equal　footing；　and　gave　to　each　the　same　control；　so　far　as　orders　of　transportation　for　men　and　stores　were　concerned。　　Thomas's　spies　brought　him　frequent　and　accurate　reports　of　Jos。　E。　Johnston's　army　at　Dalton；　giving　its　strength　anywhere　between　forty　and　fifty　thousand　men；　and　these　were　being　reenforced　by　troops　from　Mississippi；　and　by　the　Georgia　militia；　under　General　G。　W。　Smith。　　General　Johnston　seemed　to　be　acting　purely　on　the　defensive；　so　that　we　had　time　and　leisure　to　take　all　our　measures　deliberately　and　fully。　　I　fixed　the　date　of　May　1st；　when　all　things　should　be　in　readiness　for　the　grand　forward　movement；　and　then　returned　to　Nashville；　General　Schofield　going　back　to　Knoxville；　and　McPherson　to　Huntsville；　Thomas　remaining　at　Chattanooga。
  On　the　2d　of　April；　at　Nashville；　I　wrote　to　General　Grant；　then　at　Washington；　reporting　to　him　the　results　of　my　visit　to　the　several　armies；　and　asked　his　consent　to　the　several　changes　proposed；　which　was　promptly　given　by　telegraph。　　I　then　addressed　myself　specially　to　the　troublesome　question　of　transportation　and　supplies。　　I　found　the　capacity　of　the　railroads　from　Nashville　forward　to　Decatur；　and　to　Chattanooga；　so　small；　especially　in　the　number　of　locomotives　and　care；　that　it　was　clear　that　they　were　barely　able　to　supply　the　daily　wants　of　the　armies　then　dependent　on　them；　with　no　power　of　accumulating　a　surplus　in　advance。　　The　cars　were　daily　loaded　down　with　men　returning　from　furlough；　with　cattle；　horses；　etc。；　and；　by　reason　of　the　previous　desolation　of　the　country　between　Chattanooga　and　Knoxville；　General　Thomas　had　authorized　the　issue　of　provisions　to　the　suffering　inhabitants。
  We　could　not　attempt　an　advance　into　Georgia　without　food；　ammunition；　etc。；　and　ordinary　prudence　dictated　that　we　should　have　an　accumulation　at　the　front；　in　case　of　interruption　to　the　railway　by　the　act　of　the　enemy；　or　by　common　accident。　Accordingly；　on　the　6th　of　April；　I　issued　a　general　order；　limiting　the　use　of　the　railroad…cars　to　transporting　only　the　essential　articles　of　food；　ammunition；　and　supplies　for　the　army　proper；　forbidding　any　further　issues　to　citizens；　and　cutting　off　all　civil　traffic；　requiring　the　commanders　of　posts　within　thirty　miles　of　Nashville　to　haul　out　their　own　stores　in　wagons；　requiring　all　troops　destined　for　the　front　to　march；　and　all　beef…　cattle　to　be　driven　on　their　own　legs。　　This　was　a　great　help；　but　of　course　it　naturally　raised　a　howl。　　Some　of　the　poor　Union　people　of　East　Tennessee　appealed　to　President　Lincoln；　whose　kind　heart　responded　promptly　to　their　requeSt。　He　telegraphed　me　to　know　if　I　could　not　modify　or　repeal　my　orders；　but　I　answered　him　that　a　great　campaign　was　impending；　on　which　the　fate　of　the　nation　hung；　that　our　railroads　had　but　a　limited　capacity；　and　could　not　provide　for　the　necessities　of　the　army　and　of　the　people　too；　that　one　or　the　other　must　quit；　and　we　could　not　until　the　army　of　Jos。　Johnston　was　conquered；　etc。；　etc。　　Mr。　Lincoln　seemed　to　acquiesce；　and　I　advised　the　people　to　obtain　and　drive　out　cattle　from　Kentucky；　and　to　haul　out　their　supplies　by　the　wagon…　road　from　the　same　quarter；　by　way　of　Cumberland　Gap。　　By　these　changes　we　nearly　or　quite　doubled　our　daily　accumulation　of　stores　at　the　front；　and　yet　even　this　was　not　found　enough。
