nature；　or　whether　both　are　not　simply　the　same　thing；　and　I　here　suppose　that　I　do　not　yet　know　any　reason　to　persuade　me　to　adopt　the　one　belief　rather　than　the　other。　　From　this　it　follows　that　I　am　entirely　indifferent　as　to　which　of　the　two　I　affirm　or　deny；　or　even　whether　I　abstain　from　forming　any　judgment　in　the　matter。　　　　　　And　this　indifference　does　not　only　extend　to　matters　as　to　which　the　understanding　has　no　knowledge；　but　also　in　general　to　all　those　which　are　not　apprehended　with　perfect　clearness　at　the　moment　when　the　will　is　deliberating　upon　them：　　for；　however　probable　are　the　conjectures　which　render　me　disposed　to　form　a　judgment　respecting　anything；　the　simple　knowledge　that　I　have　that　those　are　conjectures　alone　and　not　certain　and　indubitable　reasons；　suffices　to　occasion　me　to　judge　the　contrary。　　Of　this　I　have　had　great　experience　of　late　when　I　set　aside　as　false　all　that　I　had　formerly　held　to　be　absolutely　true；　for　the　sole　reason　that　I　remarked　that　it　might　in　some　measure　be　doubted。　　　　　　But　if　I　abstain　from　giving　my　judgment　on　any　thing　when　I　do　not　perceive　it　with　sufficient　clearness　and　distinctness；　it　is　plain　that　I　act　rightly　and　am　not　deceived。　　But　if　I　determine　to　deny　or　affirm；　I　no　longer　make　use　as　I　should　of　my　free　will；　and　if　I　affirm　what　is　not　true；　it　is　evident　that　I　deceive　myself；　even　though　I　judge　according　to　truth；　this　comes　about　only　by　chance；　and　I　do　not　escape　the　blame　of　misusing　my　freedom；　for　the　light　of　nature　teaches　us　that　the　knowledge　of　the　understanding　should　always　precede　the　determination　of　the　will。　　And　it　is　in　the　misuse　of　the　free　will　that　the　privation　which　constitutes　the　characteristic　nature　of　error　is　met　with。　　Privation；　I　say；　is　found　in　the　act；　in　so　far　as　it　proceeds　from　me；　but　it　is　not　found　in　the　faculty　which　I　have　received　from　God；　nor　even　in　the　act　in　so　far　as　it　depends　on　Him。　　　　　　For　I　have　certainly　no　cause　to　complain　that　God　has　not　given　me　an　intelligence　which　is　more　powerful；　or　a　natural　light　which　is　stronger　than　that　which　I　have　received　from　Him；　since　it　is　proper　to　the　finite　understanding　not　to　comprehend　a　multitude　of　things；　and　it　is　proper　to　a　created　understanding　to　be　finite；　on　the　contrary；　I　have　every　reason　to　render　thanks　to　God　who　owes　me　nothing　and　who　has　given　me　all　the　perfections　I　possess；　and　I　should　be　far　from　charging　Him　with　injustice；　and　with　having　deprived　me　of；　or　wrongfully　withheld　from　me；　these　perfections　which　He　has　not　bestowed　upon　me。　　　　　　I　have　further　no　reason　to　complain　that　He　has　given　me　a　will　more　ample　than　my　understanding；　for　since　the　will　consists　only　of　one　single　element；　and　is　so　to　speak　indivisible；　it　appears　that　its　nature　is　such　that　nothing　can　be　abstracted　from　it　＇without　destroying　it＇；　and　certainly　the　more　comprehensive　it　is　found　to　be；　the　more　reason　I　have　to　render　gratitude　to　the　giver。　　　　　　And；　finally；　I　must　also　not　complain　that　God　concurs　with　me　in　forming　the　acts　of　the　will；　that　is　the　judgment　in　which　I　go　astray；　because　these　acts　are　entirely　true　and　good；　inasmuch　as　they　depend　on　God；　and　in　a　certain　sense　more　perfection　accrues　to　my　nature　from　the　fact　that　I　can　form　them；　than　if　I　could　not　do　so。　　As　to　the　privation　in　which　alone　the　formal　reason　of　error　or　sin　consists；　it　has　no　need　of　any　concurrence　from　God；　since　it　is　not　a　thing　＇or　an　existence＇；　and　since　it　is　not　related　to　God　as　to　a　cause；　but　should　be　termed　merely　a　negation　＇according　to　the　significance　given　to　these　words　in　the　Schools＇。　　For　in　fact　it　is　not　an　imperfection　in　God　that　He　has　given　me　the　liberty　to　give　or　withhold　my　assent　from　certain　things　as　to　which　He　has　not　placed　a　clear　and　distinct　knowledge　in　my　understanding；　but　it　is　without　doubt　an　imperfection　in　me　not　to　make　a　good　use　of　my　freedom；　and　to　give　my　judgment　readily　on　matters　which　I　only　understand　obscurely。　I　nevertheless　perceive　that　God　could　easily　have　created　me　so　that　I　never　should　err；　although　I　still　remained　free；　and　endowed　with　a　limited　knowledge；　viz。　by　giving　to　my　understanding　a　clear　and　distinct　intelligence　of　all　things　as　to　which　I　should　ever　have　to　deliberate；　or　simply　by　His　engraving　deeply　in　my　memory　the　resolution　never　to　form　a　judgment　on　anything　without　having　a　clear　and　distinct　understanding　of　it；　so　that　I　could　never　forget　it。　　And　it　is　easy　for　me　to　understand　that；　in　so　far　as　I　consider　myself　alone；　and　as　if　there　were　only　myself　in　the　world；　I　should　have　been　much　more　perfect　than　I　am；　if　God　had　created　me　so　that　I　could　never　err。　　