moral　and　religious　aspect；　but　it　also　holds　good　in　reference　to　performances　in　art　and　science。
  The　keen　eye　of　a　teacher　who　perceives　in　his　pupil　decided　evidences　of　talent；　may　lead　him　to
  state　his　opinion　that　a　Raphael　of　a　Mozart　lies　hidden　in　the　boy：　and　the　result　will　show　how　far
  such　an　opinion　was　well…founded。　But　if　a　daub　of　a　painter；　or　a　poetaster；　soothe　themselves　by
  the　conceit　that　their　head　is　full　of　high　ideas；　their　consolation　is　a　poor　one；　and　if　they　insist　on
  being　judged　not　by　their　actual　works　but　by　their　projects；　we　may　safely　reject　their　pretensions
  as　unfounded　and　unmeaning。　The　converse　case　however　also　occurs。　In　passing　judgment　on
  men　who　have　accomplished　something　great　and　good；　we　often　make　use　of　the　false　distinction
  between　inward　and　outward。　All　that　they　have　accomplished；　we　say；　is　outward　merely；
  inwardly　they　were　acting　from　some　very　different　motive；　such　as　a　desire　to　gratify　their　vanity
  or　other　unworthy　passion。　This　is　the　spirit　of　envy。　Incapable　of　any　great　action　of　its　own；　envy
  tries　hard　to　depreciate　greatness　and　to　bring　it　down　to　its　own　level。　Let　us；　rather；　recall　the
  fine　expression　of　Goethe；　that　there　is　no　remedy　but　Love　against　great　superiorities　of　others。
  We　may　seek　to　rob　men's　great　actions　of　their　grandeur；　by　the　insinuation　of　hypocrisy；　but；
  though　it　is　possible　that　men　in　an　instance　now　and　then　may　dissemble　and　disguise　a　good　deal；
  they　cannot　conceal　the　whole　of　their　inner　self；　which　infallibly　betrays　itself　in　the　decursus
  vitae。　Even　here　it　is　true　that　a　man　is　nothing　but　the　series　of　his　actions。
  What　is　called　the　'pragmatic'　writing　of　history　has　in　modern　times　frequently　sinned　in　its
  treatment　of　great　historical　characters；　and　defaced　and　tarnished　the　true　conception　of　them　by
  this　fallacious　separation　of　the　outward　and　the　inward。　Not　content　with　telling　the　unvarnished
  tale　of　the　great　acts　which　have　been　wrought　by　the　heroes　of　the　world's　history；　and　wit
  acknowledging　that　their　inward　being　corresponds　with　the　import　of　their　acts；　the　pragmatic
  historian　fancies　himself　justified　and　even　obliged　to　trace　the　supposed　secret　motives　that　lie
  behind　the　open　facts　of　the　record。　The　historian；　in　that　case；　is　supposed　to　write　with　more
  depth　in　proportion　as　he　succeeds　in　tearing　away　the　aureole　from　all　that　has　been　heretofore
  held　grand　and　glorious；　and　in　depressing　it；　so　far　as　its　origin　and　proper　significance　are
  concerned；　to　the　level　of　vulgar　mediocrity。　To　make　these　pragmatic　researches　in　history　easier；
  it　is　usual　to　recommend　the　study　of　psychology；　which　is　supposed　to　make　us　acquainted　with
  the　real　motives　of　human　actions。　The　psychology　in　question　however；　is　only　that　petty
  knowledge　of　men；　which　looks　away　from　the　essential　and　permanent　in　human　nature　to　fasten
  its　glance　on　the　casual　and　private　features　shown　in　isolated　instincts　and　passions。　A　pragmatic
  psychology　ought　at　leat　to　leave　the　historian；　who　investigates　the　motives　at　the　ground　of　great
  actions；　a　choice　between　the　'substantial'　interests　of　patriotism；　justice；　religious　truth；　and　the
  like；　on　the　one　hand；　and　the　subjective　and　'formal'　interests　of　vanity；　ambition；　avarice；　and　the
  like；　on　the　other。　The　latter；　however；　are　the　motives　which　must　be　viewed　by　the　pragmatist　as
  really　efficient；　otherwise　the　assumption　of　a　contrast　between　inward　（the　disposition　of　the
  agent）　and　the　outward　（the　import　of　he　action）　would　fall　to　the　ground。　But　inward　and　outward
  have　in　truth　the　same　content；　and　the　right　doctrine　is　the　very　reverse　of　this　pedantic　judiciality。
  If　the　heroes　of　history　had　been　actuated　by　subjective　and　formal　interests　alone；　they　would
  never　have　accomplished　what　they　have。　And　if　we　have　due　regard　to　the　unity　between　the
  inner　and　the　outer；　we　must　own　that　great　men　willed　what　they　did；　and　did　what　they　willed。
  §141
  The　empty　abstractions；　by　means　of　which　the　one　identical　content　perforce
  continues　in　the　two　correlatives；　suspend　themselves　in　the　immediate　transition；
  the　one　into　the　other。　The　content　is　itself　nothing　but　their　identity　（§138）：　and
  these　abstractions　are　the　seeming　of　essence；　put　as　seeming。　By　the
  manifestation　of　force　the　inward　is　put　into　existence：　but　this　putting　is　the
  mediation　by　empty　abstractions。　In　its　own　self　the　intermediating　process
