FIRST　EPILOGUE：　1813　…　20
  CHAPTER　I
  Seven　years　had　passed。　The　storm…tossed　sea　of　European　history　had
  subsided　within　its　shores　and　seemed　to　have　become　calm。　But　the
  mysterious　forces　that　move　humanity　（mysterious　because　the　laws　of
  their　motion　are　unknown　to　us）　continued　to　operate。
  Though　the　surface　of　the　sea　of　history　seemed　motionless；　the
  movement　of　humanity　went　on　as　unceasingly　as　the　flow　of　time。
  Various　groups　of　people　formed　and　dissolved；　the　coming　formation
  and　dissolution　of　kingdoms　and　displacement　of　peoples　was　in
  course　of　preparation。
  The　sea　of　history　was　not　driven　spasmodically　from　shore　to
  shore　as　previously。　It　was　seething　in　its　depths。　Historic　figures
  were　not　borne　by　the　waves　from　one　shore　to　another　as　before。
  They　now　seemed　to　rotate　on　one　spot。　The　historical　figures　at　the
  head　of　armies；　who　formerly　reflected　the　movement　of　the　masses　by
  ordering　wars；　campaigns；　and　battles；　now　reflected　the　restless
  movement　by　political　and　diplomatic　combinations；　laws；　and　treaties。
  The　historians　call　this　activity　of　the　historical　figures　〃the
  reaction。〃
  In　dealing　with　this　period　they　sternly　condemn　the　historical
  personages　who；　in　their　opinion；　caused　what　they　describe　as　the
  reaction。　All　the　well…known　people　of　that　period；　from　Alexander　and
  Napoleon　to　Madame　de　Stael；　Photius；　Schelling；　Fichte；
  Chateaubriand；　and　the　rest；　pass　before　their　stern　judgment　seat　and
  are　acquitted　or　condemned　according　to　whether　they　conduced　to
  progress　or　to　reaction。
  According　to　their　accounts　a　reaction　took　place　at　that　time　in
  Russia　also；　and　the　chief　culprit　was　Alexander　I；　the　same　man　who
  according　to　them　was　the　chief　cause　of　the　liberal　movement　at　the
  commencement　of　his　reign；　being　the　savior　of　Russia。
  There　is　no　one　in　Russian　literature　now；　from　schoolboy　essayist
  to　learned　historian；　who　does　not　throw　his　little　stone　at　Alexander
  for　things　he　did　wrong　at　this　period　of　his　reign。
  〃He　ought　to　have　acted　in　this　way　and　in　that　way。　In　this　case　he
  did　well　and　in　that　case　badly。　He　behaved　admirably　at　the　beginning
  of　his　reign　and　during　1812；　but　acted　badly　by　giving　a　constitution
  to　Poland；　forming　the　Holy　Alliance；　entrusting　power　to　Arakcheev；
  favoring　Golitsyn　and　mysticism；　and　afterwards　Shishkov　and
  Photius。　He　also　acted　badly　by　concerning　himself　with　the　active
  army　and　disbanding　the　Semenov　regiment。〃
  It　would　take　a　dozen　pages　to　enumerate　all　the　reproaches　the
  historians　address　to　him；　based　on　their　knowledge　of　what　is　good
  for　humanity。
  What　do　these　reproaches　mean？
  Do　not　the　very　actions　for　which　the　historians　praise　Alexander
  I　（the　liberal　attempts　at　the　beginning　of　his　reign；　his　struggle
  with　Napoleon；　the　firmness　he　displayed　in　1812　and　the　campaign　of
  1813）　flow　from　the　same　sources…　the　circumstances　of　his　birth；
  education；　and　life…　that　made　his　personality　what　it　was　and　from
  which　the　actions　for　which　they　blame　him　（the　Holy　Alliance；　the
  restoration　of　Poland；　and　the　reaction　of　1820　and　later）　also
  flowed？
  In　what　does　the　substance　of　those　reproaches　lie？
  It　lies　in　the　fact　that　an　historic　character　like　Alexander　I；
  standing　on　the　highest　possible　pinnacle　of　human　power　with　the
  blinding　light　of　history　focused　upon　him；　a　character　exposed　to
  those　strongest　of　all　influences：　the　intrigues；　flattery；　and
  self…deception　inseparable　from　power；　a　character　who　at　every　moment
  of　his　life　felt　a　responsibility　for　all　that　was　happening　in
  Europe；　and　not　a　fictitious　but　a　live　character　who　like　every　man
  had　his　personal　habits；　passions；　and　impulses　toward　goodness；
  beauty；　and　truth…　that　this　character…　though　not　lacking　in　virtue
  （the　historians　do　not　accuse　him　of　that）…　had　not　the　same
  conception　of　the　welfare　of　humanity　fifty　years　ago　as　a　present…day
  professor　who　from　his　youth　upwards　has　been　occupied　with
  learning：　that　is；　with　books　and　lectures　and　with　taking　notes
  from　them。
  But　even　if　we　assume　that　fifty　years　ago　Alexander　I　was
  mistaken　in　his　view　of　what　was　good　for　the　people；　we　must
  inevitably　assume　that　the　historian　who　judges　Alexander　will　also
  after　the　lapse　of　some　time　turn　out　to　be　mistaken　in　his　view　of
  what　is　good　for　humanity。　This　assumption　is　all　the　more　natural　and
  inevitable　because；　watching　the　movement　of　history；　we　see　that
