you　have　nothing　to　reproach　me　with。　My　comfort　is；　you　are　as
  much　a　sceptic　as　I　am。
  。　There；　Hylas；　I　must　beg　leave　to　differ　from　you。
  。　What！　Have　you　all　along　agreed　to　the　premises；　and
  do　you　now　deny　the　conclusion；　and　leave　me　to　maintain　those
  paradoxes　by　myself　which　you　led　me　into？　This　surely　is　not
  fair。
  。　　deny　that　I　agreed　with　you　in　those　notions
  that　led　to　Scepticism。　You　indeed　said　the　　of　sensible
  things　consisted　in　；　or　distinct　from　their　being　perceived。　And　pursuant　to
  this　notion　of　reality；　　are　obliged　to　deny　sensible　things
  any　｛212｝　real　existence：　that　is；　according　to　your　own
  definition；　you　profess　yourself　a　sceptic。　But　I　neither　said
  nor　thought　the　reality　of　sensible　things　was　to　be　defined
  after　that　manner。　To　me　it　is　evident　for　the　reasons　you　allow
  of；　that　sensible　things　cannot　exist　otherwise　than　in　a　mind　or
  spirit。　Whence　I　conclude；　not　that　they　have　no　real　existence；
  but　that。；　seeing　they　depend　not　on　my　thought；　and　have　all
  existence　distinct　from　being　perceived　by　me；　。　As　sure；　therefore；　as　the
  sensible　world　really　exists；　so　sure　is　there　an　infinite
  omnipresent　Spirit　who　contains　and　supports　it。
  。　What！　This　is　no　more　than　I　and　all　Christians　hold；
  nay；　and　all　others　too　who　believe　there　is　a　God；　and　that　He
  knows　and　comprehends　all　things。
  。　Aye；　but　here　lies　the　difference。　Men　commonly
  believe　that　all　things　are　known　or　perceived　by　God；　because
  they　believe　the　being　of　a　God；　whereas　I；　on　the　other　side；
  immediately　and　necessarily　conclude　the　being　of　a　God；　because
  all　sensible　things　must　be　perceived　by　Him。
  。　But；　so　long　as　we　all　believe　the　same　thing；　what
  matter　is　it　how　we　come　by　that　belief？
  。　But　neither　do　we　agree　in　the　same　opinion。　For
  philosophers；　though　they　acknowledge　all　corporeal　beings　to　be
  perceived　by　God；　yet　they　attribute　to　them　an　absolute
  subsistence　distinct　from　their　being　perceived　by　any　mind
  whatever；　which　I　do　not。　Besides；　is　there　no　difference　between
  saying；　；　；
  and　saying；　；　；　；　：　？　This
  furnishes　you　with　a　direct　and　immediate　demonstration；　from　a
  most　evident　principle；　of　the　。　Divines　and
  philosophers　had　proved　beyond　all　controversy；　from　the　beauty
  and　usefulness　of　the　several　parts　of　the　creation；　that　it　was
  the　workmanship　of　God。　But　that　　setting　aside　all　help　of
  astronomy　and　natural　philosophy；　all　contemplation　of　the
  contrivance；　order；　and　adjustment　of　things　　an　infinite　Mind
  should　be　necessarily　inferred　from　the　bare　；　is　an　advantage　to　them　only　who　have　made　this
  easy　reflexion：　that　the　sensible　world　is　that　which　we　perceive
  by　our　several　senses；　and　that　nothing　is　perceived　by　the
  senses　beside　ideas；　and　that　no　｛213｝　idea　or　archetype　of　an
  idea　can　exist　otherwise　than　in　a　mind。　You　may　now；　without　any
  laborious　search　into　the　sciences；　without　any　subtlety　of
  reason；　or　tedious　length　of　discourse；　oppose　and　baffle　the
  most　strenuous　advocate　for　Atheism。　Those　miserable　refuges；
  whether　in　an　eternal　succession　of　unthinking　causes　and
  effects；　or　in　a　fortuitous　concourse　of　atoms；　those　wild
  imaginations　of　Vanini；　Hobbes；　and　Spinoza：　in　a　word；　the　whole
  system　of　Atheism；　is　it　not　entirely　overthrown；　by　this　single
  reflexion　on　the　repugnancy　included　in　supposing　the　whole；　or
  any　part；　even　the　most　rude　and　shapeless；　of　the　visible　world；
  to　exist　without　a　mind？　Let　any　one　of　those　abettors　of　impiety
  but　look　into　his　own　thoughts；　and　there　try　if　he　can　conceive
  how　so　much　as　a　rock；　a　desert；　a　chaos；　or　confused　jumble　of
  atoms；　how　anything　at　all；　either　sensible　or　imaginable；　can
  exist　independent　of　a　Mind；　and　he　need　go　no　farther　to　be
  convinced　of　his　folly。　Can　anything　be　fairer　than　to　put　a
  dispute　on　such　an　issue；　and　leave　it　to　a　man　himself　to　see　if
  he　can　conceive；　even　in　thought；　what　he　holds　to　be　true　in
  fact；　and　from　a　notional　to　allow　it　a　real　existence？
  。　It　cannot　be　denied　there　is　something　highly
  serviceable　to　religion　in　what　you　advance。　But　do　you　not　think
  it　looks　very　like　a　notion　entertained　by　some　eminent　moderns；
  of　？
  。　I　would　gladly　know　that　opinion：　pray　explain　it　to
  me。
