；　one…fourth；　makes　3；245　to　be　added　to　the　killed　and　wounded　given　above；　making　an　aggregate　loss　in　Johnston's　army；　from　Dalton　to　New　Hope；　inclusive；　of　8；638；　against　ours　of　9；299。
  Therefore　General　Johnston　is　greatly　in　error；　in　his　estimates　on　page　357；　in　stating　our　loss；　as　compared　with　his；　at　six　or　ten　to　one。
  I　always　estimated　my　force　at　about　double　his；　and　could　afford　to　lose　two　to　one　without　disturbing　our　relative　proportion；　but　I　also　reckoned　that；　in　the　natural　strength　of　the　country；　in　the　abundance　of　mountains；　streams；　and　forests；　he　had　a　fair　offset　to　our　numerical　superiority；　and　therefore　endeavored　to　act　with　reasonable　caution　while　moving　on　the　vigorous　〃offensive。〃
  With　the　drawn　battle　of　New　Hope　Church；　and　our　occupation　of　the　natural　fortress　of　Allatoona；　terminated　the　month　of　May；　and　the　first　stage　of　the　campaign。
  CHAPTER　XVII。
  ATLANTA　CAMPAIGNBATTLES　ABOUT　KENESAW　MOUNTAIN。
  JUNE；　1864。
  On　the　lst　of　June　our　three　armies　were　well　in　hand；　in　the　broken　and　densely…wooded　country　fronting　the　enemy　intrenched　at　New　Hope　Church；　about　five　miles　north　of　Dallas。　　General　Stoneman's　division　of　cavalry　had　occupied　Allatoona；　on　the　railroad；　and　General　Garrard's　division　was　at　the　western　end　of　the　pass；　about　Stilesboro。　　Colonel　W。　W。　Wright；　of　the　Engineers；　was　busily　employed　in　repairing　the　railroad　and　rebuilding　the　bridge　across　the　Etowah　（or　High　tower）　River；　which　had　been　destroyed　by　the　enemy　on　his　retreat；　and　the　armies　were　engaged　in　a　general　and　constant　skirmish　along　a　front　of　about　six　milesMcPherson　the　right；　Thomas　the　centre；　and　Schofield　on　the　left。　　By　gradually　covering　our　front　with　parapet；　and　extending　to　the　left；　we　approached　the　railroad　toward　Acworth　and　overlapped　the　enemy's　right。　　By　the　4th　of　June　we　had　made　such　progress　that　Johnston　evacuated　his　lines　in　the　night；　leaving　us　masters　of　the　situation；　when　I　deliberately　shifted　McPherson's　army　to　the　extreme　left；　at　and　in　front　of　Acworth；　with　Thomas's　about　two　miles　on　his　right；　and　Schofield's　on　his　right　all　facing　eaSt。　Heavy　rains　set　in　about　the　lst　of　June；　making　the　roads　infamous；　but　our　marches　were　short；　as　we　needed　time　for　the　repair　of　the　railroad；　so　as　to　bring　supplies　forward　to　Allatoona　Station。　　On　the　6th　I　rode　back　to　Allatoona；　seven　miles；　found　it　all　that　was　expected；　and　gave　orders　for　its　fortification　and　preparation　as　a　〃secondary　base。〃
  General　Blair　arrived　at　Acworth　on　the　8th　with　his　two　divisions　of　the　Seventeenth　Corpsthe　same　which　had　been　on　veteran　furloughhad　come　up　from　Cairo　by　way　of　Clifton；　on　the　Tennessee　River；　and　had　followed　our　general　route　to　Allatoona；　where　he　had　left　a　garrison　of　about　fifteen　hundred　men。　　His　effective　strength；　as　reported；　was　nine　thousand。　　These；　with　new　regiments　and　furloughed　men　who　had　joined　early　in　the　month　of　May；　equaled　our　losses　from　battle；　sickness；　and　by　detachments；　so　that　the　three　armies　still　aggregated　about　one　hundred　thousand　effective　men。
