chance；　because　they　have　brought　a　being　into　the　world　who　becomes
  in　fact　a　citizen　of　the　world；　and　they　have　placed　that　being　in　a
  state　which　they　cannot　be　left　to　treat　with　indifference；　even
  according　to　the　natural　conceptions　of　right。
  We　cannot　even　conceive　how　it　is　possible　that　God　can　create
  free　beings；　for　it　appears　as　if　all　their　future　actions；　being
  predetermined　by　that　first　act；　would　be　contained　in　the　chain　of
  natural　necessity；　and　that；　therefore；　they　could　not　be　free。　But　as
  men　we　are　free　in　fact；　as　is　proved　by　the　categorical　imperative　in
  the　moral　and　practical　relation　as　an　authoritative　decision　of
  reason；　yet　reason　cannot　make　the　possibility　of　such　a　relation　of
  cause　to　effect　conceivable　from　the　theoretical　point　of　view；
  because　they　are　both　suprasensible。　All　that　can　be　demanded　of
  reason　under　these　conditions　would　merely　be　to　prove　that　there　is
  no　contradiction　involved　in　the　conception　of　a　creation　of　free
  beings；　and　this　may　be　done　by　showing　that　contradiction　only　arises
  when；　along　with　the　category　of　causality；　the　condition　of　time　is
  transferred　to　the　relation　of　suprasensible　things。　This　condition；
  as　implying　that　the　cause　of　an　effect　must　precede　the　effect　as　its
  reason；　is　inevitable　in　thinking　the　relation　of　objects　of　sense
  to　one　another；　and　if　this　conception　of　causality　were　to　have
  objective　reality　given　to　it　in　the　theoretical　bearing；　it　would
  also　have　to　be　referred　to　the　suprasensible　sphere。　But　the
  contradiction　vanishes　when　the　pure　category；　apart　from　any　sensible
  conditions；　is　applied　from　the　moral　and　practical　point　of　view；　and
  consequently　as　in　a　non…sensible　relation　to　the　conception　of
  creation。
  The　philosophical　jurist　will　not　regard　this　investigation；　when
  thus　carried　back　even　to　the　ultimate　principles　of　the
  transcendental　philosophy；　as　an　unnecessary　subtlety　in　a
  metaphysic　of　morals；　or　as　losing　itself　in　aimless　obscurity；　when
  he　takes　into　consideration　the　difficulty　of　doing　justice　in　this
  inquiry　to　the　ultimate　relations　of　the　principles　of　right。
  29。　The　Rights　of　the　Parent。
  From　the　duty　thus　indicated；　there　further　necessarily　arises　the
  right　of　the　parents　to　the　management　and　training　of　the　child；　so
  long　as　it　is　itself　incapable　of　making　proper　use　of　its　body　as
  an　organism；　and　of　its　mind　as　an　understanding。　This　involves　its
  nourishment　and　the　care　of　its　education。　This　includes；　in
  general；　the　function　of　forming　and　developing　it　practically；　that
  it　may　be　able　in　the　future　to　maintain　and　advance　itself；　and
  also　its　moral　culture　and　development；　the　guilt　of　neglecting　it
  falling　upon　the　parents。　All　this　training　is　to　be　continued　till
  the　child　reaches　the　period　of　emancipation　（emancipatio）；　as　the　age
  of　practicable　self…support。　The　parents　then　virtually　renounce　the
  parental　right　to　command；　as　well　as　all　claim　to　repayment　for　their
  previous　care　and　trouble；　for　which　care　and　trouble；　after　the
  process　of　education　is　complete；　they　can　only　appeal　to　the
  children；　by　way　of　any　claim；　on　the　ground　of　the　obligation　of
  gratitude　as　a　duty　of　virtue。
  From　the　fact　of　personality　in　the　children；　it　further　follows
  that　they　can　never　be　regarded　as　the　property　of　the　parents；　but
  only　as　belonging　to　them　by　way　of　being　in　their　possession；　like
  other　things　that　are　held　apart　from　the　possession　of　all　others　and
  that　can　be　brought　back　even　against　the　will　of　the　subjects。
  Hence　the　right　of　the　parents　is　not　a　purely　real　right；　and　it　is
  not　alienable　（jus　personalissimum）。　But　neither　is　it　a　merely
  personal　right；　it　is　a　personal　right　of　a　real　kind；　that　is；　a
  personal　right　that　is　constituted　and　exercised　after　the　manner　of　a
  real　right。
  It　is　therefore　evident　that　the　title　of　a　personal　right　of　a　real
  kind　must　necessarily　be　added；　in　the　science　of　right；　to　the　titles
  of　real　right　and　personal　right；　the　division　of　rights　into　these
  two　being　not　complete。　For；　if　the　right　of　the　parents　to　the
  children　were　treated　as　if　it　were　merely　a　real　right　to　a　part　of
  what　belongs　to　their　house；　they　could　not　found　only　upon　the　duty
  of　the　children　to　return　to　them　in　claiming　them　when　they　run　away；
  but　they　would　be　then　entitled　to　seize　them　and　impound　them　like
  things　or　runaway　cattle。
  TITLE　III。　Household　Right。　（Master　and　Servant）