  I　accordingly　called　together　in　Nashville　the　master　of　transportation；　Colonel　Anderson；　the　chief　quartermaster；　General　J。　L。　Donaldson；　and　the　chief　commissary；　General　Amos　Beckwith；　for　conference。　　I　assumed　the　strength　of　the　army　to　move　from　Chattanooga　into　Georgia　at　one　hundred　thousand　men；　and　the　number　of　animals　to　be　fed；　both　for　cavalry　and　draught；　at　thirty…five　thousand；　then；　allowing　for　occasional　wrecks　of　trains；　which　were　very　common；　and　for　the　interruption　of　the　road　itself　by　guerrillas　and　regular　raids；　we　estimated　it　would　require　one　hundred　and　thirty　cars；　of　ten　tons　each；　to　reach　Chattanooga　daily；　to　be　reasonably　certain　of　an　adequate　supply。　Even　with　this　calculation；　we　could　not　afford　to　bring　forward　hay　for　the　horses　and　mules；　nor　more　than　five　pounds　of　oats　or　corn　per　day　for　each　animal。　　I　was　willing　to　risk　the　question　of　forage　in　part；　because　I　expected　to　find　wheat　and　corn　fields；　and　a　good　deal　of　grass；　as　we　advanced　into　Georgia　at　that　season　of　the　year。　　The　problem　then　was　to　deliver　at　Chattanooga　and　beyond　one　hundred　and　thirty　car…loads　daily；　leaving　the　beef…cattle　to　be　driven　on　the　hoof；　and　all　the　troops　in　excess　of　the　usual　train…guards　to　march　by　the　ordinary　roads。　　Colonel　Anderson　promptly　explained　that　he　did　not　possess　cars　or　locomotives　enough　to　do　this　work。　　I　then　instructed　and　authorized　him　to　hold　on　to　all　trains　that　arrived　at　Nashville　from　Louisville；　and　to　allow　none　to　go　back　until　he　had　secured　enough　to　fill　the　requirements　of　our　problem。　　At　the　time　he　only　had　about　sixty　serviceable　locomotives；　and　about　six　hundred　cars　of　all　kinds；　and　he　represented　that　to　provide　for　all　contingencies　he　must　have　at　least　one　hundred　locomotives　and　one　thousand　cars。　　As　soon　as　Mr。　Guthrie；　the　President　of　the　Louisville　&　Nashville　Railroad；　detected　that　we　were　holding　on　to　all　his　locomotives　and　cars；　he　wrote　me；　earnestly　remonstrating　against　it；　saying　that　he　would　not　be　able　with　diminished　stock　to　bring　forward　the　necessary　stores　from　Louisville　to　Nashville。　　I　wrote　to　him；　frankly　telling　him　exactly　how　we　were　placed；　appealed　to　his　patriotism　to　stand　by　us；　and　advised　him　in　like　manner　to　hold　on　to　all　trains　coming　into　Jeffersonville；　Indiana。　　He　and　General　Robert　Allen；　then　quartermaster…general　at　Louisville；　arranged　a　ferry…boat　so　as　to　transfer　the　trains　over　the　Ohio　River　from　Jeffersonville；　and　in　a　short　time　we　had　cars　and　locomotives　from　almost　every　road　at　the　North；　months　afterward　I　was　amused　to　see；　away　down　in　Georgia；　cars　marked　〃Pittsburg　&　Fort　Wayne；〃　〃Delaware　&　Lackawanna；〃　〃Baltimore　&　Ohio；〃　and　indeed　with　the　names　of　almost　every　railroad　north　of　the　Ohio　River。　　How　these　railroad　companies　ever　recovered　their　property；　or　settled　their　transportation　accounts；　I　have　never　heard；　but　to　this　fact；　as　much　as　to　any　other　single　fact；　I　attribute　the　perfect　success　which　afterward　attended　our　campaigns；　and　I　have　always　felt　grateful　to　Mr。　Guthrie；　of　Louisville；　who　had　sense　enough　and　patriotism　enough　to　subordinate　the　interests　of　his　railroad　company　to　the　cause　of　his　country。