  vanishes　to　the　immediacy；　in　which　the　inward　and　the　outward　are　absolutely
  identical　and　their　difference　is　distinctly　no　more　than　assumed　and　imposed。
  This　identity　is　Actuality。
  ESSENCE：　Second　Subdivision　of　The　Logic；
  C。　ACTUALITY
  Substantiality　…　Causality　…　Reciprocity
  §　142
  Actuality　is　the　unity；　become　immediate；　of　essence　with　existence；　or　of　inward
  with　outward。　The　utterance　of　the　actual　is　the　actual　itself：　so　that　in　this
  utterance　it　remains　just　as　essential；　and　only　is　essential；　in　so　far　as　it　is
  immediate　external　existence。
  We　have　ere　this　met　Being　and　Existence　as　forms　of　the　immediate。　Being　is；　in
  general；　unreflected　immediacy　and　transition　into　another。　Existence　is　immediate
  unity　of　being　and　reflection：　hence　appearance：　it　comes　from　the　ground；　and
  falls　to　the　ground。
  In　actuality　this　unity　is　explicitly　put；　and　the　two　sides　of　the　relation　identified。
  Hence　the　actual　is　exempted　from　transition；　and　its　externality　is　its　energising。
  In　that　energising　it　is　reflected　into　itself：　its　existence　is　only　the　manifestation　of
  itself；　not　of　another。
  §　142n
  Exists　but　not　Real
  Actuality　and　thought　（or　Idea）　are　often　absurdly　opposed。　How　commonly　we　hear　people
  saying　that；　though　no　objection　can　be　urged　against　the　truth　and　correctness　of　a　certain
  thought；　there　is　nothing　of　the　kind　to　be　seen　in　reality；　or　it　cannot　be　actually　carried　out！
  People　who　use　such　language　only　prove　that　they　have　not　properly　apprehended　the　nature
  either　of　thought　or　of　actuality。　Thought　in　such　a　case　is；　one　the　one　hand；　the　synonym　for　a
  subjective　conception；　plan；　intention；　or　the　like；　just　as　actuality；　on　the　other；　is　made
  synonymous　with　external　and　sensible　existence。　This　is　all　very　well　in　common　life；　where　great
  laxity　is　allowed　in　the　categories　and　the　names　given　to　them；　and　it　may　of　course　happen　that；
  e。g。；　the　plan；　or　so…called　idea；　say；　of　a　certain　method　of　taxation　；　is　good　and　advisable　in　the
  abstract；　but　that　nothing　of　the　sort　is　found　in　so…called　actuality；　or　could　possibly　be　carried　out
  under　the　given　conditions。　But　when　the　abstract　understanding　gets　hold　of　these　categories　and
  exaggerates　the　distinction　they　imply　into　a　hard　and　fast　line　of　contrast；　when　it　tells　us　that　in
  this　actual　world　we　must　knock　ideas　out　of　our　heads；　it　is　necessary　energetically　to　protest
  against　these　doctrines；　alike　in　the　name　of　science　and　of　sound　reason。　For　on　the　one　hand
  Ideas　are　not　confined　to　our　heads　merely；　nor　is　the　Idea；　on　the　whole；　so　feeble　as　to　leave　the
  question　of　its　actualisation　or　non…actualisation　dependent　on　our　will。　The　Idea　is　rather　the
  absolutely　active　as　well　as　actual。
  ？
  The　Actual　is　Real
  And　on　the　other　hand　actuality　is　not　so　bad　and　irrational；　as　purblind　or　wrong…headed　and
  muddle…brained　would…be　reformers　imagine。　So　far　is　actuality；　as　distinguished　from　mere
  appearance；　and　primarily　presenting　a　unity　of　inward　and　outward；　from　being　in　contrariety　with
  reason；　that　it　is　rather　thoroughly　reasonable；　and　everything　which　is　not　reasonable　must　on　that
  very　ground　cease　to　be　held　actual。　The　same　view　may　be　traced　in　the　usages　of　educated
  speech；　which　declines　to　give　the　name　of　real　poet　or　real　statesman　to　a　poet　or　a　statesman
  who　can　do　nothing　really　meritorious　or　reasonable。　Aristotle　to　that　of　Plato。　Popular　opinion
  makes　the　difference　to　be　as　follows。　While　Plato　recognises　the　idea　and　only　the　idea　as　the
  truth；　Aristotle；　rejecting　the　idea；　keeps　to　what　is　actual；　and　is　on　that　account　to　be　considered
  the　founder　and　chief　of　empiricism。　On　this　it　may　be　remarked：　that　it　is　not　the　vulgar　actuality　of
  what　is　immediately　at　hand；　but　the　idea　as　actuality。　Where　then　lies　the　controversy　of　Aristotle
  against　Plato？　It　lies　in　this：　Aristotle　calls　the　Platonic　idea　a　mere　dynamis；　and　establishes　in
  opposition　to　Plato　that　the　idea；　which　both　equally　recognise　to　be　the　only　truth；　is　essentially　to
  be　viewed　as　an　energeia；　in　other　words；　as　the　inward　which　is　quite　to　the　fore；　or　as　unity　of
  inner　and　outer；　or　as　actuality；　in　the　emphatic　sense　here　given　to　the　word。
  §　143
  Actuality　is　concrete
  Such　a　concrete　category　as　Actuality　includes　the　characteristics　aforesaid　and
  their　difference；　and　is　therefore　also　the　development　of　them；　in　such　a　way
  t