  30。　Relation　and　Right　of　the　Master　of　a　Household。
  The　children　of　the　house；　who；　along　with　the　parents；　constitute　a
  family；　attain　majority；　and　become　masters　of　themselves　（majorennes；
  sui　juris）；　even　without　a　contract　of　release　from　their　previous
  state　of　dependence；　by　their　actually　attaining　to　the　capability
  of　self…maintenance。　This　attainment　arises；　on　the　one　hand；　as　a
  state　of　natural　majority；　with　the　advance　of　years　in　the　general
  course　of　nature；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　it　takes　form；　as　a　state　in
  accordance　with　their　own　natural　condition。　They　thus　acquire　the
  right　of　being　their　own　masters；　without　the　interposition　of　any
  special　juridical　act；　and　therefore　merely　by　law　（lege）；　and　they
  owe　their　parents　nothing　by　way　of　legal　debt　for　their　education；
  just　as　the　parents；　on　their　side；　are　now　released　from　their
  obligations　to　the　children　in　the　same　way。　Parents　and　children　thus
  gain　or　regain　their　natural　freedom；　and　the　domestic　society；
  which　was　necessary　according　to　the　law　of　right；　is　thus　naturally
  dissolved。
  Both　parties；　however；　may　resolve　to　continue　the　household；　but
  under　another　mode　of　obligation。　It　may　assume　the　form　of　a　relation
  between　the　bead　of　the　house；　as　its　master；　and　the　other　members　as
  domestic　servants；　male　or　female；　and　the　connection　between　them
  in　this　new　regulated　domestic　economy　（societas　herilis）　may　be
  determined　by　contract。　The　master　of　the　house；　actually　or
  virtually；　enters　into　contract　with　the　children；　now　become　major
  and　masters　of　themselves；　or；　if　there　be　no　children　in　the
  family；　with　other　free　persons　constituting　the　membership　of　the
  household；　and　thus　there　is　established　domestic　relationship　not
  founded　on　social　equality；　but　such　that　one　commands　as　master；
  and　another　obeys　as　servant　（imperantis　et　subjecti　domestici）。
  The　domestics　or　servants　may　then　be　regarded　by　the　master　of
  the　household　as　thus　far　his。　As　regards　the　form　or　mode　of　his
  possession　of　them；　they　belong　to　him　as　if　by　a　real　right；　for　if
  any　of　them　run　away；　he　is　entitled　to　bring　them　again　under　his
  power　by　a　unilateral　act　of　his　will。　But　as　regards　the　matter　of
  his　right；　or　the　use　he　is　entitled　to　make　of　such　persons　as　his
  domestics；　he　is　not　entitled　to　conduct　himself　towards　them　as　if　he
  was　their　proprietor　or　owner　（dominus　servi）；　because　they　are　only
  subjected　to　his　power　by　contract；　and　by　a　contract　under　certain
  definite　restrictions。　For　a　contract　by　which　the　one　party　renounced
  his　whole　freedom　for　the　advantage　of　the　other；　ceasing　thereby　to
  be　a　person　and　consequently　having　no　duty　even　to　observe　a
  contract；　is　self　contradictory；　and　is　therefore　of　itself　null　and
  void。　The　question　as　to　the　right　of　property　in　relation　to　one
  who　has　lost　his　legal　personality　by　a　crime　does　not　concern　us
  here。
  This　contract；　then；　of　the　master　of　a　household　with　his
  domestics；　cannot　be　of　such　a　nature　that　the　use　of　them　could
  ever　rightly　become　an　abuse　of　them；　and　the　judgement　as　to　what
  constitutes　use　or　abuse　in　such　circumstances　the　is　not　left
  merely　to　the　master；　but　is　also　competent　to　the　servants；　who　ought
  never　to　be　held　in　bondage　or　bodily　servitude　as　slaves　or　serfs。
  Such　a　contract　cannot；　therefore；　be　concluded　for　life；　but　in　all
  cases　only　for　a　definite　period；　within　which　one　party　may
  intimate　to　the　other　a　termination　of　their　connection。　Children；
  however；　including　even　the　children　of　one　who　has　become　enslaved
  owing　to　a　crime；　are　always　free。　For　every　man　is　born　free；　because
  he　has　at　birth　as　yet　broken　no　law；　and　even　the　cost　of　his
  education　till　his　maturity　cannot　be　reckoned　as　a　debt　which　he　is
  bound　to　pay。　Even　a　slave；　if　it　were　in　his　power；　would　be　bound　to
  educate　his　children　without　being　entitled　to　count　and　reckon　with
  them　for　the　cost；　and　in　view　of　his　own　incapacity　for　discharging
  this　function；　the　possessor　of　a　slave；　therefore；　enters　upon　the
  obligation　which　he　has　rendered　the　slave　himself　unable　to　fulfil。
  Here；　again；　as　under　the　first　two　titles；　it　is　clear　that　there
  is　a　personal　right　of　a　real　kind；　in　the　relation　of　the　master　of　a
  house　to　his　domestics。　For　he　can　legally　demand　them　as　belonging　to
  what　is　externally　his；　from　any　other　possessor　of　them；　and　he　is
  entitled　to　f