  On　the　10th　of　June　the　whole　combined　army　moved　forward　six　miles；　to　〃Big　Shanty；〃　a　station　on　the　railroad；　whence　we　had　a　good　view　of　the　enemy's　position；　which　embraced　three　prominent　hills　known　as　Kenesaw；　Pine　Mountain；　and　Lost　Mountain。　　On　each　of　these　hills　the　enemy　had　signal…stations　and　fresh　lines　of　parapets。　　Heavy　masses　of　infantry　could　be　distinctly　seen　with　the　naked　eye；　and　it　was　manifest　that　Johnston　had　chosen　his　ground　well；　and　with　deliberation　had　prepared　for　battle；　but　his　line　was　at　least　ten　miles　in　extenttoo　long；　in　my　judgment；　to　be　held　successfully　by　his　force；　then　estimated　at　sixty　thousand。　　As　his　position；　however；　gave　him　a　perfect　view　over　our　field；　we　had　to　proceed　with　due　caution。　　McPherson　had　the　left；　following　the　railroad；　which　curved　around　the　north　base　of　Kenesaw；　Thomas　the　centre；　obliqued　to　the　right；　deploying　below　Kenesaw　and　facing　Pine　Hill；　and　Schofield；　somewhat　refused；　was　on　the　general　right；　looking　south；　toward　Lost　Mountain。
  On　the　11th　the　Etowah　bridge　was　done；　the　railroad　was　repaired　up　to　our　very　skirmish　line；　close　to　the　base　of　Kenesaw；　and　a　loaded　train　of　cars　came　to　Big　Shanty。　　The　locomotive；　detached；　was　run　forward　to　a　water…tank　within　the　range　of　the　enemy's　gone　on　Kenesaw；　whence　the　enemy　opened　fire　on　the　locomotive；　but　the　engineer　was　not　afraid；　went　on　to　the　tank；　got　water；　and　returned　safely　to　his　train；　answering　the　guns　with　the　screams　of　his　engine；　heightened　by　the　cheers　and　shouts　of　our　men。
  The　rains　continued　to　poor；　and　made　our　developments　slow　and　dilatory；　for　there　were　no　roads；　and　these　had　to　be　improvised　by　each　division　for　its　own　supply　train　from　the　depot　in　Big　Shanty　to　the　camps。　　Meantime　each　army　was　deploying　carefully　before　the　enemy；　intrenching　every　camp；　ready　as　against　a　sally。　The　enemy's　cavalry　was　also　busy　in　our　rear；　compelling　us　to　detach　cavalry　all　the　way　　back　as　far　as　Resaca；　and　to　strengthen　all　the　infantry　posts　　as　far　as　Nashville。　　Besides；　there　was　great　danger；　always　in　my　mind；　that　Forrest　would　collect　a　heavy　cavalry　command　in　Mississippi；　cross　the　Tennessee　River；　and　break　up　our　railroad　below　Nashville。　　In　anticipation　of　this　very　danger；　I　had　sent　General　Sturgis　to　Memphis　to　take　command　of　all　the　cavalry　in　that　quarter；　to　go　out　toward　Pontotoc；　engage　Forrest　and　defeat　him；　but　on　the　14th　of　June　I　learned　that　General　Sturgis　had　himself　been　defeated　on　the　10th　of　June；　and　had　been　driven　by　Forrest　back　into　Memphis　in　considerable　confusion。　　I　expected　that　this　would　soon　be　followed　by　a　general　raid　on　all　our　roads　in　Tennessee。　　General　G。　J。　Smith；　with　the　two　divisions　of　the　Sixteenth　and　Seventeenth　Corps　which　had　been　with　General　Banks　up　Red　River；　had　returned　from　that　ill…fated　expedition；　and　had　been　ordered　to　General　Canby　at　New　Orleans；　who　was　making　a　diversion　about　Mobile；　but；　on　hearing　of　General　Sturgis's　defeat；　I　ordered　General　Smith　to　go　out　from　Memphis　and　renew　the　offensive；　so　as　to　keep　Forrest　off　our　roads。　　