  。　They　conceive　that　the　soul；　being　immaterial；　is
  incapable　of　being　united　with　material　things；　so　as　to　perceive
  them　in　themselves；　but　that　she　perceives　them　by　her　union　with
  the　substance　of　God；　which；　being　spiritual；　is　therefore　purely
  intelligible；　or　capable　of　being　the　immediate　object　of　a
  spirit's　thought。　Besides　the　Divine　essence　contains　in　it
  perfections　correspondent　to　each　created　being；　and　which　are；
  for　that　reason；　proper　to　exhibit　or　represent　them　to　the　mind。
  。　I　do　not　understand　how　our　ideas；　which　are　things
  altogether　passive　and　inert；　can　be　the　essence；　or　any　part　（or
  like　any　part）　of　the　essence　or　substance　of　God；　who　is　an
  ｛214｝　impassive；　indivisible；　pure；　active　being。　Many　more
  difficulties　and　objections　there　are　which　occur　at　first　view
  against　this　hypothesis；　but　I　shall　only　add　that　it　is　liable
  to　all　the　absurdities　of　the　common　hypothesis；　in　making　a
  created　world　exist　otherwise　than　in　the　mind　of　a　Spirit。
  Besides　all　which　it　hath　this　peculiar　to　itself；　that　it　makes
  that　material　world　serve　to　no　purpose。　And；　if　it　pass　for　a
  good　argument　against　other　hypotheses　in　the　sciences；　that　they
  suppose　Nature；　or　the　Divine　wisdom；　to　make　something　in　vain；
  or　do　that　by　tedious　roundabout　methods　which　might　have　been
  performed　in　a　much　more　easy　and　compendious　way；　what　shall　we
  think　of　that　hypothesis　which　supposes　the　whole　world　made　in
  vain？
  。　But　what　say　you？　Are　not　you　too　of　opinion　that　we
  see　all　things　in　God？　If　I　mistake　not；　what　you　advance　comes
  near　it。
  。　＇Few　men　think；　yet　all　have　opinions。　Hence　men's
  opinions　are　superficial　and　confused。　It　is　nothing　strange　that
  tenets　which　in　themselves　are　ever　so　different；　should
  nevertheless　be　confounded　with　each　other；　by　those　who　do　not
  consider　them　attentively。　I　shall　not　therefore　be　surprised　if
  some　men　imagine　that　I　run　into　the　enthusiasm　of　Malebranche；
  though　in　truth　I　am　very　remote　from　it。　He　builds　on　the　most
  abstract　general　ideas；　which　I　entirely　disclaim。　He　asserts　an
  absolute　external　world；　which　I　deny。　He　maintains　that　we　are
  deceived　by　our　senses；　and；　know　not　the　real　natures　or　the
  true　forms　and　figures　of　extended　beings；　of　all　which　I　hold
  the　direct　contrary。　So　that　upon　the　whole　there　are　no
  Principles　more　fundamentally　opposite　than　his　and　mine。　It　must
  be　owned　that＇＇5＇　I　entirely　agree　with　what　the　holy　Scripture
  saith；　〃That　in　God　we　live　and　move　and　have　our　being。〃　But
  that　we　see　things　in　His　essence；　after　the　manner　above　set
  forth；　I　am　far　from　believing。　Take　here　in　brief　my　meaning：
  It　is　evident　that　the　things　I　perceive　are　my　own　ideas；　and
  that　no　idea　can　exist　unless　it　be　in　a　mind：　nor　is　it　less
  plain　that　these　ideas　or　things　by　me　perceived；　either
  themselves　or　their　archetypes；　exist　independently　of　my　mind；
  since　I　know　myself　not　to　be　their　author；　it　being　out　of　my
  power　to　determine　at　pleasure　what　particular　ideas　I　shall　be
  affected　with　upon　opening　my　eyes　or　ears：　they　must　therefore
  exist　in　some　other　Mind；　whose　｛215｝　Will　it　is　they　should　be
  exhibited　to　me。　The　things；　I　say；　immediately　perceived　are
  ideas　or　sensations；　call　them　which　you　will。　But　how　can　any
  idea　or　sensation　exist　in；　or　be　produced　by；　anything　but　a
  mind　or　spirit？　This　indeed　is　inconceivable。　And　to　assert　that
  which　is　inconceivable　is　to　talk　nonsense：　is　it　not？
  。　Without　doubt。
  。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　it　is　very　conceivable　that
  they　should　exist　in　and　be　produced　by　a　spirit；　since　this　is
  no　more　than　I　daily　experience　in　myself；　inasmuch　as　I　perceive
  numberless　ideas；　and；　by　an　act　of　my　will；　can　form　a　great
  variety　of　them；　and　raise　them　up　in　my　imagination：　though；　it
  must　be　confessed；　these　creatures　of　the　fancy　are　not
  altogether　so　distinct；　so　strong；　vivid；　and　permanent；　as　those
  perceived　by　my　senses　　which　latter　are　called　。
  From　all　which　I　conclude；　。
  ；　from　the　variety；　order；　and　manner　of　these；　I　conclude
  ；　；　；　。　　it　well；　I　do　not　say；　I　see　things　by
  perceiving　that　which　represents　them　in　the　intelligible
  Substance　of　God。　This　I　do　not　understand；