：　〃If　you　steal　from　another；　you　steal
  from　yourself？〃　In　this　way；　that　whoever　steals　anything　makes　the
  property　of　all　insecure；　he　therefore　robs　himself　of　all　security　in
  property；　according　to　the　right　of　retaliation。　Such　a　one　has
  nothing；　and　can　acquire　nothing；　but　he　has　the　will　to　live；　and
  this　is　only　possible　by　others　supporting　him。　But　as　the　state
  should　not　do　this　gratuitously；　he　must　for　this　purpose　yield　his
  powers　to　the　state　to　be　used　in　penal　labour；　and　thus　he　falls
  for　a　time；　or　it　may　be　for　life；　into　a　condition　of　slavery。　But
  whoever　has　committed　murder；　must　die。　There　is；　in　this　case；　no
  juridical　substitute　or　surrogate；　that　can　be　given　or　taken　for
  the　satisfaction　of　justice。　There　is　no　likeness　or　proportion
  between　life；　however　painful；　and　death；　and　therefore　there　is　no
  equality　between　the　crime　of　murder　and　the　retaliation　of　it　but
  what　is　judicially　accomplished　by　the　execution　of　the　criminal。
  His　death；　however；　must　be　kept　free　from　all　maltreatment　that　would
  make　the　humanity　suffering　in　his　person　loathsome　or　abominable。
  Even　if　a　civil　society　resolved　to　dissolve　itself　with　the　consent
  of　all　its　members…　as　might　be　supposed　in　the　case　of　a　people
  inhabiting　an　island　resolving　to　separate　and　scatter　themselves
  throughout　the　whole　world…　the　last　murderer　lying　in　the　prison
  ought　to　be　executed　before　the　resolution　was　carried　out。　This　ought
  to　be　done　in　order　that　every　one　may　realize　the　desert　of　his
  deeds；　and　that　blood…guiltiness　may　not　remain　upon　the　people；　for
  otherwise　they　might　all　be　regarded　as　participators　in　the　murder　as
  a　public　violation　of　justice。
  The　equalization　of　punishment　with　crime　is　therefore　only　possible
  by　the　cognition　of　the　judge　extending　even　to　the　penalty　of
  death；　according　to　the　right　of　retaliation。　This　is　manifest　from
  the　fact　that　it　is　only　thus　that　a　sentence　can　be　pronounced　over
  all　criminals　proportionate　to　their　internal　wickedness；　as　may　be
  seen　by　considering　the　case　when　the　punishment　of　death　has　to　be
  inflicted；　not　on　account　of　a　murder；　but　on　account　of　a　political
  crime　that　can　only　be　punished　capitally。　A　hypothetical　case；
  founded　on　history；　will　illustrate　this。　In　the　last　Scottish
  rebellion　there　were　various　participators　in　it…　such　as　Balmerino
  and　others…　who　believed　that　in　taking　part　in　the　rebellion　they
  were　only　discharging　their　duty　to　the　house　of　Stuart；　but　there
  were　also　others　who　were　animated　only　by　private　motives　and
  interests。　Now；　suppose　that　the　judgement　of　the　supreme　court
  regarding　them　had　been　this：　that　every　one　should　have　liberty　to
  choose　between　the　punishment　of　death　or　penal　servitude　for　life。　In
  view　of　such　an　alternative；　I　say　that　the　man　of　honour　would　choose
  death；　and　the　knave　would　choose　servitude。　This　would　be　the
  effect　of　their　human　nature　as　it　is；　for　the　honourable　man　values
  his　honour　more　highly　than　even　life　itself；　whereas　a　knave
  regards　a　life；　although　covered　with　shame；　as　better　in　his　eyes
  than　not　to　be。　The　former　is；　without　gainsaying；　less　guilty　than
  the　other；　and　they　can　only　be　proportionately　punished　by　death
  being　inflicted　equally　upon　them　both；　yet　to　the　one　it　is　a　mild
  punishment　when　his　nobler　temperament　is　taken　into　account；
  whereas　it　is　a　hard　punishment　to　the　other　in　view　of　his　baser
  temperament。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　were　they　all　equally　condemned
  to　penal　servitude　for　life；　the　honourable　man　would　be　too
  severely　punished；　while　the　other；　on　account　of　his　baseness　of
  nature；　would　be　too　mildly　punished。　In　the　judgement　to　be
  pronounced　over　a　number　of　criminals　united　in　such　a　conspiracy；　the
  best　equalizer　of　punishment　and　crime　in　the　form　of　public　justice
  is　death。　And　besides　all　this；　it　has　never　been　heard　of　that　a
