。。。　The　organic　structures；　and　the　evidence　they　afford　of　mutual　adaptation；
  belong　to　a　higher　province；　the　province　of　animated　nature。　But　even　without
  taking　into　consideration　the　possible　blemish　which　the　study　of　animated　nature
  and　of　the　other　teleological　aspects　of　existing　things　may　contract　from　the
  pettiness　of　the　final　causes；　and　from　puerile　instances　of　them　and　their
  bearings；　merely　animated　nature　is；　at　the　best；　incapable　of　supplying　the
  material　for　a　truthful　expression　to　the　idea　to　God。　God　is　more　than　life：　he　is
  Spirit。　And　therefore　if　the　thought　of　the　Absolute　takes　a　starting…point　for　its
  rise；　and　desires　to　take　the　nearest；　the　most　true　and　adequate　starting…point　will
  be　found　in　the　nature　of　spirit　alone。
  §　51
  The　other　way　of　unification　by　which　to　realise　the　Ideal　of　Reason　is　to　set　out
  from　the　abstractum　of　Thought　and　seek　to　characterise　it：　for　which　purpose
  Being　is　the　only　available　term。　This　is　the　method　of　the　Ontological　proof。　The
  opposition；　here　presented　from　a　merely　subjective　point　of　view；　lies　between
  Thought　and　Being；　whereas　in　the　first　way　of　junction；　being　is　common　to　the
  two　sides　of　the　antithesis；　and　the　contrast　lies　only　between　its　individualisation
  and　universality。　Understanding　meets　this　second　way　with　what　is　implicitly　the
  same　objection　as　it　made　to　the　first。　It　denied　that　the　empirical　involves　the
  universal；　so　it　denies　that　the　universal　involves　the　specialisation；　which
  specialisation　in　this　instance　is　being。　In　other　words　it　says：　Being　cannot　be
  deduced　from　the　notion　by　any　analysis。
  The　uniformly　favourable　reception　and　acceptance　which　attended　Kant's
  criticism　of　the　Ontological　proof　was　undoubtedly　due　to　the　illustration　which　he
  made　use　of。　To　explain　the　difference　between　thought　and　being；　he　took　the
  instance　of　a　hundred　sovereigns；　which；　for　anything　it　matters　to　the　notion；　are
  the　same　hundred　whether　they　are　real　or　only　possible；　though　the　difference　of
  the　two　cases　is　very　perceptible　in　their　effect　on　a　man's　purse。　Nothing　can　be
  more　obvious　than　that　anything　we　only　think　or　conceive　is　not　on　that　account
  actual；　that　mental　representation；　and　even　notional　comprehension；　always　falls
  short　of　being。　Still　it　may　not　unfairly　be　styled　a　barbarism　in　language；　when
  the　name　of　notion　is　given　to　things　like　a　hundred　sovereigns。　And；　putting　that
  mistake　aside；　those　who　perpetually　urge　against　the　philosophic　Idea　the
  difference　between　Being　and　Thought　might　have　admitted　that　philosophers
  were　not　wholly　ignorant　of　the　fact。　Can　there　be　any　proposition　more　trite　than
  this　？　But　after　all；　it　is　well　to　remember；　when　we　speak　of　God；　that　we　have
  an　object　of　another　kind　than　any　hundred　sovereigns；　and　unlike　any　one
  particular　notion；　representation；　or　however　else　it　may　be　styled。　It　is　in　fact　this
  and　this　alone　which　marks　everything　finite：　its　being　in　time　and　space　is
  discrepant　from　its　notion。　God；　on　the　contrary；　expressly　has　to　be　what　can
  only　be　'thought　as　existing'；　his　notion　involves　being。　It　is　this　unity　of　the　notion
  and　being　that　constitutes　the　notion　of　God。
  If　this　were　all；　we　should　have　only　a　formal　expression　of　the　divine　nature
  which　would　not　really　go　beyond　a　statement　of　the　nature　of　the　notion　itself。
  And　that　the　notion；　in　its　most　abstract　terms；　involves　being　is　plain。　For　the
  notion；　whatever　other　determination　it　may　receive；　is　at　least　reference　back　on
  itself；　which　results　by　abolishing　the　intermediation；　and　thus　is　immediate。　And
  what　is　that　reference　to　self；　but　being？　Certainly　it　would　be　strange　if　the
  notion；　the　very　inmost　of　mind；　if　even　the　'Ego'；　or　above　all　the　concrete
  totality　we　call　God；　were　not　rich　enough　to　include　so　poor　a　category　as　being；
  the　very　poorest　and　most　abstract　of　all。　For；　if　we　look　at　the　thought　it　holds；
  nothing　can　be　more　insignificant　than　being。　And　yet　there　may　be　something　still
  more　insignificant　than　being　that　which　at　first　sight　is　perhaps　supposed　to　be；
  an　external　and　sensible　existence；　like　that　of　the　paper　lying　before　me。
  However；　in　this　matter；　nobody　proposes　to　speak　of　the　sensible　existence　of　a
  limited　and　perishable　thing。　Besides；　the　petty　stricture　of　the　Kritik　that　'thought
  and　being　are　different'　can　at　most　molest　the　path　of　the　human　mind　from　the
  thought　of　God　to　the　certainty　that　he　is：　it　cannot　take　it　away。　It　is　this　process