Nevertheless　I　cannot　deny　that　in　some　sense　it　is　a　greater　perfection　in　the　whole　universe　that　certain　parts　should　not　be　exempt　from　error　as　others　are　than　that　all　parts　should　be　exactly　similar。　　And　I　have　no　right　to　complain　if　God；　having　placed　me　in　the　world；　has　not　called　upon　me　to　play　a　part　that　excels　all　others　in　distinction　and　perfection。　　　　　　And　further　I　have　reason　to　be　glad　on　the　ground　that　if　He　has　not　given　me　the　power　of　never　going　astray　by　the　first　means　pointed　out　above；　which　depends　on　a　clear　and　evident　knowledge　of　all　the　things　regarding　which　I　can　deliberate；　He　has　at　least　left　within　my　power　the　other　means；　which　is　firmly　to　adhere　to　the　resolution　never　to　give　judgment　on　matters　whose　truth　is　not　clearly　known　to　me；　for　although　I　notice　a　certain　weakness　in　my　nature　in　that　I　cannot　continually　concentrate　my　mind　on　one　single　thought；　I　can　yet；　by　attentive　and　frequently　repeated　meditation；　impress　it　so　forcibly　on　my　memory　that　I　shall　never　fail　to　recollect　it　whenever　I　have　need　of　it；　and　thus　acquire　the　habit　of　never　going　astray。　　　　　　And　inasmuch　as　it　is　in　this　that　the　greatest　and　principal　perfection　of　man　consists；　it　seems　to　me　that　I　have　not　gained　little　by　this　day's　Meditation；　since　I　have　discovered　the　source　of　falsity　and　error。　　And　certainly　there　can　be　no　other　source　than　that　which　I　have　explained；　for　as　often　as　I　so　restrain　my　will　within　the　limits　of　my　knowledge　that　it　forms　no　judgment　except　on　matters　which　are　clearly　and　distinctly　represented　to　it　by　the　understanding；　I　can　never　be　deceived；　for　every　clear　and　distinct　conception20　is　without　doubt　something；　and　hence　cannot　derive　its　origin　from　what　is　nought；　but　must　of　necessity　have　God　as　its　author￥God；　I　say；　who　being　supremely　perfect；　cannot　be　the　cause　of　any　error；　and　consequently　we　must　conclude　that　such　a　conception　＇or　such　a　judgment＇　is　true。　　Nor　have　I　only　learned　to…day　what　I　should　avoid　in　order　that　I　may　not　err；　but　also　how　I　should　act　in　order　to　arrive　at　a　knowledge　of　the　truth；　for　without　doubt　I　shall　arrive　at　this　end　if　I　devote　my　attention　sufficiently　to　those　things　which　I　perfectly　understand；　and　if　I　separate　from　these　that　which　I　only　understand　confusedly　and　with　obscurity。　　To　these　I　shall　henceforth　diligently　give　heed。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditation　V。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　essence　of　material　things；　and；　again；　of　God；　that　He　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　exists。
  Many　other　matters　respecting　the　attributes　of　God　and　my　own　nature　or　mind　remain　for　consideration；　but　I　shall　possibly　on　another　occasion　resume　the　investigation　of　these。　　Now　（after　first　noting　what　must　be　done　or　avoided；　in　order　to　arrive　at　a　knowledge　of　the　truth）　my　principal　task　is　to　endeavour　to　emerge　from　the　state　of　doubt　into　which　I　have　these　last　days　fallen；　and　to　see　whether　nothing　certain　can　be　known　regarding　material　things。　　　　　　But　before　examining　whether　any　such　objects　as　I　conceive　exist　outside　of　me；　I　must　consider　the　ideas　of　them　in　so　far　as　they　are　in　my　thought；　and　see　which　of　them　are　distinct　and　which　confused。　　　　　　In　the　first　place；　I　am　able　distinctly　to　imagine　that　quantity　which　philosophers　commonly　call　continuous；　or　the　extension　in　length；　breadth；　or　depth；　that　is　in　this　quantity；　or　rather　in　the　object　to　which　it　is　attributed。　Further；　I　can　number　in　it　many　different　parts；　and　attribute　to　each　of　its　parts　many　sorts　of　size；　figure；　situation　and　local　movement；　and；　finally；　I　can　assign　to　each　of　these　movements　all　degrees　of　duration。　　　　　　And　not　only　do　I　know　these　things　with　distinctness　when　I　consider　them　in　general；　but；　likewise　＇however　little　I　apply　my　attention　to　the　matter＇；　I　discover　an　infinitude　of　particulars　respecting　numbers；　figures；　movements；　and　other　such　things；　whose　truth　is　so　manifest；　and　so　well　accords　with　my　nature；　that　when　I　begin　to　discover　them；　it　seems　to　me　that　I　learn　nothing　new；　or　recollect　what　I　formerly　knew￥that　is　to　say；　that　I　for　the　first　time　perceive　things　which　were　already　present　to　my　mind；　although　I　had　not　as　yet　applied　my　mind　to　them。　　　　　　And　what　I　here　find　to　be　most　important　is　that　I　discover　in　myself　an　infinitude　of　ideas　of　certain　things　which　cannot　be　esteemed　as　pure　negations；　although　they　may　possibly　have　no　existence　outside　of　my　thought；　and　which　are　not