  About　this　time；　viz。；　the　early　part　of　April；　I　was　much　disturbed　by　a　bold　raid　made　by　the　rebel　General　Forrest　up　between　the　Mississippi　and　Tennessee　Rivers。　　He　reached　the　Ohio　River　at　Paducah；　but　was　handsomely　repulsed　by　Colonel　Hicks。　　He　then　swung　down　toward　Memphis；　assaulted　and　carried　Fort　Pillow；　massacring　a　part　of　its　garrison；　composed　wholly　of　negro　troops。　At　first　I　discredited　the　story　of　the　massacre；　because；　in　preparing　for　the　Meridian　campaign；　I　had　ordered　Fort　Pillow　to　be　evacuated；　but　it　transpired　afterward　that　General　Hurlbut　had　retained　a　small　garrison　at　Fort　Pillow　to　encourage　the　enlistment　of　the　blacks　as　soldiers；　which　was　a　favorite　political　policy　at　that　day。　　The　massacre　at　Fort　Pillow　occurred　April　12；　1864；　and　has　been　the　subject　of　congressional　inquiry。　No　doubt　Forrest's　men　acted　like　a　set　of　barbarians；　shooting　down　the　helpless　negro　garrison　after　the　fort　was　in　their　possession；　but　I　am　told　that　Forrest　personally　disclaims　any　active　participation　in　the　assault；　and　that　he　stopped　the　firing　as　soon　as　he　could。　　I　also　take　it　for　granted　that　Forrest　did　not　lead　the　assault　in　person；　and　consequently　that　he　was　to　the　rear；　out　of　sight　if　not　of　hearing　at　the　time；　and　I　was　told　by　hundreds　of　our　men；　who　were　at　various　times　prisoners　in　Forrest's　possession；　that　he　was　usually　very　kind　to　them。　　He　had　a　desperate　set　of　fellows　under　him；　and　at　that　very　time　there　is　no　doubt　the　feeling　of　the　Southern　people　was　fearfully　savage　on　this　very　point　of　our　making　soldiers　out　of　their　late　slaves；　and　Forrest　may　have　shared　the　feeling。
  I　also　had　another　serious　cause　of　disturbance　about　that　time。　　I　wanted　badly　the　two　divisions　of　troops　which　had　been　loaned　to　General　Banks　in　the　month　of　March　previously；　with　the　express　understanding　that　their　absence　was　to　endure　only　one　month；　and　that　during　April　they　were　to　come　out　of　Red　River；　and　be　again　within　the　sphere　of　my　command。　　I　accordingly　instructed　one　of　my　inspector…generals；　John　M。　　Corse；　to　take　a　fleet　steamboat　at　Nashville；　proceed　via　Cairo；　Memphis；　and　Vicksburg；　to　General　Banks　up　the　Red　River；　and　to　deliver　the　following　letter　of　April　3d；　as　also　others；　of　like　tenor；　to　Generals　A。　J。　Smith　and　Fred　Steele；　who　were　supposed　to　be　with　him：
  HEADQUARTERS　MILITARY　DIVISION　OF　THE　MISSISSIPPI　NASHVILLE；　TENNESSEE；　April　3；　1864
  Major…General　N。　P。　BANKS；　commanding　Department　of　the　Gulf；　Red　River。
  GENERAL：　The　thirty　days　for　which　I　loaned　you　the　command　of　General　A。　J。　Smith　will　expire　on　the　10th　instant。　　I　send　with　this　Bri