  of　transition；　depending　on　the　absolute　inseparability　of　the　thought　of　God　from
  his　being；　for　which　its　proper　authority　has　been　revindicated　in　the　theory　of
  faith　or　immediate　knowledge　—　whereof　hereafter。
  §　52
  In　this　way　thought；　at　its　highest　pitch；　has　to　go　outside　for　any
  determinateness；　and　although　it　is　continually　termed　Reason；　is　out…and…out
  abstract　thinking。　And　the　result　of　all　is　that　Reason　supplies　nothing　beyond　the
  formal　unity　required　to　simplify　and　systematise　experiences；　it　is　a　canon；　not
  an　organon；　of　truth；　and　can　furnish　only　a　criticism　of　knowledge；　not　a
  doctrine　of　the　infinite。　In　its　final　analysis　this　criticism　is　summed　up　in　the
  assertion　that　in　strictness　thought　is　only　the　indeterminate　unity　and　the　action
  of　this　indeterminate　unity。
  §52n
  Kant　undoubtedly　held　reason　to　be　the　faculty　of　the　unconditioned　but　if　reason　be　reduced　to
  abstract　identity　only；　it　by　implication　renounces　its　unconditionality　and　is　in　reality　no　better　than
  empty　understanding。　For　reason　is　unconditioned　only　in　so　far　as　its　character　and　quality　are　not
  due　to　an　extraneous　and　foreign　content；　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　self…characterising；　and　thus；　in
  point　of　content；　is　its　own　master。　Kant；　however；　expressly　explains　that　the　action　of　reason
  consists　solely　in　applying　the　categories　to　systematise　the　matter　given　by　perception；　i。e。　to
  place　it　in　an　outside　order；　under　the　guidance　of　the　principle　of　non…contradiction。
  §　53
  （b）　The　Practical　Reason　is　understood　by　Kant　to　mean　a　thinking　Will；　i。e。　a
  Will　that　determines　itself　on　universal　principles。　Its　office　is　to　give　objective；
  imperative　laws　of　freedom　laws；　that　is；　which　state　what　ought　to　happen。　The
  warrant　for　thus　assuming　thought　to　be　an　activity　which　makes　itself　felt
  objectively；　that　is；　to　be　really　a　Reason；　is　the　alleged　possibility　of　proving
  practical　freedom　by　experience；　that　is；　of　showing　it　in　the　phenomenon　of
  selfconsciousness。　This　experience　in　consciousness　is　at　once　met　by　all　that　the
  Necessitarian　produces　from　contrary　experience；　particularly　by　the　sceptical
  induction　（employed　among　others　by　Hume）　from　the　endless　diversity　of　what
  men　regard　as　right　and　duty　i。e。　from　the　diversity　apparent　in　those　professedly
  objective　laws　of　freedom。
  §　54
  What；　then；　is　to　serve　as　the　law　which　the　Practical　Reason　embraces　and
  obeys；　and　as　the　criterion　in　its　act　of　selfdetermination？　There　is　no　rule　at　hand
  but　the　same　abstract　identity　of　understanding　as　before：　there　must　be　no
  contradiction　in　the　act　of　self…　determination。　Hence　the　Practical　Reason　never
  shakes　off　the　formalism　which　is　represented　as　the　climax　of　the　Theoretical
  Reason。
  But　this　Practical　Reason　does　not　confine　the　universal　principle　of　the　Good　to
  its　own　inward　regulation：　it　first　becomes　practical；　in　the　true　sense　of　the
  word；　when　it　insists　on　the　Good　being　manifested　in　the　world　with　an　outward
  objectivity；　and　requires　that　the　thought　shall　be　objective　throughout；　and　not
  merely　subjective。　We　shall　speak　of　this　postulate　of　the　Practical　Reason
  afterwards。
  §54n
  The　free　self…determination　which　Kant　denied　to　the　speculative；　he　has　expressly　vindicated　for
  the　practical　reason。　To　many　minds　this　particular　aspect　of　the　Kantian　philosophy　made　it
  welcome；　and　that　for　good　reasons。　To　estimate　rightly　what　we　owe　to　Kant　in　the　matter；　we
  ought　to　set　before　our　minds　the　form　of　practical　philosophy　and　in　particular　of　'moral
  philosophy'　which　prevailed　in　his　time。　It　may　be　generally　described　as　a　system　of
  Eudaemonism；　which；　when　asked　what　man's　chief　end　ought　to　be；　replied　Happiness。　And　by
  happiness　Eudaemonism　understood　the　satisfaction　of　the　private　appetites；　wishes；　and　wants　of
  the　man：　thus　raising　the　contingent　and　particular　into　a　principle　for　the　will　and　its　actualisation。
  To　this　Eudaemonism；　which　was　destitute　of　stability　and　consistency；　and　which　left　the　'door
  and　gate'　wide　open　for　every　whim　and　caprice；　Kant　opposed　the　practical　reason；　and　thus
  emphasised　the　need　for　a　principle　of　will　which　should　be　universal　and　lay　the　same　obligation
  on　all。　The　theoretical　reason；　as　has　been　made　evident　in　the　preceding　paragraphs；　is　identified
  by　Kant　with　the　negative　faculty　of　the　infinite；　and　as　it　has　no　positive　content　of　its　own；　it　is
  restricted