第 27 节
作者:桃桃逃      更新:2022-08-21 16:33      字数:9319
  here。 The things of nature are limited and are natural things only to such extent as
  they are not aware of their universal limit; or to such extent as their mode or
  quality is a limit from our point of view; and not from their own。 No one knows;
  or even feels; that anything is a limit or defect; until he is at the same time above
  and beyond it。 Living beings; for example; possess the privilege of pain which is
  denied to the inanimate: even with living beings; a single mode or quality passes
  into the feeling of a negative。 For living beings as such possess within them a
  universal vitality; which overpasses and includes the single mode; and thus; as
  they maintain themselves in the negative of themselves; they feel the
  contradiction to exist within them。 But the contradiction is within them only in so
  far as one and the same subject includes both the universality of their sense of
  life; and the individual mode which is in negation with it。 This illustration will
  show how a limit or imperfection in knowledge comes to be termed a limit or
  imperfection; only when it is compared with the actually present Idea of the
  universal; of a total and perfect。 A very little consideration might show that to call
  a thing finite or limited proves by implication the very presence of the infinite and
  unlimited; and that our knowledge of a limit can only be when the unlimited is on
  this side in consciousness。
  The result however of Kant's view of cognition suggests a second remark。 The
  philosophy of Kant could have no influence on the method of the sciences。 It
  leaves the categories and method of ordinary knowledge quite unmolested。
  Occasionally; it may be; in the first sections of a scientific work of that period; we
  find propositions borrowed from the Kantian philosophy; but the course of the
  treatise renders it apparent that these propositions were superfluous decoration;
  and that the few first pages might have been omitted without producing the least
  change in the empirical contents。
  We may next institute a comparison of Kant with the metaphysics of the
  empirical school。 Natural plain Empiricism; though it unquestionably insists most
  upon sensuous perception; still allows a supersensible world or spiritual reality;
  whatever may be its structure and constitution; and whether derived from
  intellect; or from imagination; etc。 So far as form goes; the facts of this
  supersensible world rest on the authority of mind; in the same way as the other
  facts embraced in empirical knowledge rest on the authority of external
  perception。 But when Empiricism becomes reflective and logically consistent; it
  turns its arms against this dualism in the ultimate and highest species of fact; it
  denies the independence of the thinking principle and of a spiritual world which
  develops itself in thought。 Materialism or Naturalism; therefore; is the consistent
  and thoroughgoing system of Empiricism。 In direct opposition to such an
  Empiricism; Kant asserts the principle of thought and freedom; and attaches
  himself to the first mentioned form of empirical doctrine; the general principles of
  which he never departed from。 There is a dualism in his philosophy also。 On one
  side stands the world of sensation; and of the understanding which reflects upon
  it。 This world; it is true; he alleges to be a world of appearances。 But that is only a
  title or formal description; for the source; the facts; and the modes of observation
  continue quite the same as in Empiricism。 On the other side and independent
  stands a self…apprehending thought; the principle of freedom; which Kant has in
  common with ordinary and bygone metaphysic; but emptied of all that it held;
  and without his being able to infuse into it anything new。 For; in the Critical
  doctrine; thought; or; as it is there called; Reason; is divested of every specific
  form; and thus bereft of all authority。 The main effect of the Kantian philosophy
  has been to revive the consciousness of Reason; or the absolute inwardness of
  thought。 Its abstractness indeed prevented that inwardness from developing into
  anything; or from originating any special forms; whether cognitive principles or
  moral laws; but nevertheless it absolutely refused to accept or indulge anything
  possessing the character of an externality。 Henceforth the principle of the
  independence of Reason; or of its absolute self…subsistence; is made a general
  principle of philosophy; as well as a foregone conclusion of the time。
  §60n
  (1) The Critical philosophy has one great negative merit。 It has brought home the conviction that
  the categories of understanding are finite in their range; and that any cognitive process confined
  within their pale falls short of the truth。 But Kant had only a sight of half the truth。 He explained the
  finite nature of the categories to mean that they were subjective only; valid only for our thought;
  from which the thing…in…itself was divided by an impassable gulf。 In fact; however; it is not because
  they are subjective that the categories are finite: they are finite by their very nature; and it is on their
  own selves that it is requisite to exhibit their finitude。 Kant however holds that what we think is
  false; because it is we who think it。 A further deficiency in the system is that it gives only a
  historical description of thought; and a mere enumeration of the factors of consciousness。 The
  enumeration is in the main correct: but not a word touches upon the necessity of what is thus
  empirically colligated。 The observations made on the various stages of consciousness culminant in
  the summary statement that the content of all we are acquainted with is only an appearance。 And
  as it is true at least that all finite thinking is concerned with appearances; so far the conclusion is
  justified。 This stage of 'appearance' however … the phenomenal world … is not the terminus of
  thought: there is another and a higher region。 But that region was to the Kantian philosophy an
  inaccessible 'other world'。
  (2) After all it was only formally that the Kantian system established the principle that thought is
  spontaneous and self…determining。 Into details of the manner and the extent of this
  self…determination of thought; Kant never went。 It was Fichte who first noticed the omission; and
  who; after he had called attention to the want of a deduction for the categories; endeavoured really
  to supply something of the kind。 With Fichte; the 'Ego' is the starting…point in the philosophical
  development: and the outcome of its action is supposed to be visible in the categories。 But in
  Fichte the 'Ego' is not really presented as a free; spontaneous energy; it is supposed to receive its
  first excitation by a shock or impulse from without。 Against this shock the 'Ego' will; it is assumed;
  react; and only through this reaction does it first become conscious of itself。 Meanwhile; the nature
  of the impulse remains a stranger beyond our pale: and the 'Ego'; with something else always
  confronting it; is weighted with a condition。 Fichte; in consequence; never advanced beyond
  Kant's conclusion; that the finite only is knowable; while the infinite transcends the range of
  thought。 What Kant calls the thing…by…itself; Fichte calls the impulse from without … that abstraction
  of something else than 'I'; not otherwise describable or definable than as the negative or non…Ego
  in general。 The 'I' is thus looked at as standing in essential relation with the not…I; through which its
  act of self…determination is first awakened。 And in this manner the 'I' is but the continuous act of
  self…liberation from this impulse; never gaining a real freedom; because with the surcease of the
  impulse the 'I'; whose being is its action; would also cease to be。 Nor is the content produced by
  the action of the ' I' at all different from the ordinary content of experience; except by the
  supplementary remark; that this content is mere appearance。
  III。 Third Attitude of Thought to Objectivity
  IMMEDIATE OR INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
  § 61
  If we are to believe the Critical philosophy; thought is subjective; and its ultimate
  and invincible mode is abstract universality or formal identity。 Thought is thus
  set in opposition to Truth; which is no abstraction; but concrete universality。 In
  this highest mode of thought; which is entitled Reason; the Categories are left out
  of account。 The extreme theory on the opposite side holds thought to be an act of
  the particular only; and on that ground declares it incapable of apprehending the
  Truth。 This is the Intuitional theory。
  §62
  According to this theory; thinking; a private and particular operation; has its whole
  scope and product in the Categories。 But these Categories; as arrested by the
  understanding; are limited vehicles of thought; forms of the conditioned; of the
  dependent and derivative。 A thought limited to these modes has no sense of the
  Infinite and the True; and cannot bridge over the gulf that separates it from them。
  (This stricture refers to the proofs of God's existence。) These inadequate modes
  or categories are also spoken of