  criminal　condemned　to　death　on　account　of　a　murder　has　complained　that
  the　sentence　inflicted　on　him　more　than　was　right　and　just；　and　any
  one　would　treat　him　with　scorn　if　he　expressed　himself　to　this
  effect　against　it。　Otherwise　it　would　be　necessary　to　admit　that；
  although　wrong　and　injustice　are　not　done　to　the　criminal　by　the
  law；　yet　the　legislative　power　is　not　entitled　to　administer　this　mode
  of　punishment；　and　if　it　did　so；　it　would　be　in　contradiction　with
  itself。
  However　many　they　may　be　who　have　committed　a　murder；　or　have　even
  commanded　it；　or　acted　as　art　and　part　in　it；　they　ought　all　to　suffer
  death；　for　so　justice　wills　it；　in　accordance　with　the　idea　of　the
  juridical　power；　as　founded　on　the　universal　laws　of　reason。　But　the
  number　of　the　accomplices　（correi）　in　such　a　deed　might　happen　to　be
  so　great　that　the　state；　in　resolving　to　be　without　such　criminals；
  would　be　in　danger　of　soon　also　being　deprived　of　subjects。　But　it
  will　not　thus　dissolve　itself；　neither　must　it　return　to　the　much
  worse　condition　of　nature；　in　which　there　would　be　no　external
  justice。　Nor；　above　all；　should　it　deaden　the　sensibilities　of　the
  people　by　the　spectacle　of　justice　being　exhibited　in　the　mere　carnage
  of　a　slaughtering　bench。　In　such　circumstances　the　sovereign　must
  always　be　allowed　to　have　it　in　his　power　to　take　the　part　of　the
  judge　upon　himself　as　a　case　of　necessity…　and　to　deliver　a
  judgement　which；　instead　of　the　penalty　of　death；　shall　assign　some
  other　punishment　to　the　criminals　and　thereby　preserve　a　multitude
  of　the　people。　The　penalty　of　deportation　is　relevant　in　this
  connection。　Such　a　form　of　judgement　cannot　be　carried　out　according
  to　a　public　law；　but　only　by　an　authoritative　act　of　the　royal
  prerogative；　and　it　may　only　be　applied　as　an　act　of　grace　in
  individual　cases。
  Against　these　doctrines；　the　Marquis　Beccaria　has　given　forth　a
  different　view。　Moved　by　the　compassionate　sentimentality　of　a
  humane　feeling；　he　has　asserted　that　all　capital　punishment　is　wrong
  in　itself　and　unjust。　He　has　put　forward　this　view　on　the　ground
  that　the　penalty　of　death　could　not　be　contained　in　the　original　civil
  contract；　for；　in　that　case；　every　one　of　the　people　would　have　had　to
  consent　to　lose　his　life　if　be　murdered　any　of　his　fellow　citizens。
  But；　it　is　argued；　such　a　consent　is　impossible；　because　no　one　can
  thus　dispose　of　his　own　life。　All　this　is　mere　sophistry　and
  perversion　of　right。　No　one　undergoes　punishment　because　he　has　willed
  to　be　punished；　but　because　he　has　willed　a　punishable　action；　for
  it　is　in　fact　no　punishment　when　any　one　experiences　what　he　wills；
  and　it　is　impossible　for　any　one　to　will　to　be　punished。　To　say；　〃I
  will　to　be　punished；　if　I　murder　any　one；〃　can　mean　nothing　more　than；
  〃I　submit　myself　along　with　all　the　other　citizens　to　the　laws〃；　and
  if　there　are　any　criminals　among　the　people；　these　laws　will　include
  penal　laws。　The　individual　who；　as　a　co…legislator；　enacts　penal　law
  cannot　possibly　be　the　same　person　who；　as　a　subject；　is　punished
  according　to　the　law；　for；　qua　criminal；　he　cannot　possibly　be
  regarded　as　having　a　voice　in　the　legislation；　the　legislator　being
  rationally　viewed　as　just　and　holy。　If　any　one；　then；　enact　a　penal
  law　against　himself　as　a　criminal；　it　must　be　the　pure　juridically
  law…giving　reason　（homo　noumenon）；　which　subjects　him　as　one　capable
  of　crime；　and　consequently　as　another　person　（homo　phenomenon）；
  along　with　all　the　others　in　the　civil　union；　to　this　penal　law。　In
  other　words；　it　is　not　the　people　taken　distributively；　but　the
  tribunal　of　public　justice；　as　distinct　from　the　criminal；　that
  prescribes　capital　punishment；　and　it　is　not　to　be　viewed　as　if　the
  social　contract　contained　the　promise　of　all　the　individuals　to
  allow　themselves　to　be　punished；　thus　disposing　of　themselves　and
  their　lives。　For　i