This　he　did　finally；　defeating　Forrest　at　Tupelo；　on　the　13th；　14th；　and　15th　　days　of　July；　and　he　so　stirred　up　matters　in　North　Mississippi　that　Forrest　could　not　leave　for　Tennessee。　　This；　for　a　time；　left　me　only　the　task　of　covering　the　roads　against　such　minor　detachments　of　cavalry　as　Johnston　could　spare　from　his　immediate　army；　and　I　proposed　to　keep　these　too　busy　in　their　own　defense　to　spare　detachments。　　By　the　14th　the　rain　slackened；　and　we　occupied　a　continuous　line　of　ten　miles；　intrenched；　conforming　to　the　irregular　position　of　the　enemy；　when　I　reconnoitred；　with　a　view　to　make　a　break　in　their　line　between　Kenesaw　and　Pine　Mountain。　　When　abreast　of　Pine　Mountain　I　noticed　a　rebel　battery　on　its　crest；　with　a　continuous　line　of　fresh　rifle…trench　about　half…way　down　the　hill。　　Our　skirmishers　were　at　the　time　engaged　in　the　woods　about　the　base　of　this　hill　between　the　lines；　and　I　estimated　the　distance　to　the　battery　on　the　crest　at　about　eight　hundred　yards。　　Near　it；　in　plain　view；　stood　a　group　of　the　enemy；　evidently　observing　us　with　glasses。　　General　Howard；　commanding　the　Fourth　Corps；　was　near　by；　and　I　called　his　attention　to　this　group；　and　ordered　him　to　compel　it　to　keep　behind　its　cover。　　He　replied　that　his　orders　from　General　Thomas　were　to　spare　artillery…ammunition。　　This　was　right；　according　to　the　general　policy；　but　I　explained　to　him　that　we　must　keep　up　the　morale　of　a　bold　offensive；　that　he　must　use　his　artillery；　force　the　enemy　to　remain　on　the　timid　defensive；　and　ordered　him　to　cause　a　battery　close　by　to　fire　three　volleys。　　I　continued　to　ride　down　our　line；　and　soon　heard；　in　quick　succession；　the　three　volleys。　　The　next　division　in　order　was　Geary's；　and　I　gave　him　similar　orders。　　General　Polk；　in　my　opinion；　was　killed　by　the　second　volley　fired　from　the　first　battery　referred　to。
  In　a　conversation　with　General　Johnston；　after　the　war；　he　explained　that　on　that　day　he　had　ridden　in　person　from　Marietta　to　Pine　Mountain；　held　by　Bates's　division；　and　was　accompanied　by　Generals　Hardee　and　Polk。　　When　on　Pine　Mountain；　reconnoitring；　quite　a　group　of　soldiers；　belonging　to　the　battery　close　by；　clustered　about　him。　　He　noticed　the　preparations　of　our　battery　to　fire；　and　cautioned　these　men　to　scatter。　　They　did　so；　and　he　likewise　hurried　behind　the　parapet；　from　which　he　had　an　equally　good　view　of　our　position　but　General　Polk；　who　was　dignified　and　corpulent；　walked　back　slowly；　not　wishing　to　appear　too　hurried　or　cautious　in　the　presence　of　the　men；　and　was　struck　across　the　breast　by　an　unexploded　shell；　which　killed　him　instantly。　　This　is　my　memory　of　the　conversation；　and　it　is　confirmed　by　Johnston　himself　in　his　〃Narrative；〃　page　337；　except　that　he　calculated　the　distance　of　our　battery　at　six　hundred　yards；　and　says　that　Polk　was　killed　by　the　third　shot；　I　know　that　our　guns　fired　by　volley；　and　believe　that　he　was　hit　by　a　shot　of　the　second　volley。　　It　has　been　asserted　that　I　fired　t