  every　year　and　with　each　new　writer；　opinion　as　to　what　is　good　for
  mankind　changes；　so　that　what　once　seemed　good；　ten　years　later
  seems　bad；　and　vice　versa。　And　what　is　more；　we　find　at　one　and　the
  same　time　quite　contradictory　views　as　to　what　is　bad　and　what　is　good
  in　history：　some　people　regard　giving　a　constitution　to　Poland　and
  forming　the　Holy　Alliance　as　praiseworthy　in　Alexander；　while　others
  regard　it　as　blameworthy。
  The　activity　of　Alexander　or　of　Napoleon　cannot　be　called　useful
  or　harmful；　for　it　is　impossible　to　say　for　what　it　was　useful　or
  harmful。　If　that　activity　displeases　somebody；　this　is　only　because　it
  does　not　agree　with　his　limited　understanding　of　what　is　good。　Whether
  the　preservation　of　my　father's　house　in　Moscow；　or　the　glory　of　the
  Russian　arms；　or　the　prosperity　of　the　Petersburg　and　other
  universities；　or　the　freedom　of　Poland　or　the　greatness　of　Russia；
  or　the　balance　of　power　in　Europe；　or　a　certain　kind　of　European
  culture　called　〃progress〃　appear　to　me　to　be　good　or　bad；　I　must　admit
  that　besides　these　things　the　action　of　every　historic　character　has
  other　more　general　purposes　inaccessible　to　me。
  But　let　us　assume　that　what　is　called　science　can　harmonize　all
  contradictions　and　possesses　an　unchanging　standard　of　good　and　bad　by
  which　to　try　historic　characters　and　events；　let　us　say　that　Alexander
  could　have　done　everything　differently；　let　us　say　that　with
  guidance　from　those　who　blame　him　and　who　profess　to　know　the　ultimate
  aim　of　the　movement　of　humanity；　he　might　have　arranged　matters
  according　to　the　program　his　present　accusers　would　have　given　him…　of
  nationality；　freedom；　equality；　and　progress　（these；　I　think；　cover
  the　ground）。　Let　us　assume　that　this　program　was　possible　and　had　then
  been　formulated；　and　that　Alexander　had　acted　on　it。　What　would　then
  have　become　of　the　activity　of　all　those　who　opposed　the　tendency　that
  then　prevailed　in　the　government…　an　activity　that　in　the　opinion　of
  the　historians　was　good　and　beneficent？　Their　activity　would　not
  have　existed：　there　would　have　been　no　life；　there　would　have　been
  nothing。
  If　we　admit　that　human　life　can　be　ruled　by　reason；　the
  possibility　of　life　is　destroyed。
  EP1｜CH2
  CHAPTER　II
  If　we　assume　as　the　historians　do　that　great　men　lead　humanity　to
  the　attainment　of　certain　ends…　the　greatness　of　Russia　or　of
  France；　the　balance　of　power　in　Europe；　the　diffusion　of　the　ideas
  of　the　Revolution　general　progress　or　anything　else…　then　it　is
  impossible　to　explain　the　facts　of　history　without　introducing　the
  conceptions　of　chance　and　genius。
  If　the　aim　of　the　European　wars　at　the　beginning　of　the　nineteenth
  century　had　been　the　aggrandizement　of　Russia；　that　aim　might　have
  been　accomplished　without　all　the　preceding　wars　and　without　the
  invasion。　If　the　aim　wag　the　aggrandizement　of　France；　that　might　have
  been　attained　without　the　Revolution　and　without　the　Empire。　If　the
  aim　was　the　dissemination　of　ideas；　the　printing　press　could　have
  accomplished　that　much　better　than　warfare。　If　the　aim　was　the
  progress　of　civilization；　it　is　easy　to　see　that　there　are　other
  ways　of　diffusing　civilization　more　expedient　than　by　the
  destruction　of　wealth　and　of　human　lives。
  Why　did　it　happen　in　this　and　not　in　some　other　way？
  Because　it　happened　so！　〃Chance　created　the　situation；　genius
  utilized　it；〃　says　history。
  But　what　is　chance？　What　is　genius？
  The　words　chance　and　genius　do　not　denote　any　really　existing
  thing　and　therefore　cannot　be　defined。　Those　words　only　denote　a
  certain　stage　of　understanding　of　phenomena。　I　do　not　know　why　a
  certain　event　occurs；　I　think　that　I　cannot　know　it；　so　I　do　not　try
  to　know　it　and　I　talk　about　chance。　I　see　a　force　producing　effects
  beyond　the　scope　of　ordinary　human　agencies；　I　do　not　understand　why
  this　occurs　and　I　talk　of　genius。
  To　a　herd　of　rams；　the　ram　the　herdsman　drives　each　evening　into　a
  special　enclosure　to　feed　and　that　becomes　twice　as　fat　as　the
  others　must　seem　to　be　a　genius。　And　it　must　appear　an　astonishing
  conjunction　of　genius　with　a　whole　series　of　extraordinary　chances
  that　this　ram；　who　instead　of　getting　into　the　general　fold　every
  evening　goes　into　a　special　enclosure　where　there　are　oats…　that
  this　very　ram；　swelling　with　fat；　is　killed　for　meat。
  But　the　rams　need　only　cease　to　suppose　that　all　that　happens　to
  them　happens　solely　for